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Ports play a critical role in transportation infrastructure, but are vulnerable to 
seismic hazards.  Downtime and reduced throughput from seismic damage in ports results 
in significant business interruption losses for port stakeholders.  Current risk management 
practices only focus on the effect of seismic hazards on individual port 
structures.  However, damage and downtime of these structures has a significant impact 
on the overall port system’s ship handling operations and the regional, national, and even 
international economic impacts that result from extended earthquake-induced disruption 
of a major container port.  Managing risks from system-wide disruptions resulting from 
earthquake damage has been studied as a central element of a Grand Challenge project 
sponsored by the National Science Foundation Network for Earthquake Engineering 
Simulation (NEES) program.  The following thesis presents the concepts and methods 
developed for the seismic risk management of a port-wide system of berths.  In particular 
the thesis discusses the framework used to calculated port losses: the use of spatially 
correlated ground motion intensity measures to estimate damage to pile-supported 
marginal wharves and container cranes of various configurations via fragility 
relationships developed by project team members, repair costs and downtimes 
subsequently determined via repair models for both types of structures, and the impact on 
cargo handling operations calculated via logistical models of the port system. Results are 
expressed in the form of loss exceedance curves than include both repair/replacement 
costs and business interruption losses.  The thesis also discusses how the results from 
such an analysis might be used by port decision makers to make more informed decisions 





1.1  Motivation 
Seaports are an integral part of the current world infrastructure.  Global trade has 
consistently increased in the past (see Figure 1.1) and once the economy fully rebounds, 
it should continue to increase.   
 
Figure 1.1 Container traffic in US ports (from AAPA data) 
The global economy depends on ports as critical nodes to load and unload cargo.  
However, many ports around the world and in the US are located in areas with a 
significant seismic hazard.  Figure 1.2 maps the 10 largest container ports in the US on 
top of the US Geological Survey (USGS) seismic hazard map: of the ten largest ports, six 
of them lie in areas with significant seismic hazard.   

























Figure 1.2 The largest container ports in the US on the USGS seismic hazard map 
 
Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to ports and the seismic hazards that 
threaten to disrupt them.  History has shown through the Port of Kobe in Japan, at Port-
Au-Prince in Haiti, and the 2011 Japanese earthquake/tsunami that the possibility of 
earthquake damage should be an important consideration in a port system.  In 1995 after 
the Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake, the Port of Kobe suffered extensive liquefaction, 
wharf, and crane damage.  The direct losses associated with replacing damaged facilities 
amounted to approximately $5.5 billion dollars.  However, the indirect losses from 
business interruptions, although much harder to quantify, were likely greater.  Chang 
(2000) noted, “Once shippers were forced to invest in setting up operations elsewhere 
while Kobe was repairing its earthquake damage, they seemed in many cases not to have 
returned.”  The overall impact of the earthquake demoted what was once the 6th largest 
container port in the world to the 55th largest port in 2007 (AAPA 2009), 12 years after 
the earthquake.  
Japan’s economy was severely disrupted again in 2011.  After the earthquake and 
tsunami, the Port of Tokyo took five days to recover operationally, and the ports north of 
Tokyo took significantly longer as many were closed or disabled for weeks and even 
months (Reuters 2011).  It was estimated that the earthquake affected the ports that 
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handled approximately 7% of Japan’s industrial exports, and the country lost $3.4 billion 
US dollars a day in lost seaborne trade (Reuters 2011).   Japan is an excellent case study 
on the effects of business interruption.  It is very evident that business interruption losses 
have a lasting effect on both the economy and the port itself, so it would behoove current 
ports in seismically active areas to attempt to prevent fates similar to the ports in Japan.   
Earthquake mitigation and planning should be considered to prevent business 
interruption losses, but also for emergency preparedness. The main port in Port-au-Prince 
Haiti was greatly affected by the January 2010 earthquake that killed hundreds of 
thousands of people (Werner et al, 2011).  Approximately 50% of the port was destroyed 
including the main container terminal (BBC News 2010).  The US Navy worked to repair 
the terminal and it reopened on a limited basis after nine days (CNN News 2010).  
However, the port’s only container crane was partially submerged in water (Figure 1.3) 
and could not be used for unloading.  Crews were forced to ferry supplies to the port and 
it only operated at a pre-earthquake capacity of 10% (BBC News 2010).  Most of the aid 
sent by foreign countries had to be flown in through the Haitian airport, which was 
immediately overwhelmed.  Many foreign aid agencies resulted to shipping goods in 
through the ports and airport in the Dominican Republic and then trucking the aid to Haiti 
(Taylor 2010).  After six months, the crane remained submerged, and two floating barges 
had replaced the main pier, which still could not operate at pre-earthquake levels 
(Associated Press 2010).  To date, the port has still not fully recovered.  Therefore, it is 
important to investigate the effects of earthquakes not only on the physical structures but 




Figure 1.3 Partially submerged container crane at the Port-au-Prince Port (photo courtesy 
of (Riddle 2010)) 
One of the main problems with the current treatment of seismic risk in ports is 
that currently ports do not explicitly account for seismic disruption.  While engineers 
design individual components to withstand certain earthquake loads, little thought has 
been put into the sustainability of the port system.  This could be remedied through 
probabilistic risk assessment, which would examine the vulnerabilities of the port 
components and of the port system, allowing port sustainability issues to be addressed.  
However, probabilistic risk assessment to date has mostly only been conducted on 
individual structures (buildings / bridges) or highway systems.  Container ports are 
combination of networked individual components working together within a more 
complex system.  Therefore, several features must be factored into the risk assessment of 
a port.  Globally, a port is a place where cargo is transferred to and from container ships. 
Ships call at terminals composed of one or more berths consisting of a pile-supported 
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wharf structure and one or more container cranes for loading and unloading containers 
(Figure 1.4). Each berth contains several components whose response to earthquake 
ground motions must be included in a seismic risk assessment: 
1.) Crane Response 
2.) Wharf Response 
3.) Soil-Structure Interaction 
4.) Possibility of Liquefaction within Backfill 
 
 
Figure 1.4 - Hypothetical Berth 
 
Another of the main problems with current treatment of seismic risk in ports is 
that the earthquake design that is applied to the wharves, the cranes, and to some extent 
the backfill, have performance requirements that are associated with arbitrary return 
periods for ground motions rather than potential losses (Port of Los Angeles 2007).  By 
ignoring the performance metrics valuable to port stakeholders, they lack the tools to 
make informed decisions concerning seismic risks given that potential direct and indirect 
losses are not explicitly considered.  Perhaps this lack of knowledge has prevented some 
of the seismic improvements that could have been made to prevent earthquake disruption.  
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The seismic risk assessment of the port system proposed in the scope of this work would 
not only look at the port as a system, but also allow for the evaluation of performance 
based on metrics valuable to the stakeholders within the port; resulting in solution to the 
two issues that are lacking when dealing with the current seismic risk treatment in ports. 
 
1.2 Objectives and Scope 
This research is encompassed within a NEES Grand Challenge project on Seismic Risk 
Management for Port Systems.  The project integrates the work of many researchers 
across the country to predict earthquake effects at a port system.  Specifically, the project 
attempts to model the response of several port components / subcomponents (soil 
backfill, soil-structure interaction, wharf, pile connections, and cranes), and then use 
those component responses to model the port operations post-earthquake.  Other 
researchers have completed much of the physical and computer modeling of the port 
components and port operations.  This research aims to connect all the completed 
research and model the overall port.  The objective will be to integrate both the 
components and operations into a seismic risk management framework that will focus on 
the performance and resilience of the port as a system. Under this focus, port stakeholders 
will be able to obtain port performance metrics that are more meaningful to them; 
therefore, they will be able to manage seismic risk more effectively, and plan for business 
continuity.  
Research tasks within this scope include: 
• Use a seismic risk analysis framework to calculate the monetary losses at a port 




• Develop a list of earthquakes with which to apply to the seismic risk framework, 
and examine the validity of the earthquake list. 
• Integrate previously completed port component modeling into the seismic risk 
framework. 
• Consider estimated repair requirements for various damage states of port 
components, and how downtime during repair periods affect wharf cargo-
handling operations and throughput. 
• Integrate previously completed operational modeling into the seismic risk 
framework. 
• Examine the risk analysis results for a baseline port configuration, and also 
several mitigated port configurations. 
• Illustrate the use of the risk analysis framework in various economic analysis 
applications. 
1.3 Dissertation Outline 
The content of the dissertation has been organized into the following chapters: 
• Chapter 2 provides an overview of the historical examples of seismic port 
damage, as well as a review of current seismic design guidelines, an overview of 
the previous research conducted on risk analysis in ports, and a discussion of the 
gaps in knowledge.  
• Chapter 3 overviews the methodology of the proposed risk assessment 
framework and suggests methods to use for the treatment of seismic hazard, 
component modeling and fragility, and system modeling and fragility for a 
hypothetical port system located in Santa Cruz, California.  
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• Chapter 4 examines the results of the seismic risk framework as applied to a 
baseline configuration of a probabilistic, scenario-based, and intensity-based 
earthquake scenario of the hypothetical port.  Responses of wharves, cranes, and 
the operational system to a sample of probabilistic earthquake events are studied 
to ascertain the validity of the risk analysis framework, loss exceedance curves 
are calculated and their uses discussed, and the sources of uncertainty within the 
risk framework are isolated and examined. 
• Chapter 5 examines the seismic risk framework results of various mitigated 
configurations of the hypothetical port, and provides direct and economic analysis 
comparisons of such to the baseline configuration examined in Chapter 4.   
• Chapter 6 provides a discussion of how the risk analysis framework can be 
applied to existing ports. 
• Chapter 7 summarizes the research while drawing conclusions, discusses the 






2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Historical Examples of Earthquake Damage in Ports  
2.1.1 Historical Earthquake Occurrences in Ports 
Damage to port systems from earthquakes is not an emerging problem.  Seismic 
port damage has been documented as far back as 1923.  Examining previous port damage 
provides valuable insight into ways in which port damage can be reduced during future 
earthquakes (Werner 1998).   A complete list of earthquake damage to port structures 
during the years 1923-1995 can be found in the TCLEE monograph: Seismic Guidelines 
for Ports. The following table (Table 2.1) highlights some of the previously record 
earthquakes at port and the resulting damage from the TCLEE monograph in addition to 
some more recent data: 
Table 2.1 Examples of Earthquake-Induced Damage to Port Facilities 
EQ 
Location 
Date Mag. Port Damage Reference 
Kanto, 
Japan 9/1/23 8.3 (Mw) Yokohama 
Sliding, tilting and collapse of concrete 
block quay walls, buckling of pile supports 




WA 4/13/49 7.1 (Ms) Seattle 
Damage to dock structures caused among 
other things by vertical displacements, 
displacements of filled soil materials 
(Werner 
1998) 
Alaska 3/27/64 9.2 (Mw) 
(1) Anchorage 
 (2) Valdez 
(3) Whittier 
(4) Seward 
(1) Extensive damage to pile supports, (2) 
Port destroyed by a landslide, (3) buckling, 
bending, twisting of steel pile supported 









Ports experienced damage to batter piles due 
to lateral displacement and settlement, 
container cranes were damaged, liquefaction 







1/17/95 6.8 (Ms) Kobe 
Extensive liquefaction of fills, seaward 
displacement of quay walls, vertical 
displacement, de-railing, overturning, and 
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2.1.2 Common Modes of Damage 
Numerous components within a port system are susceptible to earthquake 
damage.  The most common types of damage considered apply to the wharf structures, 
but cranes, embankments, and utility and transportation lifelines are also commonly 
considered within the scope of earthquake-induced damage. The following sections 
outline some of the damage modes common to typical port components. 
 
2.1.2.1  Wharves 
Damage to wharf components is perhaps the damage most prominent cause of the 
interruption of port operations.  Some common port wharf structures and their failure 
modes include:  
 
Gravity Quay Walls – A gravity quay wall consists of a caisson or other rigid wall 
placed on the seabed.  Stability of the wall is maintained through the friction at its base.  
Typical failure modes for quay walls during earthquakes involve seaward displacement, 
settlement, and tilt.  Figure 2.1 shows an example of two typical failure modes.  It should 
be noted that failure mode b was commonly seen for quay walls at the Port of Kobe 




Figure 2.1 Deformation/failure modes of gravity quay walls (from (PIANC 2001)) 
Anchored Sheet Pile Walls – Anchored sheet pile walls are composed of a wall of sheet 
piles that are held in place by tie-rods and anchors.  Failure modes of anchor walls are 
dependent upon the geometry of the wall as well as the composition of the soil backfill.  
Lateral displacement within loose sandy soil deposits (Figure 2.2) can affect the anchor 





Figure 2.2 Typical modes of failure for anchored sheet piles (from (PIANC 2001)) 
Pile-Supported Marginal Wharves – Pile-supported marginal wharves consist of a deck 
supported by multiple piles embedded into a sloped embankment.  Common 
deformations/ failure modes for this type of wharf (Figure 2.3) involve the inertial force 
of the deck (a), a horizontal force from the retaining wall in the backfill (b), and the 
lateral displacement of loose subsoil (c).  In addition, significant deformations within the 
wharf deck connections are also a common failure mode (Werner, 1998).  It should be 








2.1.2.2  Cranes 
One of the most common modes of rail supported crane damage is the derailment 
of the crane through tipping.  Generally, in this case, no serious damage occurs, and the 
crane can once again be operational within a matter of days (Kosbab et al. 2009).  Other 
modes of failure include detachment or pull-out of vehicle, rupture of clamps and 
anchors, buckling, and overturning (PIANC 2001).  Figure 2.4 illustrates some of these 
deformation modes: 
 
Figure 2.4 – Crane Deformation Modes: a.) Widening between Legs, b.) Narrowing 
between Legs due to Rocking, c.) Tilting of Crane from Differential Settlement, and d.) 





Lateral displacements, settling, embankment failures, and lateral spreading due to 
liquefaction are the main failure modes within wharf embankments.  Shifting of the 
embankment itself often initiates a failure or deformation in one or more of the other port 
components.  The photos below show some of the aforementioned failure modes in port 





Figure 2.5 – a.) Lateral Spreading: Port de Port-Au-Prince (Photo by (Rix, 2010)) and b.) 
Crane Settlement: 1985 Chile Earthquake (from (Werner 1998)) 




Damage to utility and transportation lifelines impacts the post-earthquake repair 
and restoration efforts.  Possible failure modes include the shearing or rupturing of 
pipelines carrying gas, water, or wastewater, the loss of power due to damaged power 
lines, or any damage to roadways or bridges used for port access. The Port of Kobe offers 
an excellent example of how lifeline damage affects the port.  After the earthquake the 
Port of Kobe lost power which in turn caused the loss of the entire contents of every 
refrigerated warehouse, water lines ruptured and the service to Port Island was out for 30 
days, and many of the roadways and bridges into and around the Port of Kobe were 
damaged and could not be used immediately (Werner 1998).  In fact, repairs to the 
roadways and bridges continued to restrict cargo throughput even after many of the 
berths became operational again.   Figure 2.6 shows one main roadway under repair 7 
months after the Kobe earthquake whose repairs restricted the flow of cargo to and from 


















2.2 Review of Current Design Guidelines  
2.2.1 PIANC 
In 2001 the International Navigation Association (PIANC) introduced a set of 
international guidelines for seismic design.  The guidelines examined port systems, both 
large and small, across the globe and identified two levels of earthquake motions at 
which designs will be calculated: 
Level 1 (L1) – level of earthquake motions likely to occur during the life-span of 
a structure. 
Level 2 (L2) – the level of earthquake motions associated with infrequent rare 
events 
Acceptable levels of damage from each of these design motions are specified by 
the users/owners of the facility under one of the following degrees of Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Acceptable level of damage in PIANC performance-based design (from 
(PIANC 2001)) 
 
Performance of the actual structure is then defined by a performance grade S, A, 
B, or C according an acceptable level of damage defined at each of the levels of 
earthquake motions (Table 2.3): 
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Table 2.3 – Performance grades S, A, B, and C (from (PIANC 2001)) 
 
 
Performance grades for structures are chosen either by the operator/user or based 
on the importance of the structure.  The seismic performance of that structure is then 
evaluated by comparing a response parameter calculated from simplified, simplified-
dynamic or dynamic analyses with the response parameter of the damage criteria 
specified for the selected performance grade.  If the results of the analysis do not meet the 
damage criteria, this indicates that the proposed design or existing structure analyzed 
should be modified. 
The PIANC guidelines suggest that the chosen method for analysis be appropriate 
to the performance grade chosen.  For example, if a structure is to be examined at 
performance grade S, it will require a more sophisticated model.  Table 2.4 shows the 
type of analysis most appropriate for each performance grade:   





2.2.2 Port of Los Angeles Code 
The design considerations for the Port of Los Angeles (POLA), which were based 
on the Marine Oil Terminal Engineering and Maintenance Standards (MOTEMS) seismic 
design guidelines for marine oil terminals, establishes minimum wharf and crane design 
criteria that is meant to protect public safety in the event of rare intense ground shaking, 
and also aims to reduce the risk of economic losses through the implementation of 
performance criteria for structures in the event of moderate and large ground motions.  
Many of the existing wharves at POLA are pile-supported marginal wharves and the 
structural system analyzed within the code is based on a strong beam (deck), weak 
column (piles) frame concept.   The following is some general criteria assumed in the 
analysis of the port structures based on the current POLA designs (Port of Los Angeles 
2007): 
1.) Structural System - for the structural system expects that the wharf shall be 
designed as a ductile moment-resisting frame consisting of a reinforced 
concrete deck supported by vertical piles.  All elements of the deck shall be 
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capacity-protected to resist loading from piles, and the expansion joints will 
provide accommodation of thermal expansion. 
2.) Piles – Uncoupled inertial and kinematic loading of piles shall be 
considered.  Seismic piles are expected to have fully ductile performances 
with special pile-deck connection detailing.  Secondary seismic piles do not 
need to be fully ductile, and have less stringent detailing of pile-deck 
connections.  Battered piles shall not be used for the design of new wharves 
or for the replacement of damaged wharves.  Any steel pipe piles should 
meet local buckling requirements in accordance with the applicable 
standards.  
3.) Concrete Cover – A 3 in. (minimum) concrete cover should be placed on 
wharf beams, slabs, piles, and all concrete placed against the soil, except for 
headed reinforcing bars such as pile dowels or shear stirrups.  Here the 
cover can be reduced to 2.5 in. (at the top surface only). 
4.) Crane Rails – Crane rails should be connected to beams by supported 
vertical piles, and should be connected horizontally by a continuous wharf 
deck, struts, or other means that controls the gauge of the rails. 
5.) Embankment – The embankment beneath the wharf should be protected 
from erosion by riprap in order to prevent the migration of fines along the 
back of the wharf. 
6.) Utilities and Pipelines – Flexible connections should be provided where 
utilities span joints, individual wharf units, or places where they span rigid 
and non-rigid structures.  Ground surface rupture will be addressed by 
providing increased flexibility of utility connections that pass from the 





The code uses a performance-based design approach for the design of new 
marginal container wharves and the evaluation of the existing container wharves.  Design 
is based on the performance of the wharves and cranes at each of the following three 
ground motions: 
1.) Operating level earthquake (OLE) – This earthquake has a 50% probability 
of exceedance in 50 years or a 72-year return period and it is expected that 
any forces and deformations of the structures or permanent embankment 
deformations of the wharf should not result in significant structural damage.  
If repairs need to be made they are expected to be visible and accessible and 
should not interrupt wharf operations.  OLE forces and deformations should 
not result in any structural, electrical, or mechanical crane damage.  If 
derailment occurs it should be repaired in a reasonable amount of time (Port 
of Los Angeles 2007). 
2.) Contingency Level Earthquake (CLE) - This earthquake has a 10% 
probability of exceedance in 50 years or a 475-year return period.  For this 
level earthquake it is expected that any forces and deformations of the wharf 
or permanent embankment deformations result in controlled inelastic 
structural behavior and limited permanent deformations.  Temporary loss of 
operations is expected but should be restored within an acceptable amount 
of time.  No design requirements exist for the cranes at this design level 
(Port of Los Angeles 2007). 
3.) Ultimate Level Earthquake (ULE) – this earthquake is defined in accordance 
with the ASCE/SEI 7-05 Standard.  This level earthquake is considered the 
largest designed for by the port.  After this level earthquake it is expected 
that neither the wharf nor cranes collapse and that the wharf would still be 




Structures within the port are analyzed for each ground motion and performance 
level to determine the displacement demand and capacity.  The majority of the code 
specifies the details of analyses conducted for the wharf structures.  Specifically, the code 
requires modeling of the following displacements: the torsional response of the structure, 
the interaction between adjacent wharf units at expansion joints, and the combination of 
simultaneous orthogonal excitations.  Possible analysis methods suggested by the code 
include: nonlinear static pushover analysis, modal response spectrum analysis, single 
mode transverse analysis, substitute structure analysis, and linear or nonlinear time-
history analysis (Port of Los Angeles 2007).   
In addition since permanent displacement of the embankment is a concern in 
ports, it is suggested that liquefaction potential, the static and pseudo-static slope 
stability, post-earthquake slope stability, potential for lateral spreading, potential for 
settlement of the embankment also be examined (Port of Los Angeles 2007).  Analyses 
should also consider the loads introduced to the wharf by the embankment by considering 
soil-structure interactions, the soil behavior under lateral pile loading, and the effect of 
earth pressures. 
2.2.3 American Society of Civil Engineers 
As of January 2012, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Standard 
for the Seismic Design of Port Systems has not been officially published.  However, the 
release of this document will mark the newest standards in port design in the US.  
Therefore, the design practices specified within the ASCE Standard will be covered 
within this document.   
The ASCE standard for the seismic design of ports focuses mainly on the function 
and design of piers and wharves supported on concrete or steel piles, but also presents 
design requirements for “ancillary components” (pipelines, container cranes, marine 
loading arms, etc.) Design requirements are based on performance requirements of three 
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earthquake levels: Operating Level Earthquake (OLE), Contingency Level Earthquake 
(CLE), and Design Earthquake (DE) at three different design classifications (high, 
moderate and low).  Structures are given a particular design classification based on 
importance.  High structures would be essential to the region’s economy or post-event 
recovery, and require a level of safety beyond life-safety protection, moderate structures 
are considered of secondary importance to the regional economy and no essential to post-
event recovery, but still require life-safety protection, and low structures include all 
remaining structures (ASCE 2011).  The probability of exceedance and minimum 
performance requirement of each combination of earthquake level and design 
classification are located in Table 2.5: 




The structural responses considered in Table 2.5 fall under one of three 
performance levels: minimal damage, controlled and repairable damage, or life-safety 
protection.  Minimal damage is defined by when a structure exhibits near-elastic 
structural response and only minor or no residual deformation, serviceability of the 
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structure should be continued, and all materials remain contained in a manner that poses 
no threat to public safety.  Controlled and repairable damage is defined by a structural 
response in a controlled and ductile manner with limited inelastic deformations at 
locations where repair is possible.  Repairs that are necessary result in a serviceability 
loss less than “several months”, and again, all materials remain contained in a manner 
that poses no threat to public safety.  Life-safety protection is the highest performance-
level considered in the standard.  Post-earthquake a life-safety protected structure should 
continue to support gravity loads, any damage occurring should not prevent egress, and 
materials should still be contained in a manner that does not pose a public hazard (ASCE 
2011).  If structures perform in the manner set forth in the previous descriptions for their 
specified design levels, they meet the design code for the ASCE Standard. 
 These design codes are tested by considering the following seismic hazards in the 
modeling of the wharf and ancillary components: inertial loads due to ground shaking, 
ground deformations associated with liquefaction and cyclic deformation of weak soils, 
kinematic loading due to ground deformations adjacent to piles and fault rupture effects 
(ASCE 2011).  The following sections will discuss the seismic hazards considered and 
their use in the ASCE Standard’s consideration of geotechnical hazards, the force-based 
and displacement-based structural design models considered, and the ASCE Standard’s 
consideration of ancillary components, namely cranes. 
2.2.3.1  Geotechnical Hazards 
Liquefaction potential should be evaluated for predominantly sandy soils and non-
plastic silts using current standards of practice (Martin and Lew 1999; Youd et al. 2001; 
California State Land Commission 2010) .  Liquefaction hazards warrant the evaluation 
of the following failure modes: flow slides of native soils or hydraulically placed fill, 
ground failures involving containment dikes, embankments, and slopes supporting 
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wharves and piers, lateral spreading of dike/embankment/slope, and post liquefaction 
settlement of the dike/embankment/slope and underlying foundation soils (ASCE 2011).   
Sensitive fine-grained soils have also demonstrated a mobilization in large strains 
and a resulting loss of stiffness and strength (and ground deformations) when subject to 
moderate cyclic loading (ASCE 2011).  Screening tools have been developed to identify 
fine-grained soils susceptible to liquefaction and/or large-strain development and ASCE 
recommends using the following references to determine susceptibility: Seed et al. 
(2003), Andrews and Martin (2000), Bray and Sancio (2006) and Boulanger and Idriss 
(2006). 
In addition, it is also important to conduct soil-structure interaction evaluations to 
determine the lateral loads subjected to piles by any ground deformations.  Load 
conditions considered should include the inertial loading due to the wharf deck and other 
contributing masses under seismic conditions which produces maximum moments in the 
upper portion of the piles, and the kinematic loading associated with the influence of 
permanent ground deformation of the piles which imposes maximum moments in the 
lower portion of the piles (ASCE 2011).  
2.2.3.2  Force-based Analysis and Design 
One possible method of analysis and design uses the force-based analytical 
method for equivalent lateral force analysis taken from ASCE 7 (ASCE 2005) with only 
minor modifications.  However, the standard notes that this analysis will produce pier and 
wharf structures that are less economical than those designed using the displacement-
based methods, and that in general, marginal wharves are not well suited to force-based 
design due to the large eccentricity between the center of mass and center of rigidity or 
the piles in the elastic range (ASCE 2011).  If force-based analysis is used, the following 
must be considered/modeled: seismic base shear, seismic response coefficient, 
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fundamental structural period, pile stiffness, shear strength of concrete or pipe piles, 
confinement of prestressed piles, and overstrength shear force. 
2.2.3.3  Displacement-based Analysis and Design 
The displacement-based design approach is a more complicated approach than the 
force-based, but is commonly used in design codes of actual ports such as POLA and Port 
of Long Beach (POLB) (ASCE 2011).  The displacement analysis should be based on 
appropriate ground motions and the physical structures modeled should represent the 
spatial distribution of the mass and stiffness of the structure to an extent that is adequate 
for the calculation of the significant features of its dynamic response.  Dynamic responses 
typically modeled and model considerations include: moment curvature analysis, plastic 
rotation, plastic hinge length, in-ground plastic hinge length, plastic hinge length for pile-
to-deck connections, pile depth to fixity, seismic p-delta effects,  capacity analysis (non-
linear static pushover), and demand analysis (modal response spectrum and nonlinear 
static demand) (ASCE 2011).   
2.2.3.4  Ancillary Components (Cranes) 
While the ASCE Standard focuses on multiple ancillary components, this section 
will focus on standards pertaining to the cranes.  From past crane performance, ASCE 
recognizes that the larger, heavier and more stable modern container cranes are more 
susceptible to damage during earthquakes with the modern jumbo crane with a 100 ft or 
more gage length probably experiencing significant damage in the OLE and collapse in 
the CLE or DE.  The ASCE Standard requires that the ancillary structures to the pier and 
wharf (such as the cranes) be designed to that they will not collapse in the ASCE design 
earthquake (DE), which corresponds to a 2475-year mean recurrence interval (MRI) 
design earthquake (Soderburg et al. 2009) and that seismic performance requirements be 
included within the decision-making process when procuring new cranes (ASCE 2011). 
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2.2.4 Liftech Crane Guidelines 
Currently because the ASCE guidelines are not yet published, no standardized set 
of codes exists specifically for container cranes.  Historically, either consultants or the 
crane manufactures have been responsible for setting performance requirements within 
crane design.  Early container crane designs were small with lift heights of approximately 
25 m above the wharf and weighed about 600-800 metric tons (Soderburg et al. 2009).  
Seismic loading was not considered a significant design load because cranes would tip 
before they could become damaged.  However, modern jumbo cranes have grown in size 
with the increase of ship size (Kosbab 2010) .  These modern cranes range in lift height 
from 35 m - 42 m above the wharf and weigh anywhere from 1300-1800 tons.  These 
larger cranes require stiffer portal frames, have greater portal clearances, and are more 
stable, which results in larger lateral loads (Soderburg et al. 2009).  Therefore, the early 
seismic design criteria can not be applied to modern jumbo cranes. 
The new Liftech seismic design criterion specifies design requirements for a 72 
year (OLE) and 475 year (CLE) earthquake.  Design criteria for each earthquake include 
(Soderburg et al. 2009): 
Operating Level Earthquake – Design criteria requires elastic design stresses in 
the crane structure.  Any damage that may occur should be easily reparable. 
Contingency Level Earthquake – The design criteria for this level earthquake 
considers (1) Tipping – wherein the crane is designed to tip with stresses less than 
90% of the yield, and (2) Special moment frame – wherein the portal frame is 
designed to yield plastically.  If stresses exceed 80% of yield, the member should 
meet the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) seismic detailing 
requirements.  The performance criteria requires that collapse be prevented by 
specifically designing the crane to tip, designing the crane to be ductile (seismic 
loads are absorbed by ductile yielding), and designing the crane to be structurally 
isolated from the wharf (done through the introduction of an isolation joint). 
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2.3 Prior Studies in Risk Assessment 
As seen in the previous section, the current seismic codes involving ports are all 
based on arbitrarily selected ground motion probabilities rather than acceptable levels of 
cargo throughput resilience.  Any mention of throughput is vague and gives no real 
standard of acceptable losses from downtime.  The study discussed in the following 
section was the first to specifically address cargo throughput within its risk evaluation, 
and is the framework upon which the NEES Grand Challenge framework described in 
this dissertation is based. 
2.3.1 Werner and Taylor, 2004 
Perhaps the most ambitious seismic risk assessment of a port system to date was 
performed by Werner and Taylor (2004) for the Port of Oakland.  This project used 
seismic risk reduction planning consisting of acceptable-risk evaluations that could be 
used to guide the port’s selection of a level of seismic upgrade for each of the specific 
berths examined.  These upgrades would then be aggregated to achieve an overall level of 
system-wide seismic performance.  
Not every berth in the Port of Oakland was upgraded within this project.  Some of 
the berths were involved in the Wharf and Embankment Strengthening Program (WESP) 
and for those berths structural modifications were made to improve the strength of the 
wharves and to improve the seismic response.  The remaining berths were not 
strengthened but still evaluated in the seismic risk reduction planning (SRRP).  Figure 2.7 




Figure 2.7 Berths included in the Port of Oakland WESP Seismic Risk Reduction Project 
(Werner and Taylor 2004) 
 
2.3.1.1  Overview of acceptable risk approach 
The overall goal of this analysis was to obtain an amount of “acceptable” risk 
with in the port system.  Since it is not possible to reduce the seismic risk to zero with the 
application of some design or upgrade, an acceptable risk is achieved.  Acceptable risk 
can be defined by the point where the residual risks from earthquakes remain acceptable 
and  “beyond which the economic, regulatory, legal, etc. costs of further reducing these 
risks are unacceptable.”(Werner and Taylor 2004)  To obtain this risk, the approach 




Figure 2.8 Risk Assessment Approach for the Port of Oakland (Werner and Taylor 2004) 
 
Step 1 – Develop Port System and Component Data 
The first step in the risk assessment was to gather port system data and component 
data from the Port of Oakland.  Port system data was obtained from meetings with port 
financial and operations staff and consisted of data that detailed operation of the port 
system on a daily basis.  Component data was obtained from drawings and berth plans 
and pertained pertaining specifically to the geometry, material properties and seismic 
response characteristics of both the wharf structures and the embankments. 
 
Step 2 – Identify Permissible Seismic Risk Reduction Alternatives 
For this project, seismic upgrade options were developed by structural consultants 
for each of the WESP berths. The sets of berths within the port were built at different 
times in the port’s history and therefore had varying starting configurations and slightly 
different upgrade options.  Some berths did not need a seismic upgrade (26 and 30), were 
damaged in the Loma Prieta earthquake and subsequently upgraded (35-37), or 
performed well enough in the Loma Prieta earthquake to only require small changes.  For 
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these berths, risk reduction alternatives were not costly.  However, the alternatives for the 
other berths varied in seismic performance upgrades and ranged from $7.1 to $39.1 
million dollars.    
 
Step 3 - Perform Component Evaluations 
The response of each type of berth to seismic motion was evaluated through the 
use of vulnerability models.  These models, which are essentially fragility models, related 
berth repair costs and post-earthquake functionality to a range of seismic hazard levels.   
The first step in the vulnerability modeling was to define a range of combinations 
of ground shaking and permanent ground displacement demands that could occur at the 
site from potential regional earthquakes.  Ground-motion attenuation models estimated 
firm-site horizontal peak ground accelerations (PGAs) for 15 levels of ground shaking.  
These levels corresponded to the mean and mean ± one standard deviation for 
earthquakes with a moment magnitudes of 5.5, 6.2, 6.7, and 7.1 along the Hayward Fault, 
and Mw = 7.9 along the San Andreas Fault.  One set of firm-site PGAs was applied to the 
entire port for each earthquake.  To account for local soil conditions, one-dimensional, 
equivalent linear site response analyses with site-specific profiles were applied to 
corresponding firm-site ground motion time histories.  Furthermore, corresponding 
permanent ground displacements along the depths of the piles were found by using 
pseudo-static stability methods and Newmark-type displacement analyses, and/or the 
results of FLAC dynamic finite-difference analyses. 
The risk assessment for all the different berth configurations was conducted using 
ground motions from a walkthrough procedure (Taylor et al. 2001) that detailed the 
number, location, and magnitudes of earthquakes that occurred each year over a 10,000 
year period. This period was chosen in view of the large number of California 
earthquakes.  Furthermore, since the operational portion of the port system was to be 
examined over 10 year periods, the project would actually be modeling 1,000 samples of 
  
 32 
10-year random walks.  It was also believed that this period provided a reasonable basis 
for assessing the financial costs and risk patterns in step 4 for the many combinations of 
berth seismic upgrade options considered in this project.  For each year in the 
walkthrough table, the following were estimated:  
• The seismic hazards at the berth site  
• The damageability of each berth to these hazards, along with the 
corresponding repair cost 
Damageability of each berth was decided from a range of damage states based on 
the capacities of various berth components.  Once the lower limit of the limit capacity 
was reached, a specific damage state and associated repair model was applied.  When 
deciding between repair and replacement of damaged berth components, it was assumed 
that collapse (or at least 2 rows of broken piles) would require replacement, and less 
damage would result in repair.  Furthermore, it is assumed that normal resources of 
materials, contractor, and labor availability exist, and that contracts for evaluating, 
designing, and supervising repairs could be rapidly negotiated.  Repairs due to 
liquefaction-induced subsidence of the backfill except where it was a symptom of 
potential damage to the wharf itself, crane damage, electrical damage, and damage to 
mechanical equipment and connections were excluded from all repair scenarios.  Finally, 
repair/replacement costs and potential downtimes were estimated by structural engineers 
according to the damage states and the types of repairs that needed to be made. 
 
Step 4 – Perform System Evaluations 
For each year of the walkthrough table, the following system analysis properties 
were calculated: 
1.) Post-earthquake functionality of wharf and duration of repair 




3.) The economic losses from repair costs and interruption of shipping operations 
The main goal of step 4 was to determine the functionality of the berth and if it 
was not functional, for how long it would remain that way.  The functionality of the berth 
is determined by 1000-ft. intervals, or the average length needed to accommodate one 
ship.  Downtimes in repair models were recorded in 1000-ft. increments and used in the 
estimation of system-wide business interruption losses due to earthquake damage to the 
berths.   
Business interruption losses required its own analysis procedure that is outlined in 
Figure 2.9: 
 
Figure 2.9 Operations/System Seismic Risk Analysis procedure for estimating business 




Capacities and demands within the previous steps were estimated over 10-year 
spans by using previous shipping data supplied by port operations officers.  This data was 
important because shipping demands not only vary by day of week but also seasonally.  
Therefore, it was necessary to analyze business interruptions on a day-to-day basis.  
Once evaluations of all components and all component upgrade options for each 
year of the 10,000-year period were complete and the damage states along with repair 
costs were determined, the results were “aggregated to probabilistically characterize 
economic risks associated with each combination of upgrade options for the various 
berths (Werner and Taylor 2004).” Risk assessments were then conducted using a mean-
variance criterion.  This criterion provided an opportunity to compare options on the basis 
of the yield and volatility of an investment.   
 
Step 5 – Clarify and Revise Port System Performance Goals 
This step revaluated the results from the previous steps in tandem with 
administrative, regulatory, legal, or other constraint that might make one berth option 
more preferable than another.  Options were improved iteratively until the optimal 
solution for all parties involved was decided upon. 
2.3.1.2  Results 
Eighty combinations of berth upgrade options were evaluated using mean-
variance criterion (MVC).  However some of those options were ruled out by MVC 
because the mean value and standard deviation of the total life-cycle cost were higher 
than those of at least one other combination. The combinations that passed the MVC test 
are listed in Table 1.  Overall, seismic upgrades for Berth 30 and the 68 extensions were 
warranted by MVC in all cases.  In the table for each combination, the option number for 
each upgrade is listed along with the overall normalized total cost and standard deviation 
of that cost.  Note that an upgrade option of 0 indicates that no upgrade was made.  The 
  
 35 
baseline option (or no seismic upgrade) had a present value mean total cost of $29.6 
million and a standard deviation of $11.2 million (not present value).  While the total cost 
of this option is lower than all of the other options, the standard deviation is the greatest, 
which means that it has the greatest volatility of all the investments. 
Table 2.6 Combinations of Berth Seismic upgrade Options that Pass the MVC (Werner 





2.3.2 Pachakis and Kiremidjian, 2004 
While the previous study by Werner and Taylor was perhaps the most 
comprehensive port study to date, others have examined more specific aspects of the risk 
assessment procedure.  Pachakis and Kiremidjian (2004) conducted a study that 
calculated operational losses occurring after scenario earthquakes in multi-terminal 
container ports.  The majority of the operational losses, resulting from wharf damage, 
were a consequence of downtime within the terminal.     
2.3.2.1  Assessment 
Assessment began with an estimation of ground motions at the site using a 
deterministic seismic hazard analysis.  Using predicted intensity measures present at the 
site, the damage state probabilities were calculated, and then those damage states were 
related to the losses that could occur.  Operationally, facilities have a binary status: they 
are either operational or non-operational, depending on the damage state.  The 
determination of this functional state “require[d] a system approach, where the damage 
states of the port components (buildings, cranes, wharves, and utilities) that contribute[d] 
to the cargo handling operations [were] combined through fault trees and event trees to 
produce the functional states of the terminals and their associated probabilities (Pachakis 
and Kiremidjian 2004).”   
Once the functionality of a terminal was established, downtime was calculated.    
The port simulation took place over a time period Δt, that was large enough to include a 
full restoration of damage plus a length of time long enough for operations to return to a 
steady state.  In the computation of revenue losses, the port was modeled as a queuing 
system wherein the ships were equivalent to customers and the berths represented the 
servers.  The ship traffic was described by the vector process  whose 
components included the ship arrival times, terminal of destination, ship type, length, and 
cargo to be loaded and unloaded.  The simulation assumed that the change in traffic as a 




result of the scenario event was beyond the scope of the study, so the process  was 
stationary, ergodic, and unaffected by the earthquake.  Using these assumptions, the loss 
was calculated by subtracting revenue generated when an earthquake occurred, from that 
generated when no earthquake occurred over the period Δt. 
   (2.2) 
This equation asserts that the expected revenue loss due to downtime is equal to 
the expectation over all possible damage states of the revenue loss conditional on a 
particular damage state (Pachakis and Kiremidjian 2004). 
The port model used in this evaluation assumed that the basic modeling unit of a 
port was a port terminal.  A representational schematic of this unit is shown in Figure 
2.10.   
 
Figure 2.10 Port Terminal (after (Pachakis and Kiremidjian 2004)) 
 
Using the schematic above, port operations were assumed to take place in the 




































cargo is measured in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs).  Cargo is unloaded from a ship 
using one or multiple cranes (depending on ship length and availability).  Some ships 
may then be reloaded with additional cargo kept in the terminal.  Containers stored in the 
terminal are divided into four categories: Inbound containers, outbound containers, empty 
containers and refrigerated containers (reefers).   
In order to analyze risk and revenue losses following a seismic event, it was 
necessary to obtain information about the ship traffic coming in and out of the port and 
how those ships were treated on a terminal operation level.  For this study, the following 
assumptions about terminal operation were used: when a ship enters the port it is assigned 
a terminal and a berth.  If a berth is unavailable, the ship enters a queue.  Berth queues 
were necessary because some berths could only accommodate certain types of cargo.  
Therefore, cargo also had to be considered as one of the variable attributes of a berth in 
addition to length, water depth, and number of cranes.  A berth also had to have a buffer 
size (or maximum amount of ships that could belong to the queue to be serviced).  Once 
the buffer was reached, additional ships to be added to the queue would be diverted to 
other berths or terminals.  For those ships in the queue or at the dock, the berth with the 
maximum number of available cranes would be chosen from a selected set of berths.  As 
a general rule, the more containers on the ship to be processed, the more cranes that 
would be needed for processing.  However, when waiting occurred, each ship had an 
assigned a waiting capacity so that if it was exceeded, the ship moved on to another 
terminal to be processed.  These berth and crane assignment rules were used in order to 
minimize wait time because docking fees could accrue while a ship was docked and 
waiting. 
During servicing, the total time spent servicing the ship was considered to be a 
function of the total number of TEUs, the number of cranes available, and the service rate 
for a given storage system.  The service rate, r, was the total time docking, unloading, and 




The service rate r could then be used to determine the total service time for a ship 
which was evaluated as follows: 
  (2.4) 
The total service time, σ, was used to calculate dockage fees which was 
determined by the duration of stay and the length of the ship.  In addition, ships also may 
or may not have had to pay a number of additional fees: 
• Wharfage – function of the number of TEUs loaded and discharged to and 
from the ship. 
• Demurrage – if containers discharged from the ship or waiting to be loaded to 
a ship remain within the port for more than 5 days, a fee is collected per day 
for each TEU. 
• Wharf Storage – if an owner wants to store containers at the storage facilities 
of a port for an extended period, there is a daily charge per TEU.  
• Craneage – the tenants of a berth pay a fee each time a crane loads or unloads 
a TEU. 
The previous port operational rules and equations were input into a computer 
program along with earthquake data to simulate port operations pre and post-earthquake.  
Then statistics of the revenue differences were calculated and weekly revenue streams for 
periods with and without an event were plotted.   
 
2.3.2.2  Results 
The study used the previous methodology on sample data to estimate revenue loss 











methodology produced reasonable results, and that with proper planning and ship 
diversion, that the port can still accommodate its previous shipping demands (with some 
waiting time) even after earthquake damage.  One of the highlights of this study was the 
use of sensitivity analysis.  Variables affecting port operations were isolated and it was 
determined which variables had the greatest effect on revenue losses.  Cranes and wharf 
damage had the greatest influence over revenue loss in this study.  Their downtime was 
found to be significant and the accuracy of this estimation was required to get a high-
quality loss estimate.  It was also concluded that simulating terminals simultaneously was 
very important because it’s easier to understand how the intelligent diversion of ships 
from damaged to undamaged terminals will minimize the losses after a strong 
earthquake.   
2.3.3 Na and Shinozuka, 2009 
Recently, there has also been some probabilistic risk assessment work conducted 
concurrent to the NEES Grand Challenge project.  This work, from researchers at the 
University of California Irvine, has focused on the response of quay walls during 
earthquake excitation using the Port of Kobe as a case study, the effects of spatial 
variation in soil properties on the seismic performance of port structures, and simulation-
based port loss estimation. 
2.3.3.1  Response of Quay Walls 
For the quay wall analysis, researchers conducted a case study using damage 
history data from the Kobe earthquake and created a 2D numerical model that 
represented berth PC1 which was damaged in Port Island, Kobe during the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake.  After the Kobe earthquake the Port and Harbor Research Institute of Japan 
conducted an extensive survey of the seismic performance of 24 ports in the Kobe area 
(Na et al. 2008). Reports showed that seismic responses varied among the port structures, 
where the damage patterns of the quay walls ranged from large lateral movements, to 
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tilting, to settlements of caissons, to ground movements of the backfill in the form of 
lateral movements and settlements of the apron.  A typical section of the damage patterns 
in a typical quay wall is shown in Figure 2.11. 
 
Figure 2.11 Typical section of damage criteria for a quay wall (From (Na et al. 2008)) 
2.3.3.2  Effects of Spatial Variation in Soil Parameters in the Performance of Port 
Structures 
Ports are often susceptible to liquefaction during earthquake excitation because of 
the use of hydraulic fill in the backfill of the wharves.  As a result, it is necessary to study 
the effect of liquefaction and the resulting lateral spreading on the seismic response of the 
wharves.  Na et al (2009) specifically looks at quay walls.  For this analysis, the 
researchers use FLAC to conduct a 2D nonlinear dynamic analysis of the soil-structure 
system.  In the analysis, the 2D soil system is idealized as a homogeneous non-Gaussian 
random field.  Next, a simulation algorithm was used to generate 130 digital realizations 
of 2D random field samples.  The ground motion time history from the Kobe earthquake 
was applied to each of these realizations and the spatial variation of shear modulus was 
examined.  The samples were characterized probabilistically in the Monte Carlo sense 
and are then compared to the response obtained under the uniform field assumption with 
the mean value of soil property (Na and Shinozuka 2009).  The analysis found that 
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seismic response showed significant variation in horizontal displacement.  Also, “while 
uniform field models generally lead to unconservative estimates of quay wall response, 
consideration of spatial variability of soil not only leads to better prediction of average 
response, but also can capture the dispersion of observed response of quay walls” (Na 
and Shinozuka 2009).  Figure 13 illustrates the 130 response generated through the 
analysis.  It can be seen that probability distribution of the residual horizontal 
displacements (RHD) of the realizations has a lognormal distribution, which could be 
used to predict confidence intervals of RHD response or for other statistical analysis. 
 
Figure 2.12 Statistics for 130 RHD responses (From (Na and Shinozuka 2009)) 
 
2.3.3.3  Simulation-based Port Losses 
Loss estimation in ports is an important research avenue since most of the money 
lost after a large earthquake is caused by business interruption losses.  As an example, in 
Kobe, physical damage cost $5.5 billion whereas economic loss exceeded $6 billion in 
the first 9 months after the earthquake (Na and Shinozuka 2009).  Na et al (2009) provide 
a methodology to estimate this direct economic loss by evaluating the decreased 




Figure 2.13 Loss estimation methodology (from (Na and Shinozuka 2009)) 
 
Calculation of throughput was conducted using a terminal operation simulation 
model.  Development and simulation of this model was done using the software package 
ARENA.  Inputs into this model include ship traffic, which is generated from terminal 
operation records, and a damage state for the berths at a terminal.  Damage states were 
generated through a Monte Carlo simulation using quay wall fragility curves.  The 
terminal operation simulation model is run more than once for varying states of damage 
within the port.  The first run is done for an intact port with no damage so that a baseline 
(intact) container throughput can be measured.  After, the model is run again including 
damage.  This resulting throughput can be compared to the intact throughput to see how 
the container throughput was reduced due to the damage at the port.  Direct economic 
loss can then be calculated using the calculated reduced throughput, port inventory 
information, and economic data. 
Loss estimation through the use of component fragility curves provides a way to 
examine the fragility of the port operating system. For this study, system fragility was 
calculated at an existing port terminal with four berths and 13 container cranes.  Damage 
states were independently determined probabilistically for each berth, and no damage was 
assumed for the container cranes.  With damage states established, system restoration 
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times were then probabilistically calculated.  Repair periods from tideal to tpessimistic were 
chosen using a random distribution and then the repair processes were simulated using a 
Monte Carlo approach.  Loss estimation was conducted for the port in its initial and 
retrofitted states.  Figure 2.14 provides an example of exceedance the fragility curves 
used to calculate losses for an original and retrofitted wharf. 
 
Figure 2.14 System fragility curves for (a) original and (b) retrofitted structure (From (Na 
and Shinozuka 2009)) 
2.4 Gaps in Knowledge 
 
While much research and study has been conducted surrounding the seismic risk 
analysis of port systems, there is still room for improvement.  The main objective of this 
study is to examine a US container port as a complete system using the state-of-the-art 
applicable engineering techniques.  While the aforementioned studies have certainly 
assessed risk in the key port components, they fall short of a risk assessment of the port 
as a complete system.  The Werner and Taylor study, which did the most complete job, 
only looked at the wharf response.  The soil and wharf responses were modeled along 
with a few mitigation options, however there was no consideration of crane response.  
Furthermore, the operational losses calculated capacity decreases solely based on wharf 
availability.  The operational treatment of ports in the Pachakis and Kiremidjian study 
offered an improvement since wharf and crane damage both contributed to losses, in the 
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calculation of damage states liquefaction hazards, soil-structure interaction, and pile-deck 
connections were not considered. Furthermore, the fragility curves used to determine the 
damage states for both the wharves and cranes were generic and not calculated by the 
authors.  While the Na and Shinozuka studies did calculate their own fragility curves, 
they focused on quay walls, a type of wharf typical in Japan, and not west coast US ports.  
Additionally, while this study did include soil-structure interaction, it lacked 
consideration of cranes.  Of all the port components neglected within the other studies, 
cranes are perhaps the most important.  During the 2010 earthquake in Port-Au-Prince, 
Haiti, the main container crane available in port became partially submerged in the water 
and could not be used.  Heavily damaged cranes cannot be repaired in the same way as 
wharves, which are built on-site.  Cranes are manufactured abroad and then shipped to 
the port.  Replacement times are lengthy and often last longer than it takes to rebuild 
other damaged port components (Kosbab 2010).  The current port codes obviously 
include design requirements for both the wharves and the cranes, but they are based on 
arbitrary earthquake design levels and are limited in that there is no direct calculation of 
business interruption losses.  
The seismic risk analysis developed under the NEES Grand Challenge project 
aims to remedy the gaps present within the previous studies by modeling the port system 
as completely as possible and but by also modeling spatially correlated seismic hazards in 
a fully probabilistic manner that is far superior to the arbitrary earthquake levels used in 
current designs.  This project will model liquefaction hazards, soil-structure interaction, 
wharves (including pile-deck connections), and cranes to make fragility curves for use in 
the risk assessment.  Additionally, operational losses will be calculated using sub-optimal 
tabu searches, which seek to closely replicate human decision-making.  The use of state-
of-the-art operational modeling is also a significant improvement because this is the first 
analysis conducted in which the sophistication of the operational model is equal to the 
sophistication at which engineered structures are modeled.  Lastly, the loss calculations 
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generated will be used in economic analyses to illustrate the benefits of the probabilistic 
nature of the results to port stakeholders by comparing seismic mitigation options using 
meaningful metrics.  While the Werner and Taylor study included mitigation and upgrade 
options for the wharves, the current model will also include geotechnical mitigation to 





3 SEISMIC RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Performance-Based Engineering 
Engineers evaluate structures and facilities on the basis of performance.  The most 
widely used current performance assessments evaluate a structure’s performance in a 
binary manner.  If the structure “fails,” the performance is poor or unacceptable.  If 
however, the structure does not fail, the performance is considered satisfactory.  
Additionally, in practice, performance is usually evaluated using strength; a metric valid 
to engineers, but one that has little to no meaning to stakeholders and decision makers.  
Performance-based design addresses both of these issues.  First, performance-based 
design is not binary; it can be used to evaluate structures using a continuum of 
performance levels.  Also, performance can be evaluated by any number of metrics, 
including strength.  For example, seismic performance-based design can measure 
performance in terms of potential for casualties, repair/replacement costs, or the down-
time resulting from earthquake-induced damage.   
3.1.1 Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering and Uncertainty 
Performance-based design is also closely related with probabilistic methods of 
design, which means that certain levels of uncertainty are associated with its use.  
Probabilistic methods were first introduced into PBEE through probabilistic seismic 
hazard analysis and the applications of the seismic motions.  However, as the field has 
advanced, probabilistic methods have permeated the remaining modeling techniques used 
in performance-based earthquake engineering methods.   Predictive models “should be 
recognized as mathematical idealizations of reality – they are not perfect (Kramer 2008).”  
This imperfection is usually either a result of a simplification of a more complex 
problem, or the lack of understanding of the true physics of a problem.  Since no model 
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can be perfect, uncertainties must be included and quantified within the predictive models 
of PBEE. 
There are two basic types of uncertainties that are important in engineering.  The 
first is aleatoric uncertainty which results from inherent or intrinsic variability seen in 
quantities or nature.  Aleatoric uncertainty, sometimes “randomness”, cannot be reduced.  
The other type of uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty, results from the assumptions made 
in the analysis of a system and from the limitations of supporting databases for that 
system.  Unlike aleatoric uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty can be reduced if additional 
knowledge of the subject or a more comprehensive analysis is used. 
In the case performance-based earthquake engineering, examples of both types of 
uncertainty are prevalent in all aspects of design.  Aleatoric uncertainties lie in the ground 
motions and the uncertainty of where, when, or how large an earthquake event will be.  
Furthermore, epistemic uncertainty is inherent in the simple fact that a model is used to 
predict real-life occurrences.  Furthermore, epistemic uncertainty results from our 
inability to tell the future.  When trying to quantify the losses that occur as a result of 
earthquakes, factors such as quantities, unit costs, future material and labor costs, interest 
rates, and repair times for future events are ultimately unknown.  Therefore, epistemic 
uncertainty will influence these modeling processes. 
 
3.1.2 Previous Methods for Assessing Performance 
Performance-based design has been around for a while in some form or another.  
For earthquake engineering, the first performance requirements were established for 
buildings after the 1925 Santa Barbara earthquake (NEHRP 2009).  Acceptable 
performance in this case prevented collapse onto the street.  However, the first written 
performance-based design measures in its most current form was adopted in the first 
edition of the Structural Engineers Association of California Blue Book (SEAOC 1959) 
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which attempted performance-based design by qualifying three damage states and the 
performance goals for each: 
Table 3.1 California Blue Book Performance Goals 
Damage State 
(Level of Shaking) 
Performance Goals 
Minor No damage 
Moderate No structural damage, minor non-structural 
Strong No collapse but structural and non-structural damage 
 
Risk-based evaluation of design criteria caught on after that (Cornell 1968; 
Ellingwood and Ang 1974), and the first probabilistic-based seismic design code was 
ATC-3-06 (Applied Technology Council 1978). It was based on the probabilistic seismic 
hazard analysis concept from Cornell (1968), and the mapping work of Algermissen and 
Perkins (1976).  ATC-3-06 specified levels of safety from effective peak acceleration and 
velocity exceedance probabilities based on the relationship between estimated and 
allowable interstory drifts.   
The most recent building codes have kept the probabilistic nature of ATC-3-06, 
but have expanded performance goals by allowing multiple levels of performance at 
multiple hazard levels, with performance-related quantities that are closely related to 
damage.  Vision 2000 (SEAOC 1995) was the first building code to establish procedures 
for new buildings using this format.  In addition, it also established different performance 
levels for different types of buildings.  As seen in Figure 3.1 below, performance levels 
are related to earthquake design levels by whether or not the performance at a specific 
design level is acceptable by design standards.  Acceptable performance levels are 




Figure 3.1 Combinations of earthquake hazard and performance levels as proposed by 
Vision 2000 (from (SEAOC 1995)). 
 
The graph also sets differing performance levels for three different types of structures: 
 Safety Critical – Structures containing large quantities of hazardous materials 
such as toxins, radioactive materials, or explosives that could cause significant 
external effects with damage to the building. 
 Essential/ Hazardous – Critical post-earthquake facilities such as hospitals, 
communications centers, police/fire stations, etc. or hazardous materials with 
limited impact outside the immediate vicinity of the building (i.e. refineries) 
 Basic – All remaining structures   
For instance, after an earthquake with a design level of rare, the graph indicates 
that if the desired performance level was achieved, a nuclear power plant should still be 
fully operational, a hospital could have minor damage but its functionality should not 
have been affected, and a family home may have sustained moderate damage but should 
not have fallen down. 
The efforts following Vision 2000 (FEMA 273 (Applied Technology Council 
1997), FEMA 274 (Applied Technology Council 1997), FEMA 356 (American Society 
of Civil Engineers 2000), and ATC-40 (Applied Technology Council 1996)) use the same 
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performance framework, but diverge in the manner in which performance and hazard 
levels are defined, and in the suggested procedures for estimating force and 
displacement-related demands.  FEMA 445, one of the most recent performance-based 
seismic design guidelines uses the following process to calculate losses (Also see Figure 
3.2) (Applied Technology Council 2006): 
• Characterize Ground Shaking Hazard – The method for applying a seismic 
energy to the desire component should be decided.  This can be done either 
deterministically or probabilistically. 
• Perform Structural / Nonstructural Analysis – Using engineering methods, the 
ground shaking should be applied to the components, and the forces or 
deformations occurring within the components are calculated. 
• Form Structural Response Function – Next, the probable response and the 
intensity of shaking is calculated with respect to the ground shaking intensity 
using the forces and deformations from the previous analysis. 
• Form Structural / Nonstructural Fragility Function - Here, probable damage to 
the component is estimated in light of the different levels of response that 
could occur. 
• Form Structural / Nonstructural Damage Function – The Damage function 
formed in this relates specific types of damage incurred to corresponding 
component losses. 
• Predict Loss as a Function of Damage – At this stage, all of the losses are 





Figure 3.2 Performance Assessment Process (Applied Technology Council 2006) 
 
It should be noted that each structural component and each nonstructural 
component is analyzed individually, and then each is aggregated into a final prediction of 
loss.  Specifics of each step will be further discussed in subsequent sections.  This 
process introduced the current goal/focus of performance-based seismic design: 
estimating losses.  “Performance-based seismic design research from PEER and the 
recommendations at stakeholder’s workshop indicate that in order to fulfill its promise, a 
performance-based procedure must estimate expected losses from earthquake shaking 

























Predict Loss as a Function
of Damage
Characterize Ground Shaking Hazard
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3.1.3 PEER Framework  
Numerous researchers have explored the possibility of using performance-based 
design for analysis of buildings, bridges, and even highway systems.  However, because 
the concept in its current form is not yet used as the standard in practice, the terminology 
and framework used are not yet uniform.  For this study, the Pacific Earthquake 
Engineering Research Center (PEER) framework and terminology (Porter 2006) for 
probabilistic risk assessment will be used: 
   (3.1) 
In equation (3.1), G(a|b) denotes a complementary cumulative distribution 
function (CCDF) for a conditioned upon b.  Overall, equation (3.1) represents the process 
of risk assessment that moves from ground motions to losses and can be represented by 
four different variables that have been conditioned upon one another.  These variables 
make up the PEER risk analysis terminology, and are defined here: 
Intensity Measure (IM) – Any of a number of ground motion parameters that 
characterize the level of ground motions produced by earthquake shaking (e.g., 
PGA, SA, Arias intensity, etc.) 
Engineering Demand Parameter (EDP) -   Describes the response of the system of 
interest to the ground motions (e.g., excess pore pressure, interstory drift, etc.) 
Damage Measures (DM) – Measure of the physical damage associated with the 
system response (e.g., slab cracking, wall tilt, etc.) 
Decision Variables (DV) – The losses coupled with the physical damage that are 
of some importance to the decision makers (e.g. casualties, repair cost, downtime, 
etc.) 
The PEER terminologies are illustrated within the framework progression in 
Figure 3.3: 





Figure 3.3 Illustration of Performance Prediction Processes using PEER Terminology 
(after (Kramer and Mitchell 2006)) 
 
3.1.3.1  Response, Damage, and Loss Models 
For each variable, specific values are calculated from models within the PEER 
framework equation.  As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the risk assessment process moves 
from the acquirement of intensity measures, to the production of engineering demand 
parameters, to damage measures, all the way to decision variables.  This is possible 
through the application of three separate models that calculate the four variables from one 
another: a response model, a damage model, and a loss model.  Furthermore, these 
models can be calculated independently of one another, which allow for equation (3.1) to 
be broken down into three separate models: 
Response Model – Predicts the response of a structural system to an imposed 
ground motion. (i.e. get EDP from an IM): 
     (3.1a) 
Damage Model – Predicts the physical damage to a structure from the response of 
the structure. (i.e. predict DM from EDP): 
     (3.1b) 
Loss Model – Predict losses associated with some level of physical damage. (i.e. 
get DV from a DM): 
     (3.1c) 
Broken up in this manner, exceedance probability curves may be computed for 
EDP, DM, and DV and then interpreted in the same manner that seismic hazard curves 
)(][)( imdimIMedpEDPPedp IMEDP λλ ∫ =>=
)(][)( edpdedpEDPdmDMPdm EDPDM λλ ∫ =>=
)(][)( dmddmDMdvDVPdv DMDV λλ ∫ =>=
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are computed for IM in probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA).  It should be noted 
that while the PEER framework will be used to create the risk framework for the port 
system, it couldn’t be used explicitly in its current form for two reasons.  The first is due 
to the fact that the current form is meant for a single structure and does not accommodate 
the system dynamic of the port.  Secondly, in the context of a port, the losses considered 
include both physical losses but also business interruption losses.  The PEER framework 
adaptation for the port system will be further discussed and detailed in section 3.2. 
 
3.1.3.2  Fragility Curves 
One of the advantages of using a fully probabilistic risk framework like the PEER 
method, is that broken apart, the conditional probability terms in the equations 3.1a-3.1c 
can be expressed graphically as a fragility function.  Fragility functions represent the 
variation of the mean (or median) and the uncertainty associated with the relationship 
between two variables as related to the conditional probability.  Figure 6 illustrates this 
using the combination of equations 3.1a and 3.1b, where the damage model is predicting 
using an intensity measure instead of just the EDP.  The top graph shows the mean rate of 
exceedance of some damage measure given the intensity measure.  The fragility curves 
created were determined by the dispersion of DMs at a specific intensity measure.  For 
instance, at the point in the upper graph, a low and a high dispersion are drawn.  The low 
dispersion indicates less uncertainty and results in a steeper sloped fragility curve in the 
lower graph. The higher dispersion indicates more uncertainty at the point and results in a 
flatter fragility curve.  Fragility curves will be used in this risk assessment in this form to 





Figure 3.4 - Relationship between Response Relationship, Uncertainty and Fragility 
Curves 
 
3.2 Risk Analysis Framework Applicable to this Study 
While the PEER risk assessment framework discussed in section 3.1.3 provides 
the most currently accepted framework for risk analysis, the adopted equation cannot be 
used explicitly in the context of a port system.  Problems arise because the PEER 
framework is designed for risk analysis of a singular structure (Deierlein et al. 2003), the 
performance of which solely depends on its ability to function.  For example, a bridge is 
built to span and provide passage over a river.  As long as the bridge remains standing 
and is safe to cross, it fulfills its function and satisfies a non-failure performance level.  In 
this case, the ability to meet the desired performance objective is explicitly dependent on 
the structure itself.  A container port is built for the purpose of loading and unloading 


































that are interdependent.  Wharves cannot perform their designated functions without 
cranes, and vice versa; they must work as a system.  The performance of the port is 
dependent on the performance of the individual structures within the system (losses from 
physical damage) and also on the performance of the system itself (losses from business 
interruption).  The matter becomes more complex because ports contain redundant 
systems, so that if one berth is not functional, another can be used.  The entire system 
must be considered when evaluating the performance of the port, and the risk analysis 
framework must be modified to account for this difference.   
The decision variables considered in the PEER framework are fatalities, monetary 
cost, or downtime.  In the case of a port, downtime directly results in a monetary cost 
through business interruption losses.  Therefore, it is necessary to treat downtime as a 
“damage” sustained by the port that results in a portion of the overall monetary loss.  The 
PEER framework uses the term damage to refer to the physical damage incurred by a 
structure that results in some type of loss.  For the port framework, damage will continue 
to define the purely physical damage.  However, the system “damage”, whose 
consequence is monetary loss, will be referred to as repair requirements. 
When represented graphically, an additional step is inserted into the graphical 
representation of the PEER equation as shown in Figure 3.5.  This step examines the 
physical damage at the port and uses that to estimate the repair requirements (cost and 
downtime) for the port. 
 
Figure 3.5 Graphical representation of equation 3.2 
 
















Mathematically, in the port risk assessment framework, this difference occurs in 
the damage model, which is combined with the response model to calculate the repair 
requirements given an intensity measure: 
 
(3.2) 
However, equation 3.2 must be further modified before it can properly model a 
port system.  In its current state, the equation finds the mean rate of exceedance of losses 
for an individual port structure such as a wharf or a crane at a single site.  Ports are 
obviously made of structures at multiple terminals that have a measureable spatial 
separation.  Therefore, the loss in the port system risk analysis must be calculated over 
the multiple sites within a port.  Therefore, when modified to model the port facility, the 
probabilistic risk analysis equation from PEER takes on the form: 
         (3.3) 
  Equation 3.3 is used to calculate the mean annual rate of exceedance of losses 
occurring within the port system.  Specifically,  is the mean annual rate of 
exceedance of losses for a portfolio of terminal facilities .  Earthquake 
disruption is now defined over terminals because there is a spatial correlation between 
sites located some distance apart (see Section 3.3.3), and this is accounted for at the 
terminal level.  N is the number of seismic source zones used in analysis, and  is the 
mean rate of occurrence of earthquakes larger than a minimum magnitude originating in 
source zone i; is the complementary cumulative distribution function of the system-
level losses conditional on the repair requirements at each terminal;  is the 
)(][][][][)( imdimIMedpEDPPedpEDPdmDMPdmDMrrRRPrrRRlLPl IML λλ ∫∫∫ =>=>=>=>=
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probability density function of the repair requirements at each terminal conditional on the 
intensity measures; and  is the probability density function of ground motion 
intensity conditional on earthquake i with specific values of magnitude and distance.  
Equation 2 still contains the response, damage and loss models of the PEER framework, 
except that now the response and damage models are combined within the term 
(also seen in equation 3.2), and the loss model is described by the term .   
The system dynamic of the port further dictates that to calculate the mean rate of 
exceedance for losses within the port system from equation 3.3, there are multiple 
components within the port that must be modeled.  Therefore, this is done using a risk 
analysis framework program.  Figure 3.6 maps the steps involved in the calculation of the 
mean rate of exceedance of losses using the program.  The result involves three major 
steps for calculation: (1) seismic hazard calculations are used to estimate correlated 
earthquake ground motions at each terminal within the port complex conditional on the 
earthquake magnitude and distance, (2) component fragility calculations encompass the 
PEER response and damage models which are used to estimate not only the resulting 
physical damage to container wharves and cranes but also the cost and time required to 
repair or replace the damaged structures, and (3) system fragility, or the port operations 
level that estimates the port system fragility expressed as business interruption losses due 
to reduced container throughput and ship delays or re-routing.  Each of these major steps 
is delineated graphically in Figure 3.6 through the use of different colored backgrounds.  
Subsequent explanations of each step in the figure are applied to a hypothetical port 










Considerations that must be taken into account when the risk analysis framework as 
applied to an existing or differing port are discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
Figure 3.6 - Risk Analysis Framework 
 
This risk analysis framework is repeatedly applied to a sample of earthquakes 
taken from an earthquake rupture forecast (See 3.3.1) and the total cost is calculated for 
each earthquake occurrence.  The risk analysis framework offers four built-in options as 
to how earthquakes are sampled from an earthquake rupture forecast.  A fully 
probabilistic analysis is built into the framework that allows the user to choose either 
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conventional or stratified Monte Carlo sampling.  Additionally, earthquakes can also be 
sampled using a scenario-based analysis that samples earthquakes of a certain magnitude 
range, or using an intensity-based analysis that samples earthquakes within a specified 
intensity range.  Several sampling methods were considered in the analysis of equation 
3.1.  One of the more well known methods for sampling earthquakes for use in a risk 
analysis is the walkthrough table method by Taylor et al (2001).  In this method, sampled 
earthquakes are aggregated into a list of year-by-year earthquake occurrences throughout 
a region over a span of thousands of years.  This method works well and offers elegance 
when accounting for inflation and changes in monetary value over time, but large 
earthquakes occur very infrequently.  To capture large earthquakes that will cause large 
amounts of damage within the port, the walkthrough table must be at least 10,000 years 
long.  While this approach has been used in previous studies and would clearly work, it’s 
possible to improve the efficiency of the risk analysis and reduce the overall run time, 
which for a walkthrough table would be significant.  Therefore, in an effort to streamline 
the analysis process and provide better large earthquake data within the analysis, Monte 
Carlo-based analysis methods were chosen as the primary method for earthquake 
sampling. 
3.2.1 Probabilistic Analysis 
3.2.1.1  Conventional Monte Carlo Sampling 
Fully probabilistic earthquake catalogs are created from an earthquake rupture 
forecast (See 3.3.1) in one of two ways within the risk analysis program.  The first 
method uses conventional Monte Carlo sampling.  Within this method, a specific number 
of ruptures within the ERF are randomly sampled according to probability mass functions 
calculated for each rupture (pmf_rupture = rate_rupture / total_rate).   Varying 
earthquake magnitudes are included within this sample according to the density function: 
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        (3.4) 
which is calculated from the theorem of total probability where nf equals the number of 
active faults in a region, vj denotes the annual rate of recurrence for earthquakes on fault 
j, and fj(m) equals the density function for magnitudes of earthquakes on fault j.   
  In this case, the sampled earthquake catalog will be stochastically reflective of 
the ERF population; most of the earthquakes will be small in magnitude and very few 
will be large.  Figure 3.7 plots the probability mass calculated for all of the earthquakes in 
the ERF population.    
 
Figure 3.7 Probability mass for entire ERF population 
It can be seen from Figure 3.7 that the majority of the earthquakes in the event set 
have small magnitudes while very few have large magnitudes.  Monte Carlo sampling 




















Figure 3.8 shows a histogram of earthquake magnitudes sampled using the conventional 







Figure 3.8 Histogram of conventionally-Monte-Carlo-sampled earthquakes 
The figure above clearly shows the disadvantage in using the conventional Monte 
Carlo method: in order to get a sample representative of the ERF, a large number of 
earthquakes must be sampled.  The percent of the total earthquake sample was calculated 
for each bar of the histogram for each of the previous sample sizes and plotted in Figure 
3.9 for comparison.  When compared to Figure 3.7, it is apparent that the 100-earthquake 
sample least represents the event set, while the 10000-earthquake sample most represents 




Figure 3.9 Magnitude vs. percent of total earthquake sample for conventional Monte 
Carlo sampling (100 = red, 1000 = blue, 10000 = green) 
  Conventional Monte Carlo sampling has another disadvantage: even when a 
large sample is used, very few large earthquakes are present within the sample.  The 
many small earthquakes sampled produce little to no damage, which translates into little 
to no downtime, and this data won’t provide an extensive look into the response of a port 
system during large events.  The large earthquakes that occur infrequently in 
conventional Monte Carlo sampling produce significant damage, which provides better-
quality data with which to use in the risk analysis.  Real-life large events, like those in 
Kobe or Haiti, caused extensive disruption to the port system, and significant problems 
that port stakeholders would want to try and prevent in the future.  Conventional Monte 
Carlo sampling won’t produce enough data to properly examine these large events unless 
the total number of simulations is very large.   Therefore, the method chosen for the risk 
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analysis uses Monte Carlo simulation in tandem with stratified sampling (Jayaram and 
Baker 2010) to preferentially sample these large events.  
3.2.1.2  Stratified Monte Carlo Sampling 
In the stratified sampling method for the risk analysis, earthquake magnitudes are 
divided into a number of strata, and each stratum corresponds to a single discrete value of 
magnitude.  For this project, strata range between a magnitude of 5.05 to 8.45, where 
stratum i+1 has a magnitude 0.10 greater than stratum i.  The ERF database is queried 
and ruptures are sorted according to the magnitudes of each stratum.  Then ruptures are 
randomly sampled from each magnitude stratum.  The number of samples per stratum is 
selected in an optimum manner as laid out in Rubinstein and Kroese (2007).  If N equals 
the total number of samples and ; the optimal number of samples in stratum i 
(Ni) is given by : 
        (3.5) 
because it gives a minimal variance of the mean rate of exceedance for a specific level of 
loss of : 
       (3.6) 
For equation 3.3, pi denotes the probability that an earthquake falls in stratum i, 
and σi is the standard deviation of the estimate value of loss.  Since the standard deviation 
is unknown, and the ground motion intensity is one of the largest sources of variability, 
the standard deviation of the ground motion for stratum i is used as a proxy for the 
standard deviation of the estimated mean rate of exceedance for stratum i.  This standard 
deviation is calculated for PGV using Atkinson and Boore (2008) at a magnitude equal to 
the stratum magnitude at an arbitrary distance of 20 km.  The denominator of equation 
3.5 calculates the sum of p*σ over every stratum.  Ni earthquakes are then sampled using 





































database with a magnitude equal to the magnitude of the stratum.  It should be noted that 
within the risk analysis the value of Ni was rounded up to the nearest integer value, 
therefore it is possible that .  Figure 3.10 shows a histogram of the 











Figure 3.10 Histogram of magnitudes using stratified MC sampling for 100, 1000, and 
10000 earthquakes 
  The benefit of this technique is that a larger number of large earthquakes are 
sampled.  For example, 27 earthquakes with a magnitude greater than 7.0 were sampled 
from the 100-earthquake sample using the stratified technique, whereas only seven were 
sampled using conventional Monte Carlo.  Additionally, stratified sampling requires 
fewer earthquakes to achieve the same variance of the estimated mean rate of 
exceedance.  Therefore, when employing the stratified sampling technique the sample 
size could be reduced without significantly altering the uncertainty in the estimated mean 
rate of exceedance and overall computation time would be appreciably decreased. 
However, if the magnitude distributions in Figure 3.10 are compared to Figure 
3.7, it is apparent that the sampled earthquake catalog is no longer stochastically 
representative of the earthquake event set database.  To account for this, the sampling 
parameters of each stratum (probability of occurrence (pi) of stratum i and the number of 
strata, N, are used within the calculation of the summary statistics to reverse the 




Stratum Mean :       (3.7) 
where equals the mean of the samples in stratum i, and the mean value of the mean rate 
of exceedance for a specific level of loss. 
Variance of Stratum Mean:    (3.8) 
where equals the variance of samples in stratum i and N is the number of samples 
in the stratum. 
Stratum Variance     (3.9) 
 
3.2.2 Scenario-Based Analysis 
The scenario-based analysis built into the risk analysis program could be used to 
estimate port losses for a specific earthquake scenario.  Scenarios could be hypothetical 
or based on actual earthquake events such as the 1995 Kobe or 2010 Haiti earthquakes.  
Within this analysis, earthquakes are conventional Monte Carlo sampled from the 
earthquake rupture forecast (See 3.3.1) of the port for specified range of magnitude and 
distance.  For each scenario-based analysis, the user defines a nominal magnitude, a 
magnitude tolerance, a nominal distance, a distance tolerance, and the number of Monte 
Carlo sampled earthquakes within the sample. 
To create this earthquake sample, the earthquake rupture forecast database is 
queried for earthquakes that match the input criteria.  Next, earthquakes are randomly 
sampled through conventional Monte Carlo sampling from the generated list.  As with 
stratified sampling, the earthquake sample generated from this analysis will not be 
stochastically representative of the overall earthquake rupture forecast.  Therefore, 
sample parameters for the specific sample must be stored so that the mean value of the 






























3.2.3 Intensity-Based Analysis 
Like the scenario-based analysis, the intensity-based analysis within the risk 
analysis program can also be used to define specific scenarios.  The intensity-based 
analysis better defines a specific earthquake scenario and if intensity information is 
known, should be used over the scenario-based analysis.  For instance, if the user wished 
to model the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the scenario-based analysis only defines magnitude 
and distance and could include a wide range of intensity measures that may not 
adequately define the earthquake.  However, if instead intensity values were known and 
used in the analysis, the losses calculated from the program would be much closer to the 
actual losses since intensity has a direct correlation to damage and magnitude does not. 
To create the intensity-based sample, the user specifies the intensity value type, 
the intensity value, a coefficient of variation for that value, and the number of 
earthquakes to be sampled.  Intensity measure types available within the analysis include 
peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), and spectral acceleration 
(SA).  Again, like the scenario-based analysis, the earthquake rupture forecast (See 3.3.1) 
is queried for earthquakes that match the specified input, and then the sample is randomly 
sampled through Monte Carlo sampling for the number of samples specified in the input. 
3.3 Seismic Hazard 
Once the earthquake sample is established, the first step in calculating the mean 
rate of exceedance of losses requires the estimation of the intensity of the ground motions 
at the port components for each earthquake occurrence in the sample.  This seismic 
hazard analysis is contained within the  term of Equation 3.3, which is the 
probability density function of ground motion intensity conditional on an earthquake’s 
magnitude (m) and distance (r) from source zone i.  A number of source zones are 
investigated and summed after multiplying the inner equation of 3.3 by the rate of 






3.3.1 Earthquake Rupture Forecast 
Since the hypothetical port is located in Santa Cruz, California, the Uniform 
California Earthquake Rupture Forecast, Version 2 (WGCEP 2008; WGCEP. 2008) will 
be used.  Possible earthquake ruptures at the hypothetical port are populated into an event 
set list through the use of the OpenSHA program: IM_EventSetCalc version 3.0 (Feild et 
al. 2009).  This program compiles all earthquake ruptures from the ERF within 200 km of 
the terminal sites, including background seismicity. Table 3.2 features an excerpt of ERF 
use for the hypothetical port, giving rupture rates of occurrence and magnitude for 
various segments of the South San Andreas and Calaveras faults.  







279 2.09E-05 8.15 S. San Andreas 
280 1.36E-05 8.25 S. San Andreas 
281 4.83E-06 8.35 S. San Andreas 
282 1.08E-06 8.45 S. San Andreas 
283 3.00E-05 6.55 Calaveras 
284 3.00E-05 6.55 Calaveras 
285 3.00E-05 6.55 Calaveras 
286 3.00E-05 6.55 Calaveras 
287 3.00E-05 6.55 Calaveras 
288 3.00E-05 6.55 Calaveras 
 
 
In addition to compiling the list of all possible earthquake ruptures, the event set 
calculator also finds the distance from each rupture to the terminal sites specified by the 
user and studied within the risk analysis.  The distance is the appropriate measure (e.g., 
the Joyner-Boore distance) used by the ground motion prediction equation (GMPE) 
selected by the user. This information will be subsequently used to calculate the intensity 
measures using one or more ground motion prediction equations. 
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3.3.2 Ground Motion Prediction Equation 
For a given earthquake k from the earthquake sample, a ground motion prediction 
equation (GMPE) is used to estimate firm-site ground motion intensity measures 
(calculated as lognormal random variables) at each terminal within the port. The basic 
form of the GMPE is: 
  (3.10) 
where Yjk is the ground motion intensity measure of interest at terminal j due to 
earthquake k, is the median value of the intensity measure obtained from the GMPE, 
εjk  is the intra-event residual, and ηk is the inter-event residual.  
The ground motion prediction equation chosen to calculate ln (Yjk) for 
hypothetical port analysis is that of Atkinson and Boore (2008):  
 (3.11) 
Here, , , and  represent the magnitude scaling, distance function, and site 
amplification respectively. M is the moment magnitude, RJB is the Joyner-Boore distance 
(Boore et al. 1997), and Vs30 is the average shear wave velocity over the upper 30 meters.   
The remainder of the GMPE, , calculates the intra and inter-event 
residuals.  The intra and inter-event residuals within the GMPE reflect the spatial 
correlation of ground motion intensities at closely spaced sites and the correlation of 
response spectral values at differing natural periods.   
3.3.3 Ground Motion Spatial Correlation Model 
3.3.3.1  Spatial Correlation 
A study from Park et al. (2007) reports that ignoring or underestimating spatial 
correlations overestimates frequent losses and underestimates rare losses in risk analysis 
assessments.  Spatial correlation is large for sites that are close to one another; therefore it 
 
ln Yjk( )= ln Yjk( )+ ε jk +ηk
Yjk





is important to determine this value for a port system.  Boore et al. (2003) calculated that 
past 10 kilometers the spatial correlation coefficient equals zero, so distances below that 
will have some correlation.  Terminals in ports are usually located within a five-kilometer 
distance of one another.  For instance, the Port of Oakland (Figure 3.11) has terminals 
that range from 0.62-4.87 kilometers apart.  Therefore, calculation of spatial correlation 
between terminals will be important in the port system risk assessment. 
 
Figure 3.11 Port of Oakland 
  As depicted in Figure 3.12, the spatial portion of the intra-event residual 
describes the correlation between multiple sites and a single earthquake, while the inter-





Figure 3.12 Inter vs. Intra-event spatial correlations 
Analysis has shown that spatial correlation typically reduces as the separation 
between sites increases (Jayaram and Baker 2009).  For a portfolio of sites separated by 
only a few kilometers (e.g., terminals within a port), the correlation is strong and it is 
especially important that the intra-event residual be calculated.  Both the intra-event and 
inter-event residuals are calculated using semivariograms.  Semivariograms are matrices 
that measure the average dissimilarity between data.  In this case, the semivariogram, 
γ(h), measures the dissimilarity between intensity measures separated at sites u and u’ by 
some distance h: 
         (3.12) 
Here a and  are the sill and the correlation coefficient between Zu and Zu+h of 
the semivariogram, respectively.  Let Z denote a spatially distributed random function 
where u denotes the location of a site.  The sill of the semivariogram equals the variance 
of Zu, and the correlation coefficient can be calculated using the following equation: 
         (3.13) 
For equation 3.13, b is defined as the range of the semivariogram.  The ranges of 
correlations computed at long periods (>1 sec) are quite similar.  However, correlations at 
short periods (< 1 seconds), depend on the similarity of geologic conditions between 
sites, particularly Vs30.  For the port, the geologic conditions between the terminals are 












and Baker 2009).  Therefore, the range of the exponential semivariograms, b, can be 
predicted using the period, T and the following equations: 
For short periods (T < 1 second): 
  (3.14a) 
For long periods (T ≥ 1 second): 
  (3.14b) 
Jayaram and Baker (2009) express that the spatial correlation coefficient for PGV 
is approximately equal to the correlation coefficient for spectral acceleration at a period 
of 0.5 to 1.0 seconds.  Since the intensity measures used within the risk analysis 
framework are PGV and spectral acceleration for a period of 1.5 seconds, when PGV is 
used as the intensity measure will be taken from the center of this range (0.75 s) in the 
calculation of the exponential semivariogram b.   
3.3.3.2  Spectral Correlation 
The spectral correlation portion of the intra and inter-event residual is important 
because the intensity measure calculated for the wharf will be PGV while the intensity 
measure calculated for the cranes will be spectral acceleration.  Each of these calculated 
intensity measures will occur at different periods and must be correlated accordingly.  
This correlation is modeled using the following equation (Baker and Jayaram 2008): 
 (3.15) 
































































   (3.18) 
Where:  
  (3.19) 
 
The above equations were calculated as a fit of the spectral correlations of the 
ground-motions in the Next-Generation Attenuation (NGA) database, and apply to 
periods between 0.01 and 10 seconds (Baker and Jayaram 2008).   
 
 
3.3.4 Intra-event and Inter-event Residuals 
Both the spatial and spectral correlations determined from the equations above are 
used to calculate the intra-event residual, where only the spectral correlation determines 
the inter-event residual.   
The intra-event residual (εjk) is a function of both the site location (j) and the 
earthquake (k), therefore both the spatial and spectral correlations must be considered in 
its calculation.  The intra-event residual is a correlated randomly sampled vector of 
residuals from a multi-variate standard normal distribution.  This distribution can be 
described by creating a correlation matrix containing the product of spatial and spectral 
correlations for every site pair used in the calculation of the GMPE. Spatial correlation 
between sites u and u’ will be calculated using equations 3.13-3.14b where h = the 
separation distance between sites u and u’, and the period .  Spectral 
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The inter-event residual follows a univariate normal distribution and is only 
dependent on the spectral correlation.  To create its correlation matrix, the spectral 
correlation is calculated for the different periods between all of the intensity measure type 
pairs.  The inter-event residual is calculated by sampling from this distribution of spectral 
correlations.  Once calculated, both the inter and intra- event residuals are added to the 
median value of the intensity measure obtained from Atkinson and Boore (2008) 
resulting in the final estimate of the intensity measures for earthquake k. 
3.4 Component Fragility 
3.4.1 Ground Motion Database 
Part of the process for developing the fragility of a component is modeling the 
response over a wide range of possible earthquakes.  For this project, a total of 63 
empirical and simulated ground motions were selected for the development of fragility 
models for both the wharf and crane structures.  Each of these motions are typical of 
coastal California firm-site conditions and also represent a broad range of possible 
earthquake magnitudes and distances to which these structures may be subjected.   
Of the 63 motions, 56 are empirical motions selected from the Next-Generation 
Attenuation of Ground Motions (NGA) database (Chiou et al. 2008).  These ground 
motions were selected randomly using the following criteria: 
• Minimum moment magnitude (Mw): 5.5 
• Distance to rupture: between 0-60 km 
• Fault mechanism: Strike-slip, reverse, or reverse-oblique 
• Site Class: C (“Very dense soil and soft rock”) 
• Minimum usable frequency: less than 0.5 Hz 
• Earthquake location: No earthquakes outside the U.S. except for the 1995 
Kobe, Japan and 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquakes, and no records from 
the 1983 Coalinga earthquake 
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In addition to these records, Paul Somerville of URS Corporation provided a list 
of near-fault records to be included in the suite of ground motions.  Dr. Robert Graves, 
also of URS Corporation, provided data pertaining to simulated motions, since large-
magnitude California earthquakes were not available in the NGA database.  The 
simulated motions corresponded to Mw = 7.8 ShakeOut simulations of the southern San 
Andreas fault with distance to rupture ranges from 18-60 km within a Site Class C. 
The simulated ground motion data was provided as velocity time histories.  
Acceleration time histories were then calculated by using backward-difference filter to 
numerically differentiate the velocity data: 
      (3.20) 
The frequency response of the numerical differentiation filter is shown in Figure 3.13: 
 
Figure 3.13 Frequency response of numerical differentiation filter 
The resulting suite of ground motions is summarized in Table 3.3.  Plots of the X 













Table 3.3 NGA and SIM Ground Motion Summary Table 
NGA 




Magnitude PGA (g) 
33 Parkfield 0.010 6.19 0.293 
145 Coyote Lake 0.005 5.74 0.218 
150 Coyote Lake 0.005 5.74 0.404 
448 Morgan Hill 0.005 6.19 0.343 
451 Morgan Hill 0.005 6.19 0.965 
472 Morgan Hill 0.005 6.19 0.067 
632 Whittier Narrows-01 0.020 5.99 0.137 
648 Whittier Narrows-01 0.020 5.99 0.153 
649 Whittier Narrows-01 0.020 5.99 0.154 
669 Whittier Narrows-01 0.005 5.99 0.196 
676 Whittier Narrows-01 0.005 5.99 0.161 
684 Whittier Narrows-01 0.020 5.99 0.031 
739 Loma Prieta 0.005 6.93 0.238 
751 Loma Prieta 0.005 6.93 0.091 
753 Loma Prieta 0.005 6.93 0.498 
779 Loma Prieta 0.005 6.93 0.783 
791 Loma Prieta 0.005 6.93 0.071 
802 Loma Prieta 0.005 6.93 0.382 
810 Loma Prieta 0.005 6.93 0.457 
897 Landers 0.020 7.28 0.070 
954 Northridge-01 0.010 6.69 0.200 
969 Northridge-01 0.010 6.69 0.056 
982 Northridge-01 0.005 6.69 0.764 
983 Northridge-01 0.005 6.69 0.765 
1008 Northridge-01 0.010 6.69 0.129 
1012 Northridge-01 0.010 6.69 0.319 
1013 Northridge-01 0.005 6.69 0.453 
1014 Northridge-01 0.020 6.69 0.042 
1023 Northridge-01 0.020 6.69 0.169 
1031 Northridge-01 0.020 6.69 0.128 
1035 Northridge-01 0.010 6.69 0.166 
1055 Northridge-01 0.010 6.69 0.234 
1057 Northridge-01 0.010 6.69 0.104 
1085 Northridge-01 0.005 6.69 0.647 
1086 Northridge-01 0.020 6.69 0.701 
1642 Sierra Madre 0.020 5.61 0.277 
1794 Hector Mine 0.010 7.13 0.150 
2374 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-02 0.005 5.90 0.021 
2393 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-02 0.005 5.90 0.029 
2397 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-02 0.005 5.90 0.019 
2399 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-02 0.005 5.90 0.046 
2490 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-03 0.005 6.20 0.077 
2498 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-03 0.005 6.20 0.076 
2658 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-03 0.005 6.20 0.608 
2716 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-04 0.005 6.20 0.032 
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2804 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-04 0.004 6.20 0.019 
2867 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-04 0.005 6.20 0.023 
2871 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-04 0.005 6.20 0.052 
2883 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-04 0.005 6.20 0.031 
3008 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-05 0.005 6.20 0.057 
3016 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-05 0.005 6.20 0.040 
3353 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-06 0.005 6.30 0.018 
3361 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-06 0.005 6.30 0.037 
3469 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-06 0.005 6.30 0.040 
3474 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-06 0.005 6.30 0.644 
3507 Chi-Chi, Taiwan-06 0.005 6.30 0.257 
Broadband Simulations       
0001 Shakeout-HS1.2.0 0.025 7.80 0.250 
0002 Shakeout-HS1.2.0 0.025 7.80 0.151 
0003 Shakeout-HS1.2.0 0.025 7.80 0.165 
0004 Shakeout-HS1.2.0 0.025 7.80 0.061 
0005 Shakeout-HS1.2.0 0.025 7.80 0.119 
0006 Shakeout-HS1.2.0 0.025 7.80 0.207 
0007 Shakeout-HS1.2.0 0.025 7.80 0.050 
 
Response spectra for empirical and simulated ground motions were calculated 
using the algorithm described in Nigam and Jennings (1969), and a summary of the 
acceleration response spectra for the suite of motions is shown in Figure 3.14.  Figure 
3.15 provides a summary of the moment magnitudes vs. the closest distance to rupture for 




Figure 3.14 Response spectra for entire suite of ground motions 
 
Figure 3.15 Moment magnitude vs. closest distance to the rupture 
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This collection of 63 ground motions was chosen as a representative sample of the 
wide variety of ground motions that the hypothetical port could be subject to.  
Consequentially, they were used to develop fragility models for the wharves and cranes 
within the hypothetical port. Sequentially, embankment response, soil-structure 
interaction, wharf response, and then crane response were modeled.  Each component’s 
individual response was also modeled to accommodate the future comparison of a 
number of different port mitigation options that would alter the overall fragility models of 
the wharves and cranes. 
3.4.2 Embankment Response 
3.4.2.1  Embankment Modeling Overview 
Seismic slope stability is a complex design problem.  The seismic response of an 
embankment depends on the shape of the embankment, the types of soil included within 
the embankment, and the level of the water table (Vytiniotis 2005).  In ports, the soil 
backfills within embankments commonly consist of some type of hydraulic sand fill 
(Gallagher 2000).  Therefore, liquefaction and lateral spreading become a significant 
concern (Hamada et al. 1996; Gallagher and Mitchell 2002).  To properly estimate 
damage resulting from liquefaction or lateral spreading, the response of the soil 
embankment must be properly modeled.  Within the scope of this project the 
embankment modeling was conducted by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology using dynamic coupled pore-pressure displacement seismic slope-stability 
finite element analyses (Vytiniotis et al. 2011).  The numerical model of the embankment 
was built in OPENSEES (McKenna and Rodgers 2010) using a modified Dafalias-
Manzari soil model (Dafalias and Manzari 2004). This type of model was chosen for its 
ability to accurately simulate the stress-strain behavior of sand during cyclic mobility 
events, its accurate prediction of void ratio effects, and the effects of dilation during 
subsequent loading and unloading paths.  The model calculated displacement in the 
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horizontal and vertical directions, along with the pore water pressure at a number of 
nodes located along where the wharf piles are embedded within the embankment (see 
Figure 3.16).  These specific nodes were chosen because the results would be used in 
subsequent models to estimate the soil-structure interaction between the soil and piles, 
and ultimately the wharf response. 
 





Two different embankment responses were numerically modeled within the scope 
of this project: a liquefiable embankment and an embankment mitigated with vertical 
drains (see section 3.4.2.2). 
 
Liquefiable Soil Embankment  
Since many ports use dredged material as backfill for embankments, the 
possibility of liquefaction and lateral spreading within these embankments is significant.  
The first soil profile examined will be that of an embankment subject to liquefaction.  
This embankment consists of a18.3 meter layer of hydraulic fill through which the 
majority of the wharf piles are embedded.  The profile geometries can be found in Figure 
3.17, and the soil properties for each layer are in Table 3.4. 
 




Table 3.4 Soil Properties for Liquefiable Embankment Profile (from (Vytiniotis et al. 
2011)). 
 
3.4.2.2  Soil Mitigation Options 
Two options were examined as soil remediation possibilities within the scope of this 
project.  In many ports, the backfill for the wharf is composed of loose sand placed as a 
result of dredging.    This material is especially susceptible to liquefaction upon 
earthquake excitation. Both soil remediation possibilities could be implemented to 
mitigate the effects of soil liquefaction within the backfill of the wharf.  The two 
mitigation methods studied in this project include colloidal silica gel and prefabricated 
vertical drains. 
3.4.2.2.1 Colloidal Silica Gel 
Colloidal silica gelling is a passive stabilization technique.  In this method, a stabilizing 
material is injected into the soil at the up-gradient edge of a site.  The stabilizer is then 
spread through the site using the natural ground water flow.  Once the stabilizer has 
spread to the intended area, it will begin to gel and bind soil particles together; stabilizing 
the mass.  Gel times can be predetermined based on delivery times or can be rapidly 
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brought on with the introduction of a catalyst (Spencer 2010).  Once stabilized, soil 
particles are bound together and liquefaction cannot occur.  However, while the colloidal 
silica material itself is relatively inexpensive, the injection process into existing backfill 
is not.  Therefore, it was decided that computational time would not be spent on modeling 
this particular soil mitigation technique within the embankment response. 
3.4.2.2.2 Prefabricated Vertical Drains 
Prefabricated vertical drains are essentially corrugated plastic pipes lined with geotextile 
that can be placed vertically within backfill at specific intervals, and provide a conduit for 
the dissipation of excess pore pressure built up during earthquake excitation.  The 
dissipation of the excess porewater pressure lessens the effects of liquefaction and 
alleviates lateral spreading.  Figure 3.18 shows an example of a vertical drain and the 
pattern in which they are installed within the ground. 
 
Figure 3.18 Prefabricated vertical drain and triangular installation pattern from (Howell et 
al. 2011) 
Prefabricated vertical drains (PVDs) were chosen as the main soil remediation technique 
examined within the scope of this project because of their versatility and ease of 
implementation at existing wharf structures.  Extensive physical modeling of PVDs using 
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centrifuge tests found that PVDs were effective in dissipating excess pore water pressure 
both during and after earthquake excitation.  Associated deformations from liquefaction 
were also reduced.  There was a 30-60% improvement in horizontal deformations and a 
20-60% improvement in vertical settlement (Howell et al. 2011).   
Like the physical models, it is expected that the embankment model with the 
inclusion of prefabricated vertical drains (PVDs) in the backfill will reduce the porewater 
pressures during earthquake excitation.  The change in porewater pressure will be present 
within the free field, and relative displacements of soil will be lessened.  The positioning 
of the PVDs within the embankment model geometry can be found in Figure 3.19, and 








Figure 3.19 Soil Profile – Liquefiable soil with prefabricated vertical drains (after 




For the Dafalias and Manzari (2004) sand model, the numerical simulations were 
calibrated using Toyoura sand.  The sand constants used in the constitutive model can be 
found in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Dafalias and Manzari constitutive model constants (From Vytiniotis 2005 ). 
 
 
3.4.2.3  Embankment Model Shortcomings 
The embankment analysis produces ground motions at varying soil nodes in two 
dimensions.  However, the wharf analysis uses a three-dimensional wharf model.  
Therefore it was necessary to estimate ground motions for the missing dimension.  One 
possibility considered included conducting a separate 1-D analysis to generate the needed 
ground motion, but this idea was rejected because it seemed impractical for a user to 
conduct an entirely separate 1-D analysis at multiple soil nodes in addition to the 
embankment analysis. Therefore, it was decided that the most practical method for 
generating the necessary ground motions in the third dimension was to use transfer 
functions to estimate the required ground motion. 
The ground motion not calculated within the embankment model lies in the 
longitudinal or Y direction if one considers Z as vertical, and X as the transverse 
direction from the seaside edge to landside edge of the port (See Figure 3.20).  Also, it 
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should be noted that since Figure 3.20 is drawn in the X-Z plane, for all subsequent 
descriptions of the two horizontal motions, X is the in-plane motion calculated from the 
embankment model, and Y is the out of plane (into the page) motion that will be 
calculated using transfer functions.  
 
Figure 3.20 Directional reference for the wharf. 
 
3.4.2.4  Transfer Functions 
Multiple attempts were made to use transfer functions to calculate a reasonable 
estimate of the out-of-plane motion.  Most attempts did not produce accurate estimates 
for large, highly non-linear ground motions.  The method that was ultimately chosen will 
be termed pseudo-transfer functions.  The pseudo-transfer functions are named as such 
because their calculation uses response spectra instead of the more traditional Fourier 
spectra.  The pseudo-transfer function method was found to be preferable over the use of 
the Fourier analysis transfer function because for large motions with significant soil non-
linearity, Fourier estimated out-of-plane motions were filled with noise and not 
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representative of true earthquake motions.  The use of the pseudo-transfer function 
method resolves this problem.  
 Pseudo-transfer functions are calculated by finding the response spectrum 
of Xrock and Yrock and then using equation 3.21 to calculate the ratio between the two 
spectra:  
          (3.21) 
As an example, the pseudo-transfer function will be calculated for NGA motion 
1642 which can be seen in Figure 3.21: 
 
Figure 3.21 Input rock motions (X and Y) for NGA1642 
First the response spectra of each motion is calculated using the algorithm 








spectral acceleration at a spectral damping = 5%.  Figure 3.22 shows the response spectra 
for both Xrock (in-plane) and Yrock (out-of-plane) in the upper plot and then a plot of the 























Rock In-Plane vs. Rock Out-of-Plane 
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Figure 3.22 Comparison of Rock input motion response spectra and the Pseudo-transfer 
function 


















Rock In-Plane vs. Rock Out-of-Plane




























When the pseudo-transfer function is multiplied by the response spectra for the in-
plane (Xsoil) soil motion at a specified wharf node in the embankment model (Equation 
3.22), it gives an estimate of the out-of-plane (Ysoil) response spectra (U).   
  (3.22) 
The out-of-plane motion in the time domain is then calculated from the (Ysoil) 
response spectra estimate using a spectral matching program.  The calculated response 
spectrum U will become the target spectrum within the program, which will spectrally 
match the response spectrum of the in-plane soil motion (Xsoil) to the target spectrum U.  
The program can then compute an out-of-plane (Ysoil) soil response spectrum along with 
the out-of-plane soil motion in the time domain.   
This process is most easily understood through an example.  Therefore, for the 
current NGA motion 1642, calculation of the out-of-plane (Ysoil) time history will be 
made at the ground surface soil node.  It is important to note that within the wharf model 
the Xsoil time history generated from the embankment model is used in the transfer 
function method to calculate the Ysoil time history.  However, to help check the validity of 
using this procedure, an OPENSEES (McKenna and Rodgers 2010) effective stress 
analysis for a soil profile (Figure 3.23) comparable to those used in the embankment 
response was conducted to generate the Xsoil motion and a corresponding Ysoil motion   
The OPENSEES Ysoil will be used to compare with the Ysoil computed using the transfer 
function. Soil properties for each layer of the soil profile used in the OPENSEES analysis 





Table 3.6.  The soil profile and soil properties were chosen so that they closely 













Table 3.6 – Soil Properties 
Soil Unit Weight 
(Mg/m3) 
Vs 








1.85 134.3 3.34e4 0 6.67e4 2.22e4 
Sand Fill 2.05 157.4 5.08e4 0 1.02e5 3.39e4 






Figure 3.23 Soil Profile for Transfer Function Validation 
The OPENSEES analysis conducted was an effective stress site response analysis 
for a layered soil profile on a 0% slope and underlain by an elastic half-space.  The code 
used was modified from the effective stress analysis code available on the OPENSEES 
wiki created by McGann et al (2011).  In this analysis, nine node quadrilateral elements 
with both displacement and pore pressure degrees of freedom enable the model to track 
changes in pore pressure and effective stress during earthquake excitation. The finite 
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Kuhlemeyer dashpot (1969).  The horizontal ground motions produced at the surface 
node as a result of the earthquake excitation in this analysis can be found in Figure 3.24. 
 
Figure 3.24 Horizontal soil motions (X and Y) from OPENSEES. 
It is assumed that had the embankment model actually calculated the out-of-plane 
motion, it would be comparable to the motion calculated using OPENSEES.  The 
transfer-function-calculated out-of-plane soil motion will now be calculated for 
comparison.  Using equation 3.20 the target response spectrum U, is calculated by 
multiplying the transfer function by the response spectra of the in-plane soil motion 
calculated within the embankment model. The resulting target response spectrum is 



























shown in green in Figure 3.25.  This figure also compares the calculated out-of-plane 
response spectrum to the response spectrum of the out-of-plane soil motion for NGA1642 
generated in OPENSEES (blue).  The two response spectra are comparable in that the 
root mean square error for the OPENSEES Ysoil curve minus the computed Ysoil curve 
equals 0.1990. 
  
Figure 3.25 Comparison of target response spectrum and OPENSEES-generated response 
spectrum for the out-of-plane direction. 
The estimated out-of-plane time history is extracted from the targeted response 
spectrum U using the time-domain spectral matching program RSPMATCH developed 
by Norm Abrahamson (1999).  The program uses the algorithm developed by Tseng and 
Lilanand (1988) to match seed accelerograms to a target response spectrum by adding 
wavelets in the time domain.  With respect to the example shown, the target response 

















Comparison of Spectral Accelerations for








spectrum described corresponds to the target spectrum U which was calculated in 
equation 3.20 using the pseudo-transfer function, and the seed accelerogram corresponds 
to the response spectrum of the in-plane (X) time history at the ground surface soil node 
calculated by the embankment model.  Figure 3.26 provides an example of the response 
spectra calculated by the RSPMATCH program: 
  
Figure 3.26 Response spectra produced via the RSPMATCH program. 
 The response spectra computed from the RSPMATCH program compared to those 
generated from the soil motions produced through OPENSEES was shown in Figure 
3.25.  Figure 3.27 compares the Ysoil time history produce by the RSPMATCHprogram 
from the spectra and the Ysoil time history from OPENSEES: 

















RSP Match Spectral Accelerations:










Figure 3.27 Time histories for Xsoil (R), Ysoil (B), and computed Ysoil (G) for NGA1642. 
3.4.2.4.1 Additional Pseudo-Transfer Function Validation Tests 
A total of three ground motions were used to test the pseudo-transfer function 
method.  The three motions used were NGA 0897, 1642, and 0779 and from the PGAs of 
each motion they represented a small, medium, and large ground motion respectively.  
The name and PGA of each ground motion used in testing is listed in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7 Description of NGA Motions Used in Transfer Function Validation. 
Name Size PGA (g) 
NGA0897 Small 0.070 
NGA1642 Medium 0.277 
NGA0779 Large 0.783 
 
 
To confirm that the pseudo-transfer function method computes reasonable Ysoil 
time histories for small and large motions in addition to a medium-sized motion 
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(NGA1642), Figure 3.28, Figure 3.29, Figure 3.30, and Figure 3.31 show the comparison 
between the Ysoil (B), and computed Ysoil  (G) response spectra and time histories for 
NGA0897 and NGA0779, Table 3.8 calculates the root mean square error between the 
OPENSEES and computed Ysoil response spectra: 
 
Figure 3.28 Response spectra for Ysoil (B), and computed Ysoil (G) for NGA0897. 
















Comparison of Spectral Accelerations for









Figure 3.29 Time histories for Ysoil (B), and computed Ysoil (G) for NGA0897. 
 
Figure 3.30 Response spectra for Ysoil (B), and computed Ysoil (G) for NGA0779. 
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Figure 3.31 Time histories for Ysoil (B), and computed Ysoil (G) for NGA0779. 
Table 3.8 – Root Mean Square Errors between Response Spectra 
Earthquake Motion RMSE 
NGA 0897 0.0162 
NGA 1642 0.1990 
NGA 0779 0.1630 
 
3.4.3 Wharf Response 
3.4.3.1  Wharf Model 
Finding the response of the wharf to earthquake excitation is a complicated but 
vital part in the overall risk analysis of the port.  The finite element (FE) model for the 
wharf has been developed in OPENSEES, an object-oriented FE analysis framework 
(McKenna and Mcgann 2010).  Models were built for both 2-D and 3-D analysis.   
The wharf model combines the research of several separate investigations to 
develop a more advanced method in modeling wharf responses that are unique to pile 
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supported wharves found in west coast seaports.  The following sections will overview 
the marginal wharf configurations analyzed within the scope of this study and highlight 
some of the new advances incorporated to improve the modeling of pile-deck connection 
failure mechanisms and the soil-structure interaction in liquefiable soils. 
3.4.3.1.1 Wharf Configurations 
The wharf configuration represented in this analysis accounts for some of the 
most commonly used wharf structures along the west coast.  Many of the current west 
coast wharves were designed and built in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s using seismic 
design criteria much less robust than the criteria used in modern design, which makes 
them seismically vulnerable:   
60’s Designed Wharf - This wharf configuration still exists in west coast ports today, 
but is consistent with wharves built in the 1960’s.  This wharf is thought to have 
higher seismic vulnerability than the new construction wharf. It should also be noted 
that several of these types of wharves were damaged in previous earthquake events 
and had to be repaired (Figure 3.32). 
 
Figure 3.32 Typical 1960’s Wharf 
 
3.4.3.1.2 Physical Elements 
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As the details for modeling the physical elements within the wharf are described, 
it should be noted that subsequent details of the wharf model refer specifically to the 
aforementioned 1960’s wharf configuration (Figure 3.32).  However, all concepts and 
modeling techniques are essentially the same for any pile-supported marginal wharf 
configuration.   
Figure 3.33 illustrates each of the elements that interact to produce the two-
dimensional numerical strip model of the wharf: results from the embankment model, 
macroelements / soil springs, pile-deck connection model, and the physical elements 
(wharf deck and piles) of the wharf itself.  The modeling techniques for the physical 
elements for the 2D model will be discussed first and then its translation into the 3D 
sense will also be discussed in this section.  The remainder of the interacting elements 
(soil springs / macroelements and pile-deck connection model) will be discussed in 
separate subsequent sections. 
 
Figure 3.33 Interacting components that comprise the numerical wharf model (from 
(Werner and Rix 2008)) 
The two-dimensional wharf model uses OPENSEES to build a plain strain strip 
model of a specific wharf configuration.  Again, subsequent explanations will refer to the 
1960’s wharf configuration (Figure 3.32).  In this configuration, the deck is a cast-in-
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place reinforced concrete slab that was found to be substantially rigid with negligible 
flexural deformations. Therefore, the deck is modeled using rigid beam elements.  The 
deck is supported by two different types of piles.  The bulk of the vertical load is 
supported by a series of pre-stressed reinforced concrete vertical piles, which, when 
subjected to lateral loads, resist by bending.  The non-vertical piles in the wharf 
configuration are batter piles and account for the majority of the resistance to lateral 
loading.  Lateral displacement of the wharf deck is accommodated by axial deformations 
in the batter piles, which induce tension or compression depending on the direction of 
displacement (Shafieezadeh et al. 2009). 
The three-dimensional model builds upon the two-dimensional model by taking 
the 2D strip model and repeating it in the longitudinal direction.  This conversion is 
depicted graphically in Figure 3.33.  2D wharf models are more common in practice, but 
for this study the 3D model was examined because there are forces and interactions 
considered in the 3D model that cannot be considered in a 2D model.  For instance, the 
3D model allows for the investigation of the response of the wharf in the longitudinal 
direction from the longitudinal motion (in this case calculated by the pseudo-transfer 
functions), the torsional response of the wharf caused by differing centers of mass and 
rigidity, and the boundary effects from adjacent segments (specifically pounding and 




Figure 3.34 Conversion from 2D to 3D wharf model (from (Shafieezadeh 2011)) 
3.4.3.1.3 Pile-Deck Connections 
Pile deck connections refer to the structural detailing thorough which the piles are 
connected to the deck.  Obviously, pile-deck connections are important in both 2D and 
3D modeling, but in 3D modeling forces in the longitudinal direction are also considered.  
Typical deck connections common in port facilities include embedded dowels, extended 




Figure 3.35 Typical configurations of common pile-deck connections: (a) embedded 
dowel  with  outward  bent  bars,  (b)  embedded  dowel  with  T-headed  bars,  (c) 
extended pile, and (d) extended strand. 
 
T-headed dowel bars were modeled and the non-linear behavior of the connection 
was calibrated against full-scale tests within the scope of this project.  Therefore, T-
headed dowel bar connections were used in the wharf model. 
3.4.3.1.4 Soil Structure Interaction 
Soil-structure interactions (SSI) are also applicable to both the 2D and 3D 
modeling.  Again, the difference in the application to each is the consideration of the 
longitudinal direction in 3D modeling.  Soil-structure interaction modeling is important 
because during earthquake excitation the flexibility of the foundation support beneath a 
structure alters the ground motion in the vicinity of the foundation as compared to the 
free field.  SSI models are used to determine the actual loading experienced by the 
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structure foundation.  For the wharf soil-structure interaction model, porewater pressure 
time histories and soil displacements calculated within the free field simulation of the 
embankment response discussed in 3.4.2 (and from the pseudo-transfer functions in the 
case of the longitudinal response) are input into the model at nodes along the piles.  At 
each of these nodes, soil springs and damping elements are used to mimic the inertial, 
kinematic, and dissipation effects occurring during excitation. 
Soil Springs  
 
Pile-soil interaction is modeled by different types of springs for the various 
directions and soil layers studied.  In the horizontal direction, macroelements (Varun and 
Assimaki 2008) model the SSI within the loose sand layer  and conventional p-y springs 
model the SSI within the underlying dense sand and clay  layers  (Boulanger et al. 1999).  
The pile-soil interaction in the vertical direction is modeled by t-z (side) and q-z (tip) 
springs.  P-y, t-z, and q-z soil springs are commonly used in soil-structure interaction 
models, and their formulation and documentation can be found in Boulanger et al. (2007).  
 The macroelements however, are a new and novel concept developed as part of 
this risk analysis research.  Unlike p-y elements, the macroelements are able to capture 
the effects of liquefiable soil, which was a specific embankment condition tested within 
the port project.  The macroelement is composed of a modified Bouc-Wen type hysteresis 
model, a coupled viscous damper and a nonlinear closure gap spring.  (See Figure 3.36 
for the configuration).  The effect of liquefaction on the pile-soil interaction is considered 
by evaluating the average effective stress in the vicinity of the pile using the “liquefaction 
front” concept developed by Iai et al. (1992). In this approach, pore pressure generation is 
directly proportional to the total amount of plastic shear work done per unit volume of 
soil (Towhata and Ishihara 1985).  The macroelement accounts for pore pressure 
dissipation by allowing drainage between near-field and far-field controlled by hydraulic 
conductivity of soil.  3D finite element simulations, large scale centrifuge tests, and field 
tests were used to verify the macroelement technique.  Details can be found in Varun 
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(2010), but overall predicted results showed a close agreement to the experimental 
results.   
 
Figure 3.36 Macroelement schematic showing input, output, and components (from 
(Varun 2010)). 
Damping  
In a dynamic loading, energy dissipation is accounted for through material 
damping and through damping at the bearings and joints of a structure from friction.  In 
the wharf model, structural damping in the deck, joints and piles is set at 5% (based on 
Rayleigh proportional damping).  The material damping caused by energy dissipation 
through the soil is a function of small-strain damping, radiation damping, and hysteretic 
damping.  At small strain levels, damping is usually less than 10%, and 5% damping is a 
widely accepted value (Ishihara 1996; Lai and Rix 1998) that will be used in this study.  
The energy dissipation from radiation damping was modeled using the method proposed 
by Gazetas and Makris (1991) for the vertical direction and  by  Makris  and  Gazetas  
(1992)  for  the  lateral  horizontal  direction.  These methods represent radiation damping 
as a linear dashpot in parallel with the soil spring.  The damping coefficient per unit 
length of the pile is calculated at every pile node location (in parallel to the soil spring at 
that location) as:   
        (3.23) 
where ρs is the density of the soil, Vs is the shear wave velocity of the soil, d is the pile 
diameter, a0=ωB/Vs is the normalized frequency of loading, and Q is a shape factor.  In 







and Gazetas 1992).  The hysteretic damping cause by large nonlinear soil deformations 
does not need to be calculated separately because it is automatically captured by the   
nonlinear hysteretic force-deformation behavior of soil springs in the horizontal and 
vertical directions.    
 
3.4.3.1.5 Numerical Modeling Results 
Once the numerical wharf model is run, the result is a measure of damage (See 
3.4.3.2) calculated at every pile node in the model caused be the specific ground motion 
used in that run of the numerical model.  Figure 3.37 shows the result of one such run: 
figure (a) shows the maximum curvature ductility demand calculated along each pile, and 
figure (b) shows the final deformed shape of the wharf whose displacement resulted from 
the demand in (a). 
 
Figure 3.37 Wharf and crane rail response during NGA1057: (a) profile of the maximum 
curvature ductility demand and (b) final deformed shape of the wharf  (from 
(Shafieezadeh 2011)) 
  The full extent of this damage is then classified within a damage state.  Damage 
is more extensively explained in 3.4.3.2, but basically damage is classified into one of 
three general categories: slight, moderate, or extensive.  Figure 3.38 calculates 
component fragility curves for a 2D analysis of the piles, pile-deck connections, and 
relative movement of the wharf from the landside crane rail by comparing the probability 





Figure 3.38 Component fragility curves for (a) pile section, (b) pile-deck connections, 
and (c) relative movement of the wharf with respect to the landside crane rail (solid lines 
are the fragility estimates and dashed lines are the corresponding 90% confidence 
boundaries).  (from (Shafieezadeh 2011)) 
 
The damage state is used to find the repair cost and time resulting from the 
original earthquake excitation (See 3.4.3.4).  Once the repair costs and times of damage 
states from every earthquake in the ground motion suite have been calculated, the losses 
can be aggregated within a fragility curve.  This fragility curve estimates the loss 
produced for a pile-supported wharf given an earthquake intensity measure (PGV).  The 
fragility curves are the ultimate goal of the wharf model because they will be used to 
probabilistically estimate wharf damage given the earthquake excitations within the 
overall risk analysis.   
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3.4.3.2  Wharf Damage Measures 
The numerical wharf model calculates a damage measure at every node in the 
model.  These calculated damage states help to define the damage at a given wharf 
section and to calculate the repair requirements for that damage.  Since the port is located 
over an area with varying underlying soil types and wharf structures, damage will not be 
uniform throughout the port after a ground motion.  Instead, repair costs and times are 
established for individual berths and then aggregated over the entire wharf.  
3.4.3.3 Wharf Repair Cost and Time 
The damage at each berth section will require varying degrees of repair and 
include varying modes of damage.  Thus, each berth section will also require varying 
degrees of repair time.  Probable damage modes at berth sections considered within the 
scope of this project are divided into one of four categories: pile damage, deck damage, 
damage to crane rails / collector trench, and relative movement of crane rail and wharf 
deck.  The estimated costs and repair times for each of these categories is described in the 
following sections: 
3.4.3.3.1 Pile Damage 
Pile damage can account for minor to severe damage depending on the number 
and degree of pile damage.  Possible pile damage states are explained and illustrated in  
Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 and include: minimally spalled vertical piles, moderately 
damaged vertical piles (above or below the water) broken vertical piles, broken batter pile 
pair, broken pile below ground. 
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Table 3.9 Wharf Damage States for Pile Damage (1) (Lehman et al. 2009) from (Werner 
and Cooke 2009) 
 
 
Table 3.10 Wharf Damage States for Pile Damage (2) (Lehman et al. 2009) from (Werner 
and Cooke 2009) 
 
Repairs and downtimes for each type of damage can be found in Table 3.11.  Note 
that all repair costs are in 2009 Dollars and each entry represents thousands of dollars.  
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For instance, the entry $45, actually equals $45,000 in 2009 dollars.  Costs are also 
displayed both with and without contingencies (conting.). 




First	  Pile	   Next	  few	  Damaged	  Piles	   For	  Many	  Additional	  damaged	  
Piles	  
Description	   Repair	  Cost	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Costs	  and	  downtimes	  to	  replace	  broken	  piles	  will	  be	  the	  same	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  break	  is	  above	  or	  below	  ground.	  	  See	  first	  3	  
rows	  of	  this	  table.	  	  If	  soil	  sloughing	  has	  occurred	  and	  broken	  the	  piles,	  refer	  to	  Table	  3.X	  for	  governing	  costs	  and	  times.	  
Notes:	  	   1.)	  Contingencies	  applied	  to	  repair	  design	  and	  construction	  costs,	  but	  not	  to	  mobilization.	  
2.)	  If	  damage	  occurs	  in	  absence	  of	  other	  types	  of	  damage	  that	  requires	  repair	  inspection,	  include	  2	  days	  of	  downtime	  for	  
inspection.	  
 
3.4.3.3.2 Deck Damage 
Much like pile damage, deck damage can attribute to minor to severe damage 
states depending on the area and degree of damage.  Damage states for possible deck 
damages are explained in Table 3.12 and include: damage to underside of deck above 
piles, ruptured concrete shear keys, and ruptured deck caused by punch through of piles. 
Table 3.12 Wharf Damage States for Deck Damage (Earthquake Engineering Research 
Institute (EERI) 1990; Werner 1998) from (Werner and Cooke 2009) 
 
Repair Costs and downtimes for these damage states include the repair of the deck 
itself, repair of the broken piles, and repair of batter pile pairs.  Again, the repair cost and 
  
 117 
time summary table (Table 3.13) lists costs in thousands of dollars as in Table 3.11, with 
contingencies (w/ conting.) and without contingencies (w/out conting.). 






Next	  few	  Damage	  Occurrences	   For	  Many	  Additional	  damage	  
occurrences	  
Description	   Repair	  Cost	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7	  	  days	  
-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐	  
Notes:	  	   1.)	  If	  damage	  occurs	  in	  absence	  of	  damage	  to	  other	  wharf	  components	  that	  require	  damage	  inspection,	  repair	  design,	  	  
and	  mobilization	  of	  repair	  resources,	  increase	  downtime	  by	  3	  days	  for	  inspection	  and	  repair	  design,	  and	  by	  the	  following	  
times	  for	  mobilization	  of	  repair	  resources:	  (a)	  5	  days	  for	  earthquake	  M<	  7.0;	  and	  (b)	  10	  days	  for	  M	  ≥	  7.0.	  
	   2.)	  Include	  additional	  costs	  and	  downtimes	  for	  repair	  of	  piles	  	  
 
3.4.3.3.3 Crane Rails / Collector Trench Damage 
Relative movement between crane rails and collector trenches account for more 
severe damage states because movement often prohibits use of the cranes through loss of 
power or through damage to the crane path alignment.  While repair costs account for 
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some of the losses in such a situation, the operational losses will far exceed the repair 
costs.  Damage states pertaining to the crane rail collector trench are dependent on the 
relative displacement at the expansion joints and are explained in Table 3.14 and their 
repair costs and downtimes are listed in Table 3.15.  
Table 3.14 Wharf Damage States for Crane Rail / Collector Trench Damage from 












Table 3.15 Repair Cost and Time Summary – crane rail / collector trench damage from 
(Werner and Cooke 2009) 
Relative	  Displacement	  
(Offset)	  Across	  





w/out	  contingencies	   w/	  contingencies	  
⅜	  to	  	  ¾	  	   $7,500	   $13,800	   3	  days	  
¾	  to	  1	  ½	   $22,500	   $41,400	   9	  days	  
>	  1	  ½	   $220,000	   $404,800	   80	  days	  
Notes:	  	   1.)	  Damage	  to	  collector	  trench	  will	  occur	  only	  if	  shear	  keys	  along	  expansion	  joints	  are	  damaged.	  	  Therefore,	  costs	  for	  
collector	  trench	  repair	  should	  be	  combined	  with	  costs	  for	  repair	  of	  shear	  keys	  (Error!	  Reference	  source	  not	  found.).	  	  
Downtimes	  for	  shear	  key	  repairs	  are	  concurrent	  with	  downtimes	  for	  collector	  trench	  repairs.	  
	   2.)	  If	  collector	  trench	  damage	  occurs	  in	  absence	  of	  damage	  to	  other	  wharf	  components	  that	  require	  inspection,	  repair	  
design,	  and	  mobilization	  of	  repair	  resources,	  increase	  downtime	  by	  3	  days	  for	  inspection	  and	  repair	  design	  and	  by	  the	  
following	  times	  for	  mobilization	  of	  repair	  resources:	  (a)	  5	  days	  if	  M	  <	  7.0;	  and	  (b)	  10	  days	  if	  M	  ≥	  7.0.	  
	  
 
3.4.3.3.4 Relative movement of crane rail and wharf deck 
The relative movement of the crane rail and wharf deck accounts for one of the 
most severe types of wharf damages.  Depending on the relative displacement, cranes 
could remain operable, or be rendered useless until repair has taken place.  As with the 
crane rail and collector trench, the overall wharf damage state depends on the amount of 
relative displacement (Table 3.16).  Likewise, the repair cost and downtimes also depend 
on displacement (Table 3.17). 
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Table 3.16 Wharf Damage States for Relative Movement of Crane Rail and Wharf Deck 
(Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) 1990; Werner and Dickenson 1996) 
from (Werner and Cooke 2009) 
 
Table 3.17 Repair Cost and Time Summary – Relative Movement of Crane Rail and 
Wharf Deck from (Werner and Cooke, 2009) 
Damage	  State	   Length	  of	  damage	  =	  300	  ft.	   Length	  of	  damage	  >	  1,200	  ft.	  
















Relative	  horiz.	  movement	  
of	  landside	  crane	  rail	  and	  















Relative	  horiz.	  movement	  
of	  landside	  crane	  rail	  and	  














More	  than	  6”	  of	  relative	  
movement	  of	  landside	  
crane	  rail	  and	  wharf	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Repairs	  include	  new	  
structural	  connection	  
















Repairs	  exclude	  new	  
structural	  connection	  














Notes	  	   1.)	  It	  is	  assumed	  here	  that	  these	  relative	  horizontal	  movements	  extend	  over	  a	  length	  along	  the	  crane	  rail	  girder	  that	  is	  150	  
ft.	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  expansion	  joint	  (total	  length	  =	  300	  ft.).	  	  However,	  for	  lengths	  experiencing	  movement	  different	  from	  
300	  ft,	  increase	  or	  decrease	  the	  repair	  costs	  and	  downtimes	  proportional	  to	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  actual	  length	  to	  300	  ft.	  
	   2.)	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  if	  horizontal	  movements	  exceed	  6	  in.	  and	  extend	  over	  a	  significant	  length,	  the	  entire	  girder	  b/w	  
expansion	  joints	  (1,200	  ft.)	  will	  need	  to	  be	  replaced.	  Replacement	  of	  lengths	  differing	  from	  300	  ft,	  would	  have	  repair	  costs	  
and	  downtimes	  increased	  or	  decreased	  in	  proportion	  with	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  actual	  length	  to	  300	  ft.	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3.)	  If	  these	  relative	  movements	  occur	  in	  absence	  of	  damage	  to	  other	  wharf	  components	  that	  require	  inspection,	  repair	  
design,	  and	  mobilization	  of	  repair	  resources,	  increase	  downtime	  by	  3	  days	  for	  inspection	  and	  repair	  design	  and	  by	  the	  
following	  times	  for	  mobilization	  of	  repair	  resources:	  (a)	  5	  days	  if	  M	  <	  7.0;	  and	  (b)	  10	  days	  if	  M	  ≥	  7.0.	  
	   4.)	  If	  relative	  horizontal	  movements	  are	  accompanied	  by	  relative	  vertical	  movements	  ≥	  2	  in.,	  crane	  rail	  girder	  will	  need	  to	  be	  
replaced.	  
	  
While it is intended that most occurring damage will simply be repaired, it is 
possible that some wharf damage will be so severe that replacement becomes more 
economical.  In discussions with port officials, it was decided that when repair costs = 
50-60% of the replacement costs for damaged wharfs, that replacement becomes a more 
feasible option than repair.   For the confines of this study, replacement will occur over 
repair when repair costs are greater than or equal to 60% of the repair costs.  Cost of 
replacement with contingencies = $320/ft2, and takes 24 months for the first 1200’ 
segment, and 12 months for each additional segment. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that several assumptions have been made in 
the development of the repair and replace costs/times for wharf damage.  These 
assumptions include but are not limited to:  
1.) Damages listed are not all encompassing; only those expected to most commonly 
occur. 
2.) Damages / Repairs only apply to the pile supported wharfs common to the US 
West Coast. 
3.) For cost/repair estimates, the length of one berth within the wharf is 600’. 
4.) All costs cited are in 2009 dollars. 
5.) Mobilization time/cost = 0 days for a Mw < 6.0, 5 days for 6.0 ≥ Mw ≥ 7.0, and 10 
for  Mw < 7.0. 
6.) Cost contingencies should be applied to all estimates. 
7.) Damage to the following within the port infrastructure system is not considered: 
pavements in wharf backlands, electrical and mechanical 




3.4.3.4  Calculation of Repair Requirements 
It was decided that the fragility curves calculated using the 2D wharf models 
would be used instead of the 3D models.  After investigation, it was apparent that the 
torsional component did not have as pronounced an effect in the response as expected 
(Shafieezadeh 2011).  Most of the wharf damage was a result of lateral displacements, 
which can be accurately captured in the 2D model.  Therefore, the 2D model was used in 
favor of the 3D model.  Use of the 2D model instead of the 3D also means that the repair 
requirements for deck damage and crane rail/ collector trench damage will not be 
considered since the torsional response in the longitudinal direction is not calculated.  
Therefore, only damage to the piles and the relative movement of the crane rail and wharf 
deck will be considered in the calculation of the repair requirements and the following 
fragility curves for the wharf. 
However, the repair requirements and the wharf analysis described in the previous 
sections only apply to a single wharf segment.  Each terminal is comprised of multiple 
wharf segments.  The repair costs and repair times for all of the segments within the 
wharf are exponential random variables calculated from two variables: a mean cost and 
mean time from the tables above and a correlation factor between adjacent wharf 
segments. 
The correlation factor between wharf segments [i,j] .  In the following 
terminal (Figure 3.39) if berth 1 remains wharf segment i, the rest of the berths would 
have the following correlation factors: 
 




3.4.3.5  Operational Status of the Wharf 
For each earthquake occurrence in the earthquake catalog, the component fragility 
curves for the wharf structures throughout the port will be used to estimate the initial 
damage state for each wharf section within the port system.  This damage will then be 
repaired over some period of time before the port can once again be fully operational.  
During this repair time, the port cannot function at full capacity, and port operations will 
be modeled within the operational model to determine the effect of the reduced capacity.   
The operational status of the wharf must be calculated during the repair period so that the 
operational model has knowledge of which berth sections are available over the entire 
repair period.  Table 3.18 shows a simplified example of how the operational status of the 
port’s wharf and crane structures is depicted within the risk analysis. In this example, 
several wharf sections and cranes are damaged in the earthquake and rendered 
inoperative during the first few days after the earthquake. By Day 8 following the 
earthquake, all of the wharf sections and cranes are repaired and operational and the port 
has gained full functionality.   
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Table 3.18 Example of Port System Operational Status 
   





Crane 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 … 
A 
1  N N N N N N Y Y Y … 
2  N N N N Y Y Y Y Y … 
3  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y … 
…           … 
5  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y … 
 a N N N N N N N Y Y … 
 b N N N N N N N N Y … 
 c N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y … 
 …          … 
 j Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y … 
Y = Operational; N = Not Operational 
For the example above and within the risk analysis, the operational status is 
calculated using component fragility curves, which estimate the initial damage state and 
the repair times for each damage state, which are predetermined from real-life data.  The 
operational model within the risk assessment requires an account of what day each wharf 
section or crane becomes available for use.   
The risk analysis program will apply two methods of repair sequencing within the 
terminals:  Parallel and Series repair.  Parallel sequencing is more likely and desirable of 
the two scenarios.  Parallel sequencing assumes that all wharves and cranes in need of 
repair will be worked on simultaneously.  Therefore the repair time with contingencies 
will equal the total repair time for each damaged berth.  Parallel sequencing is used for all 
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of the runs in the results section except for the one that specifically tests the series repair 
sequencing.   
Series repair is a more conservative option and assumes that damaged sections 
will not be fixed simultaneously but consecutively.  For this case, the sequence in which 
the damaged wharf sections will be repaired must be decided in order to calculate 
operational status.  There are several options available for deciding the series repair 
sequence: maximizing the longest contiguous length of berth, beginning with the berth 
with the shortest repair time and continuing to the longest repair time, choosing the 
inverse sequence of longest to shortest repair time, or attempting to maximize the number 
of ships able to berth at the undamaged wharf sections of the terminal.  The last option 
coincides with the operational goal of maximizing productivity during the repair period, 
however the latter three options are easier to implement.  Therefore, all options will be 
compared within the following example:   
 Assume that the following seven wharf sections (Figure 3.40) with the following 
repair times comprise a terminal.  Each section is 183 meters long.  Repair times equal to 
zero indicate immediate use, while those greater than zero indicate the number of days in 
which it will take a team to repair that section.    Ships docking at the wharf are assumed 
to be 270 meters, requiring two consecutive undamaged berths to dock in the terminal.  
 

















Three of the 7 sections are damaged: sections 3, 5, and 6. Therefore, there are 3! 
(6) repair sequences possible for repair.  The repair period for these sequences equals the 
sum of the repair times (since they are done consecutively), which equals 2+1+3 = 6 
days.  To compare the repair sequence options, every possible option will be simulated 
and the number of ships that are able to dock at the terminal will be calculated over the 
entire six-day repair period.  Table 3.19 shows the results of this example. 
Table 3.19 Number of Ships Able to Dock for Each Repair Sequence 
 Day  
Repair Sequence 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
3-5-6 1 2 2 2 2 3 12 
3-6-5 1 2 2 2 3 3 13 
5-3-6 2 2 2 2 2 3 13 
5-6-3 2 2 2 3 3 3 15 
6-3-5 1 1 2 2 3 3 12 
6-5-3 1 1 2 3 3 3 13 
  
The maximum number of ships is able to dock at the terminal during the repair 
period for sequence 5-6-3, and to maximize the productivity of the port post-earthquake, 
wharf sections should be repaired in that sequence.  The other sequencing options 
previously discussed did not allow as many ships to dock at the terminal during the repair 
period.  Repair sequences 6-5-3 and 3-5-6 corresponding to the longest and to the shortest 
repair time, and maximizing the longest contiguous length of wharf, respectively, allowed 
for a total of 12 ships to dock at the terminal during the repair period.  Sequence 5-3-6 
corresponds to repairing the section with the shortest repair time and then moving to the 
longest repair time.  This sequence produced slightly better results with 13 ships allowed 
during the repair period.  It is apparent that the best method for repair sequencing is to 
calculate the maximum ships able to dock at the berth during the repair period, and use 
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that specific sequence for repair.  However, this repair sequence is the hardest to 
implement because every combination of repair sequence has to be calculated before the 
optimum sequence can be chosen.  Port operators are not likely to perform a calculation 
of this nature.  Instead they would choose a good solution that’s easier to implement.  For 
this reason, the risk analysis program will use what corresponds to sequence 5-3-6: 
repairing sections in order from shortest to longest repair periods.    
It should be noted that though the previous example assumed a ship length of 270 
meters, in actual operation, ship lengths will vary.  In reality a small ship might be able to 
dock at only one wharf section length, thus increasing the total ship count.  However, 
frequency of ship lengths was studied using actual shipping data for two west coasts ports 
over a six-month period, to produce the estimate used in the previous example.  Figure 
3.41 shows the frequency of ship lengths arriving at these ports. 
 
Figure 3.41 Histogram of Ship Lengths 
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Only 11% of the ships within the data would fit at a single wharf section, while 
every other ship within the data would be able to dock at two contiguous sections.  
Therefore for the example, ship lengths were assumed to be the average length, 270 
meters. 
3.4.4 Crane Response 
3.4.4.1  Crane Modeling Overview 
Consideration of container cranes is an added concept from most previous port 
risk evaluations.  Seismic Guidelines for Ports (Werner 1998), suggests that container 
cranes generally perform well during earthquakes, however cranes have been growing in 
size and these newer, larger cranes may actually be damaged or fail during earthquakes 
(Kosbab 2010).  Severe crane damage results in significant losses due to downtime, since 
completely replacing a crane takes an average of 330 days.  Therefore, it was important 
to include crane damage within the scope of this project. 
Three typical “A” frame container cranes (Figure 3.42) were considered under the 
scope of this project. Cranes are generally classified by their outreach (ability to service 
ships of certain widths), and gage width (distance between the crane rails).  The 
following cranes range in outreach and gage width but generally represent the array of 
cranes used in US west-coast container ports (Schleiffarth 2008), and are therefore 
considered within the scope of this project:   
1.) Modern Jumbo Crane (J100) – Represents cranes with 100 foot (30.48 m) gage 
lengths and outreaches ranging from largest of the Post-Panamax class cranes (18-
20 containers wide) to the small to moderate cranes within the Super Post-
Panamax class (21-22 containers wide), which were built circa 2000.  This crane 
was designed without forethought of earthquake loading but “has a relatively stiff 
  
 129 
and strong portal sway mode due to operational stiffness requirements and lifting 
forces” (Kosbab 2010).   
2.) Heritage Jumbo Crane (LD100) – This crane type also has a 100 foot gage length 
and the outreach represents both small and large Post-Panamax class cranes (18-
20 containers wide) cranes built circa 1980.  In the original design, consideration 
of uplift of the crane legs in reaction to earthquake motion was accounted for 
though the frame was not specifically designed to withstand earthquake forces.  
Today, many of these cranes have been retrofitted with longer booms to service 
larger ships, without any further frame modifications.   
3.) Heritage Compact Crane (LD50) – This crane represents those with 50 foot 
(15.24 m) gage lengths and outreaches similar to the smallest of the Post-
Panamax class cranes built around 1970.  Subsequent crane designs meant to 
minimize rocking and uplift were based on the response of this crane. Tipping 
prior to significant structural damage is common during earthquakes.   
Crane modeling was conducted in OPENSEES (McKenna and Rodgers 2010) using a 
finite element analysis technique.  Several simplified analyses were conducted to 
determine the most vulnerable aspects of the crane, but the modeling to develop the 




Figure 3.42 Container Crane Schematic 
3.4.4.2  Crane Damage Measures 
Damage states for the cranes were compiled through the use of an internal 
document (Liftech Inc. 2008) presenting case studies and typical repairs for container 
cranes along with personal communication between Liftech, Inc. and Kosbab (2010).  
Four damage states caused by earthquake disruption have been identified for cranes: 
1.) Derailment – Derailment occurs when lateral loads are large enough to 
reduce the axial reaction of one leg to zero, thus causing the leg to be 
displaced from the wharf-mounted crane rail.  Derailment must be 
repaired by using mobile cranes or jacking systems to reposition the 
derailed crane back onto the crane rails (Liftech Inc. 2008). 
2.) Immediate Use – In this damage state the crane only suffers minor 
structural damage but is still available for use post-earthquake.  Specific 
damage can include frame buckling or torsional movement.  
3.) Structural Damage – In this damage state, the crane has suffered enough 
significant structural damage that it cannot be used immediately, but has 
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not collapsed.  Specific damage includes severe portal deformation and 
local buckling. 
4.) Complete Collapse – In this state structural damage to the crane is so 
severe that the structure collapses.  In this situation, repairs are usually not 
possible, and replacement is the only option.  Since most container cranes 
are made by one company (Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. 
(ZPMC) controls greater than 80% of international market share (Shipping 
China 2009)), purchases are semi-custom and replacement of the crane 
can take one year or more. 
3.4.4.3 Crane Fragility Curves 
Fragility curves were calculated in previous research (Kosbab 2010) to represent 
the probability of a crane reaching a particular limit state, given that specific earthquake 
intensities occur.   To calculate the fragility curves that follow, the following 
methodology was employed.  First, sensitivity analyses were conducted to characterize 
the importance of various contributors to overall uncertainty within container cranes.  
Next, finite element models, seismic demand modeling, and capacity estimates were used 
to gain knowledge of the crane response during earthquake excitation and the most 
vulnerable crane components.  The engineering demand parameter ultimately chosen was 
spectral acceleration at the fundamental period of the crane (T=1.55 s) for a spectral 
damping of 1.5%.  This EDP was easily applied from the portal uplift theory used to 
model the seismic demand.  A fragility method was employed to describe this model in 
which earthquake intensities were related to expected losses through the theorem of total 
probability.  The fragility curves created are intended to be used as industry “default” 
curves for most cranes in existence that should be tailored to specific cranes with the use 
of the aforementioned methodology.  The following figures (Figure 3.43-Figure 3.45) 




Figure 3.43 Fragility curves for J100 container crane, assuming portal uplift theory 
seismic demand model (from Kosbab 2010). 
 
Figure 3.44 Fragility curves for LD100, assuming portal uplift theory seismic demand 





Figure 3.45 Fragility curves for LD50, assuming portal uplift theory seismic demand 
model. (Kosbab 2010) 
 
By examining the fragility models above, it is easy to determine which cranes 
types are the most and least vulnerable to earthquakes.  In order from low to high seismic 
vulnerability: J100, LD100, LD50.  The aforementioned fragility curves were later 
compared to those calculated from scaled crane models (Jacobs 2010), and the agreement 
between the two was satisfactory. 
3.4.4.4  Crane Repair Cost and Time 
Repair costs and times for the cranes correspond to the damage unique to the 
crane.  It is possible for the crane to remain undamaged but still be inoperable due to 
wharf damage involving the crane rails or collector trench.  The crane specific damages 
are listed in Table 3.20 along with the mean repair costs and times.  Additionally 
coefficients of variability are also listed with each mean to account for the uncertainties 
corresponding to these values.  Repair costs and times for the cranes should be included 
within the total repair cost and time in addition to wharf damage. 
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Table 3.20 Crane Repair Costs and Time 
Damage State Cost ($) COV Downtime (Days) COV 
Derailment 50,000 0.3 6 0.3 
Immediate Use 300,000 0.5 10 0.5 
Structural Damage 500,000 0.5 60 0.5 
Complete Collapse 7,000,000 0.3 330 0.3 
 
3.4.4.5  Operational Status of the Cranes 
Crane operational status is binary in nature: the crane is operational, or it is not.  
However, as previously discussed, crane damage alone will not determine the operational 
status.  Cranes cannot operate independent of the wharf, so the damage state of the wharf 
must also be taken into consideration.  For instance, the crane damage state could be that 
of immediate use, but if a significant relative displacement between the crane rail and the 
collector trench has cut of the power to the crane, it cannot operate.  Another scenario 
might include that the crane has derailed, but the berth segments on which it operates are 
severely damaged.  Experience has shown that the most common form of crane damage 
is derailment, and that type of damage takes approximately 6 days to repair.  However, if 
the berth is severely damaged, repair could take weeks, so even after the crane is 
operational, it could not be utilized.   Both of these situations illustrate this 
interdependence, however in the operational model, the locations/ interdependence 
between the wharf and crane will not be taken into consideration.  The operational status 
of each will instead be considered independent.  For instance, if 1/3 of a wharf is 
unusable, but all of the cranes are functioning, it is assumed that every crane will be 
available for use on the usable 2/3 of the wharf despite the fact that in real life, this 
scenario might not always be true.     
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3.4.4.6 Crane Damping 
It should be noted that the damping ratio of the spectral acceleration used to 
calculate the crane fragility curves and the damping ratio of the spectral acceleration used 
as an intensity measure within the risk analysis program differ.  A period of 1.55 seconds 
and a ratio of 1.5% were used to calculate the fragility curves while a period of 1.5 s and 
a ratio of 5% were used as the intensity measure within the program.  This change had to 
be made so that the spectral acceleration values could be used within the ground motion 
prediction equations that require damping ratios of 5%.  The following equation from 
Newmark and Hall (1982) calculates a damping correction factor that is used within the 
risk analysis calculation of repair requirements to account for this difference: 
 
 
3.5 System Fragility 
The goal of the port operations models developed for this project is to simulate 
port operations decision-making by terminal operators during periods of disruption in 
port infrastructure.  This simulation will then be used to estimate the port performance 
metric: container throughput.  Inputs into the port operations model not only include the 
operational status of each of the port terminals, but also an estimation of the ship arrival 
schedule of the port along with the number of TEUs handled for each arriving ship.  
Containers that cannot be handled as throughput at the port will be counted within the 
business interruption loss (BIL) at the port. 
 
3.5.1 Ship Arrival Schedule 
The inputs to the port operations model include the day-by-day, port-wide system 
damage state and the schedule of arriving ships within the period of time beginning at the 
earthquake occurrence through the time when normal port operations are restored (i.e., 




port during this period were estimated using actual ship arrival and departure logs from 
March-August of 2008 for the Port of Los Angeles (POLA) and the Port of Long Beach 
(POLB) (Marine Exchange of Southern California 2008).  The Marine Exchange of 
Southern California (MXSOCAL) data can be found in Appendix C.  The logs for this 
data include 14 terminals, seven from POLA and seven from POLB.  Table 3.21 lists 
each terminal name, the number of associated berths, the length of the terminal, the mean 
number of ships using that terminal per day, and the standard deviation of ships per day 
obtained from these logs.  Location of the terminals can be determined by looking at the 
berth numbers.  POLA terminals have numbered berths, whereas POLB berths are both 
lettered and numbered. 
Table 3.21 Terminal Data from the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach from 
March-August of 2008. 
Terminal Name Berths Length (m) Mean Ships/Day 
σ 
Ships/Day 
West Basin Container Terminal 1 100 365.76 0.124 0.323 
West Basin Container Terminal 2 121-131 1066.8 0.366 0.545 
TraPac 135-139 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Yusen 212-225 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Seaside 226-236 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
APL 302-305 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APM 401-406 2191.51 1.108 0.863 
SSA Terminal 1 A88-A96 1097.28 0.476 0.633 
SSA Terminal 2 C60-C62 548.64 0.216 0.412 
California United E24-E26 640.08 0.135 0.342 
Long Beach Container Terminal F6-F10 838.2 0.141 0.347 
International Transportation 
Service G226-G236 1944.32 0.541 0.624 
Pacific Container J243-J270 1798.32 1.157 0.971 
Total Terminals International T132-T140 1524 0.757 0.87 
 
In all, 1230 ships were logged at all terminals during this 5-month period.  It has 
been assumed that ship arrivals are a Poisson process (Kia et al. 2000; Kia et al. 2002; 
Kuo et al. 2006).  To check this hypothesis, a goodness of fit test was performed on the 
inter-arrival times (time in between each consecutive ship arrival) of ships within the two 
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ports.  If ship arrivals are a Poisson process, then the inter-arrival times should be 
exponentially distributed.  
A goodness of fit test was conducted on terminal inter-arrival times for both 
POLA and POLB.  A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was used to compare 
frequencies of inter-arrival times from the port data to the expected frequencies of inter-
arrival times for an exponential distribution.  The null hypothesis for the test asserted that 
the two samples were from the same continuous distribution, and were tested to a 5% 
significance level.  If the calculated p-value, or the probability of the MXSOCAL test 
statistic being at least as extreme as the one calculated using the exponential distribution, 
fell below 0.05, the null hypothesis would be rejected.  Figure 3.46 and Figure 3.47 show 
the histograms scaled to a probability of occurrence and the overlying exponential 
distribution for each port. Results from the two-sample K-S tests can be found in Table 
3.22. 
 




Figure 3.47 Port of Long Beach Inter-arrival Time Distribution 
 
Table 3.22 K-S Test Results 
Terminal p-Value KS rejected at 5%? 
Port of LA 0.9971 No 
Port of LB 0.2672 No 
All terminals 0.8622 No 
 
The results in Table 3.22 show that for K-S tests done for POLA and POLB, and for 
every terminal in the MXSOCAL data combined, none were rejected at a 5% significance 
level.  It is apparent from the table that POLA showed a much better fit that POLB.  The 
p-value of the POLA data is significantly higher than the p-value of the POLB data.  This 
better fit is also apparent in the figures themselves.  Despite the lower p-value for the 
POLB data, the combined data still has a relatively high p-value, so it is safe to assume 
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that inter-arrival times can be assumed to be exponential, and therefore ship arrivals can 
be modeled using a Poisson distribution. 
Since ship arrivals can be modeled as a Poisson process, in the context of the 
hypothetical port, ship arrivals will be estimated as such.  Ship arrivals will be generated 
randomly using a Poisson distribution with a mean value based on the total berth length 
at each of the terminals.  For the shipping data collected, berth lengths and mean ship 
arrivals/day correlated, so they were plotted and a linear fit of the data was calculated.  
Since five months of data was available, the linear fit was improved by weighting data 
points so that those terminals that were most frequently used, received a greater weight 
within the linear regression model than those less frequently used.  Figure 3.48 shows a 
comparison of the two linear models.  The red line is the weighted model, and the blue 




Figure 3.48 Linear Regression Models: Weighted (blue) vs. Un-weighted (red) 
 
The formula for the linear regression model to be used in the context of this 
project is the weighted regression model: , where f(x) is the 
mean ships per day and x is the berth length in feet.  The correlation coefficient of the fit 
of this equation to the MXSOCAL data is equal to 0.79.  Inter-arrival times at the 
hypothetical port will be sampled over an exponential distribution using the inverse of the 
weighted regression model as the mean inter-arrival time (in days):  
mean inter-arrival time: tmia       (3.22) 
Ships that enter the port will get ship data (length, total TEUs, etc.) from a 
random sampling of the MXSOCAL list. Random sampling of the ship log is possible 
because no correlation was found between berth length and ship length or berth length 
and TEU capacity (see Figure 3.49 and Figure 3.50), so it is possible that any of the ships 







Figure 3.49 Berth length vs. ship length. 
 
Figure 3.50 Berth length vs. TEU Capacity. 
Table 3.23 shows a sample arrival stream for the port in the first 100 days after an 
earthquake.  The data listed (decimal day after the earthquake, ship length, and TEUs 
loaded/unloaded) is used later in the operational model to schedule berths and cranes.  






































Details on how to calculate the number of TEUs loaded and unloaded can be found in 
3.5.2. 









0.39 961.66 9072 
1.36 925.29 5775 
2.51 904.62 5102 
5.93 904.62 5161 
7.33 964.65 4020 
7.38 881.66 6179 
12.19 1109.20 10429 
16.04 983.67 9537 
19.51 964.71 6936 
23.62 1065.34 12680 
24.07 958.74 3608 
24.59 925.29 5123 
25.81 824.92 2274 
27.61 863.39 5794 
30.53 958.25 6264 
35.56 964.71 7544 
40.39 520.70 1481 
47.65 964.71 6701 
50.41 958.02 4285 
53.02 1138.09 9828 
60.29 964.32 4528 
66.58 925.29 3569 
69.39 958.15 3692 
72.32 964.35 4215 
73.88 984.13 11157 
74.96 1059.11 9078 
78.67 964.68 6666 
79.36 1134.88 8402 
86.63 964.65 5915 
93.89 964.68 6265 
95.39 917.09 3938 
95.69 1138.16 10024 
96.04 711.76 4349 
 
3.5.2 Arriving Ship Data 
 Once the arrival estimate determines how many ships will call at the port, the operational 
model requires an estimation of the amount of cargo unloaded from and loaded on to 
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each ship.  The TEU capacity for each ship was provided while load/unload data was not 
provided per ship within the MXSOCAL data.  However, monthly load / unload port 
totals were available via the individual port websites. From this data, ratios of the loaded 
or unloaded cargo vs. total TEU capacity (calculated by summing TEU ship capacities 
per month) was determined for the months in which the shipping log was monitored (See 
Appendix C).  The total TEUs loaded and unloaded onto ships were estimated using 
ratios of total monthly TEUs loaded or unloaded vs. the sum of the TEU capacities over 
each month that the shipping log was monitored (Port of Long Beach 2010; Port of Los 
Angeles 2010). 



















March 529,526 552,421 1,081,947 196 954,013 0.56 0.58 1.13 
April 612,394 549,658 1,162,051 196 940,731 0.65 0.58 1.24 
May 644,168 571,691 1,215,859 205 1,082,264 0.60 0.53 1.12 
June 635,131 576,825 1,211,955 192 987,618 0.64 0.58 1.23 
July 649,296 612,566 1,261,862 223 1,104,344 0.59 0.55 1.14 
August 691,410 637,915 1,329,325 218 1,139,703 0.61 0.56 1.17 
         
     Total Mean 
     6,208,673 0.61 0.57 1.17 
  
The five-month shipping log was sampled using a Poisson distribution to obtain 
the arriving ship stream and the total TEU capacities for the arriving ships were used to 
calculate the total TEUs loaded and unloaded by applying the mean in/out ratios to the 
sampled TEU capacities to calculate the total TEUs loaded and unloaded from each 
incoming ship.   
For example, assume that the following ship was sampled from the MXSOCAL data: 
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Tai 279.60 40.30 5668 100 
 
The TEUs loaded and unloaded from this ship would be calculated using the following 
methods: 
Unloaded (rounded to the nearest integer TEU): 
 
Loaded (rounded to the nearest integer TEU): 
 
So then the total TEUs loaded/unloaded = 3457+3231 = 6688. 
3.5.3 Berth and Quay Crane Scheduling Program 
Once the number of ships arriving per day is determined, those ships will need to 
be assigned to a berth within the port, and assigned cranes that will unload the cargo.  In 
current practice (Pachakis and Kiremidjian 2004; Canonaco et al. 2007; Bierwirth and 
Meisel 2009) , berth scheduling and crane assignment is often treated as a sequential 
problem.  First terminal operators determine the berth assignment based on berthing 
durations of each vessel.  Next, cranes are assigned to vessels depending on the number 
of ships docked simultaneously at each berth.  This practice for assignment can cause 
delays because once a ship is assigned to a berth, the number of cranes for use is finite.  
For this project, a method for simultaneous berth and crane scheduling was developed to 
prevent this crane limitation and to utilize all of the information available to port 









 In the assignment model, the berths within the ports are considered continuous 
structures having B equally sized sections and Q identical cranes operating along a single 
set of crane rails.  The length of each ship docking at a berth is divided into a number 
holds that consists of three or four container rows.  Berth section lengths are also equal to 
hold lengths.  It is assumed that multiple ships may dock at a berth and be serviced 
simultaneously.  Cranes may only service one hold at a time, but multiple cranes can be 
assigned to the same ship.   Each hold requires a certain processing time for loading / 
unloading and a ship remains at the berth until all of the unloading / loading is finished 
for each ship.  Furthermore it is assumed that once a ship had docked at a berth, it must 
remain at its original position on the berth until processing is complete.  Under these 
assumptions, the assignment model seeks to assign cranes in a manner that minimizes the 
time ships spend docked at the berth and the cost associated with servicing each vessel. 
 The following example illustrates how crane allocation can minimize the time 
ships spend docked at a berth.  Suppose that 3 ships have been assigned to the berth 
(length = 7 holds) in Figure 3.51 in the following sequence: yellow, orange, red.  The 
yellow ship has three holds that will take 4, 0, and 2 time periods to unload respectively, 
the orange ship has three holds that will take 3, 3, and 2 time periods to unload 
respectively, and the red ship has four holds that will take 5, 2, 3 and 4 time periods to 




Figure 3.51 Crane allocation example: berth (from (Erera, 2008)) 
If cranes are assigned sequentially, cranes will be allocated to the yellow ship 
first, the orange ship second and the red ship last until all cargo has been 
loaded/unloaded.  Using the time periods for loading/unloading, Figure 3.52 shows that 
the loading/unloading of all three ships will take a total of 9 time periods to complete. 
 
Figure 3.52 Crane allocation example: sequential assignments 
However, by using the crane allocation proposed to minimize the time that ships 
spend docked at the berth (dwell time), the orange ship would be serviced first because it 
  
 147 
would only take 3 time periods to finish.  Once the orange ship is complete, the red ship 
would be serviced (Figure 3.53).  The red ship begins servicing one time period prior to 
the start of servicing in the previous example, which results in one less time period 
overall to finish all three ships.  This allocation is superior because it minimizes the dwell 
times of the ship, which in turn minimizes the cost assessed for ship servicing that is in 
direct proportion with the dwell times. 
 
Figure 3.53 Crane allocation example: simultaneous berth and crane model assignment 
3.5.3.1 Summary of Operational Modeling and Generated Statistics 
In this study, an optimization-based heuristic scheduling technique (BQCSP) (Ak 
2008) is used to mimic the post-earthquake operational decision-making of terminal 
operators.  Within this technique, decisions are simulated regarding:  
 (1) What arriving vessels may be turned away or will go another port 
 (2) What times arriving vessels are berthed  
 (3) Where they will be berthed within a particular terminal complex 
 (4) Which cranes will be assigned to the vessels and when  
The scheduling technique assigns post-earthquake available berth space and cranes to 
each ship scheduled to arrive at the port. Terminal operator decisions are mimicked since 
assignments maximize an objective function that balances the need to process containers 
quickly given available resources while avoiding excessive delay to any arriving vessels. 
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The technique also uses a rolling time horizon that considers the schedule of arriving 
vessels several days into the future; berth and crane assignments are updated daily based 
on the new information.  
3.5.3.2  Example 
The following example is meant to illustrate the full functionality of the BQCSP 
operational model.  For this example, five different earthquake scenarios were input into 
the model that ranged from very little to very severe wharf and crane earthquake damage.  
Each scenario was applied to a single 3000-ft terminal containing five, 600-ft berth 
sections and six cranes.  The earthquake scenario examined specifically in the next few 
figures is Earthquake 3, and corresponds to an earthquake that resulted in moderate wharf 
damage and limited crane damage (Figure 3.54).  The t = # for each berth and crane 
corresponds to the number of days post-earthquake that it will take for that component to 
become fully operational.  A value of t = 0 indicates that the component is fully 
operational zero days after the earthquake. 
 
 
Figure 3.54 Wharf and crane repair times for example earthquake scenario 
Repair information is used as input for the BQCSP operational model to assign 
berths and cranes over a length of time after the earthquake until the port is fully repaired 
and regains steady-state operations.  The decisions made within the operational model are 
recorded in output files according to the day after the earthquake the decision was made.  
t = 22 t = 27 t = 51 t = 63 t = 78
t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0t = 57
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Table 3.26 shows an excerpt of the first 31 days after Earthquake 3 and the decisions 
made within the operational model.   



































1	   1	   9072	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
2	   1	   5775	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
3	   1	   5102	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
4	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
5	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
6	   1	   5161	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
7	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
8	   2	   10199	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
9	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
10	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
11	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
12	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
13	   1	   10429	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
14	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
15	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
16	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
17	   1	   9537	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
18	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
19	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
20	   1	   6936	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
21	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
22	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   0	  
23	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   600	  
24	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   600	  
25	   2	   8731	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   600	  
26	   0	   0	   1	   1.75	   1.25	   0	   0	   5	   0	   600	  
27	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   600	  
28	   0	   0	   1	   1.5	   0	   3920	   5	   5	   1000	   1200	  
29	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   3920	   5	   5	   1000	   1200	  
30	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   5	   0	   1200	  




The statistics recorded within the operational output are explained in greater detail 
below: 
Day – Day refers to the day number after the earthquake.  Also, it should be noted 
that for the purposes of crane and berth utilization within the port. One “day” is 
equal to four four-hour periods, or a 16-hour work day. 
# of Displaced Ships– Counts the number of ships within the arrival stream that 
cannot be accommodated at the port on a given day due to large delay times.  For 
this example, ships will become displaced if the expected delay time is greater 
than 3 days. 
# of Ships that will Berth – Counts the number of ships that will berth on any 
given day. 
Dwell – Calculates the total time the ship will remain in the port once it arrives 
Total Delay – Calculates the delay time, or time in between when the ship arrives 
and when it is actually docked at a berth. 
TEUs Handled – The total number of TEUs handled at the terminal for any given 
day. 
Cranes used per day – Calculates the number of cranes used on any given day.  
Note: each day is broken into four, 3-hour periods, cranes used per day is 
reflective of the number of cranes used in each period, divided by the total 
number of periods.  Therefore, this statistic could have a decimal value. 
Cranes Available per Day – Notes the number of cranes available to use for any 
given day. 
Berth Feet used per Day – Notes the berth length occupied by a ship on any given 
day. 
Berth Feet Available per Day – Notes the berth length available for occupation on 
any given day. 
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In examining Table 3.26 the BQCSP model made the decision to displace all 
ships until day 25, after which it began to allow ships to dock and began processing them.  
The statistical outputs resulting from these decisions and given in the table can then be 
used to calculate and plot various port performance metrics for the examined terminal.  
Subsequent figures display some of these possibilities: arrival and dwell time metrics, 
berth and crane utilization, number of ships displaced, and TEU handling metrics. 
3.5.3.3  Arrival Stream 
Figure 3.55 gives a visual representation of the full data set begun in Table 3.26: 
the number of ships berthed at the terminal each week post-earthquake, the total dwell 
time of ships during that same week, and the total number of days of delays experienced 
by ships for that week.  Again, delay is the period of time between when the ship arrives 
and is berthed. 
 
Figure 3.55 Ship Arrivals, Dwell Time, and Delays per week 
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3.5.3.4  Berth and Crane Utilization 
Figure 3.56 shows the berth and crane utilization each week post-earthquake.  Utilization 
was calculated as the ratio of used berth feet or cranes divided by the available berth feet 
or number of cranes respectively.  Utilization equal to one indicates that every available 
berth-foot or crane was used for an entire week.  In Figure 3.56 it should be noted that 
crane utilization rates are higher than the berth utilization rates.  This indicates that for 
this terminal utilization is rate-limited by the number of cranes. 
 
 
Figure 3.56 Berth and Crane Utilization per Week 
3.5.3.5  Displaced Ships 
After an earthquake event, if the terminal availability is so small that it cannot meet the 
demand of arriving ships, it becomes more economical for those ships to go to another 
port than to wait for an opening in the damaged port.  This type of operational decision 
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was prevalent in the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake.  Numerous ship operators 
had to set up operations in other ports because of the severe damage to some of Kobe’s 
terminals.  The same type of operational decision was captured within this example by 
assuming that if a ship would be delayed more than 3 days, it would become a displaced 
ship and seek out another port.  Figure 3.57 shows the number and percent of displaced 
ships in the total ship population for each post-earthquake week.  
 
Figure 3.57 # and Percent of Displaced Ships per Week 
3.5.3.6  TEU Statistics 
The TEU statistics derived from this model are perhaps the most important in 
quantifying the losses sustained by ports after an earthquake.  Figure 3.58 shows the total 
number of TEU handled by the port per week, the total number of TEUs lost per week, 
and the percent lost per week.  Lost TEUs are calculated by summing the TEUs onboard 





Figure 3.58 TEUs Handled, Lost and % Lost per week 
3.5.4 Effect of Earthquake Disruption on Shipping Operations 
Ultimately, the operational modeling was run with half-stopping criteria and a 
length limited by the repair period.  Finalized statistics are found in Figure 3.59- Figure 
3.63, and the number of weeks run in each scenario can be found in Table 3.27. 
Table 3.27 Number of Weeks Each Earthquake Scenario Was Run 




1 0.71 2 
2 4.87 5 
3 11.14 12 
4 11.71 12 





Figure 3.59 Final Berth Utilization Comparison of Earthquake Scenarios 
 































































Berth and crane utilization statistics offer insight into the trends of the other 
statistics because utilization depicts how the port is being used after the earthquake.  In 
some cases what limited resources are available can accommodate the ships arriving at 
the port on the same scale as utilization during the calibration scenario.  However at other 
points utilization increases dramatically because the port has limited resources to perform 
operational duties.  For example, there are multiple instances within the crane utilization 
equal to 100% utilization.  Here, every available crane is being used constantly for an 
entire week to keep up with the demand of incoming ships.  When the berth utilization is 
compared at those weeks with 100% crane utilization, it is apparent that while high, berth 
utilization is never higher than the crane utilization.  In fact, it is a general trend that 
crane utilization is consistently higher than berth utilization.  This indicates that this 
particular port configuration is rate-limited by the cranes.   
 
 






























Figure 3.62 TEUs Lost Statistic Comparison of Earthquake Scenarios 
 
Figure 3.61 clearly shows that for every earthquake scenario the number of TEUs 
handled is much lower than normal initially, but they eventually return to the calibration 
level.  Obviously the initial damage and subsequent repair explains this trend.  However, 
at some points (usually right before the earthquake run period ends), the TEUs handled 
during an earthquake scenario exceed those handled during normal operation (see EQ 5).  
This happens because the earthquake scenario has to catch up with the normal operation 
since the there has been limited utilization during the earthquake scenario.  For weeks 46-
47 in EQ 5, where more TEUs are handled than in the calibration state, crane utilization 
is double (100%) during the earthquake than what it would be normally (50%).  
Therefore the port must catch-up despite the increase number of ships that get turned 
away during the time period (weeks 23-45) of increased utilization (See Figure 3.59).  
Initial increases in ship displacement seem normal, but the port is so heavily damaged by 
EQ 5 that resources are scarce and the port still can not meet demand even though all of 





























Figure 3.63 Final Total Dwell Time Statistic Comparison of Earthquake Scenarios 
 
 Dwell time reduces initially after an earthquake because many ships are displaced 
(Figure 3.63), and those that do come into the port can be processed quickly.  However, 
as time passes, dwell times equal or exceed those found in normal operation.  When 
dwell times are equal, it is likely that the available components can meet the demand.  
During these periods (the first few weeks) utilization is often higher than normal 
utilization, but that is due to the fact the every component is not yet repaired.  Dwell 
times higher than normal indicate that the port is operational but not meeting demand.  
Examining EQ 5 provides a good example.  Dwell times between weeks 20 – 46 are 
mostly greater than those found in the calibration scenario.  This time period is the same 
as the period where utilization is significantly higher than normal (Figure 3.59), TEUs 
handled are lower than normal (Figure 3.61), and ships are consistently being displaced 

































(Figure 3.62).  This trend is likely due to the fact that ships that aren’t displaced are 
taking longer to load/unload because there is limited crane availability (see Figure 3.60).   
3.6 Operational Modeling Using Regression 
Several test runs were conducted using the BQCSP operational model for 
stratified samples of 2500 and 1000 earthquakes.  However, computation time for these 
models was very lengthy (5+ days).  Additionally, the number of samples within these 
models did not produce enough large earthquake samples to be stochastically 
representative at small mean rates of exceedance.  To use the BQCSP model with the 
number earthquakes needed to accurately calculate small mean rates of exceedance 
would have required extremely long computation times.  Therefore, an additional method 
was employed to reduce computation time of the operational model within the risk 
analysis framework.  Using various port configurations and the thousands of earthquake 
occurrences run using the BQCSP model as data points, a multivariate linear regression 
equation was developed to replace the BQCSP model by using a number of independent 
variables to calculate the number of TEUs lost via a linear regression.  In this analysis, 
the following earthquake scenarios were run using the BQCSP operational model to test 
the validity of using a multivariate regression equation to replace the BQCSP model: 
  
 160 
Table 3.28 BQCSP Model Test Runs 
Run # of Earthquakes Port Configuration 
A 1000 Baseline Port Configuration 
B 800 Baseline Port Configuration 
C 800 Baseline, but with vertical drains at every terminal 
D 1000 Baseline Port Configuration 
E 1000 Baseline, but with vertical drains at every terminal 
F 790 Baseline, but with only J100 type cranes 
G 1000 Baseline, with repair min and max as output 
H 1000 Baseline, with repair min and max as output 
I 1000 Baseline, with repair min and max as output 
  
It should be noted that the ship arrival stream and all other settings except those 
listed were the same for each run.  In examining the data sets, TEU Losses ranged from 0 
to over 1,000,000 TEUs.  For the first linear regression equation applied to the data, the 
correlation was fairly good, but the equation yielded a y-intercept near 19,000 TEUs.  
The data set contained multiple instances where no TEUs were lost during earthquake 
occurrences.  To accurately capture this result it was decided that the multivariate linear 
regression equation would only be used for instances when disruption caused TEU Loss 
(i.e. TEU Loss > 0).  Therefore, a mixed distribution was employed where: 
     (3.23) 
  To find the probability of TEU Loss > 0, a probit model regression equation was 
calculated.  In a probit model the dependent variable of the regression equation must be 
binary.  For this case, instances where TEU Loss = 0 equaled zero, and instances where 
TEU Loss > 0 equaled one.  The independent variables tested within the regression 
equation used to determine whether TEU Loss would be greater than zero were: the 
[ ] [ ] [ ]0*)01( >>=−=> TEUxTEUPTEUPxTEUP
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minimum and maximum wharf repair times (tWmin and tWmax ), minimum and maximum 
crane repair time (tCmin and tCmax), terminal length (xT), and number of cranes (NC).  P 
values for the coefficients of the independent variables revealed that max and min crane 
repair time was not statistically significant in calculating the probability that TEU Loss > 
0, so they were omitted as independent variables in the final probit regression calculation: 
  (3.24) 
The coefficients were calculated using the combined data from Runs G, H, and I. 
A further discussion of that choice and the residuals for the probit regression equation is 
located in 3.6.1.1. 
Figure  illustrates a cumulative distribution function generated using P[TEU Loss 
> 0] values calculated from a “modified” probit regression equation where only the wharf 
repair time data from runs G, H, and I are considered.  The cdf is calculated using the 
ln(tW) since wharf repair time is the most dominant variable in the probit regression, and 
the actual failure (0) or success (1) of TEU Loss >0 of the ABD data is plotted for each 
earthquake instance: 




Figure 3.64 – Probit Regression Equation for Combination of Runs G, H, and I 
 
       When the TEU losses don’t equal zero, they will be calculated using a 
multivariate linear regression equation.  The independent variables within this regression 
were modeled after the BQCSP operational model, which uses wharf repair times, crane 
repair times, and terminal data (# of berths, # of cranes) as input to calculate TEU Losses.  
Specifically, the linear regression equation uses berth length, the maximum and minimum 
ln(wharf time), maximum and minimum crane time, and number of cranes as independent 
variables, and the ln(TEU Loss) as the dependent variable.  The natural log of min/max 
wharf time and TEU Loss was used because TEU Loss and wharf time have a distinct 
logarithmic correlation (Figure 3.65).  In addition, for the p-values of the coefficients 
calculated, wharf times consistently had the smallest p-values for every single run 
























conducted.  Since it was the most influential independent variable, the logarithmic 
correlation was considered within the regression: 
   (3.25) 
and the correlation results for equation 4.7 can be found in Table 3.29. 
  
 
Figure 3.65 Wharf Time vs. TEU Loss 
Table 3.29 – Multivariate Regression Results 







As with the probit regression equation, the final results for the multivariate 
regression equation are also a combination of Runs G, H, and I.  Calculation of TEU Loss 
is predominantly a function of the wharf repair time, which consistently had the smallest 
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p-value in every single run.  Crane repair time was the least influential independent 
variable and in three of the smaller runs could not be considered statistically significant.  
However, the p-values in these runs though > 0.05 were still relatively small, and 
therefore crane repair time was still used as an independent variable in the calculation of 
TEU Loss.   
3.6.1.1  Run GHI Residuals and Comparison of Runs 
For the nine runs of BQCSP data tested, all runs produced similar coefficients 
despite the port configuration differences.   The data using vertical drains or upgraded 
cranes obviously produced different TEU losses, but the calculation of those losses from 
the examined independent variables produced similar coefficients to the baseline runs A, 
B, and D. For runs A-F, coefficient of determination (R2) values ranged from 0.71-0.79 
and error values were also quite similar.   
In comparing all of the runs, the greatest increase in correlation between the 
dependent and independent variables occurred in runs G, H, and I when the minimum 
wharf and crane repair times were used as independent variables in addition to the 
maximum wharf and crane repair times.  The combination of the baseline runs G, H, and 
I was chosen as the final data set from which to calculate the regression equations 
because previous runs had proved that port configuration was not an influencing factor, 
and the sample provided a large number of data points as well as the min and max wharf 
and crane repair times (Table 3.30).  
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Table 3.30 – Comparison of Correlations for Runs ABD and GHI 
Run ABD GHI 
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
R2 (Coefficient of Determination) 0.71 0.79 
Error 0.58 0.49 





To further examine the correlation of the probit and multivariate regression 
equations, plots of the residuals for the 3057 earthquake sample in GHI are shown in 
Figure 3.66 and Figure 3.67.  First the residuals for the probit regression equation are 
plotted in Figure 3.66. 
 
Figure 3.66 – Plot of Residuals for Probit Regression Equation 
Residuals for each of the independent variables in the multivariate regression 
equation to determine TEU loss are shown in Figure 3.67.  Notice that each has a small 
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Figure 3.67 – Residual Plots for Multivariate Regression Equation Variables 
 



































0 5 10 15








3.6.1.2  Operational Regression Model with the Risk Analysis Program 
Within the program the calculated operational regression model from the data in 
runs G, H, and I is implemented in the following context:  First the probability that TEU 
Loss > 0 is calculated by taking the normal cumulative distribution function of the probit 
regression equation for the combination of Runs G, H, and I: 
 
(3.26) 
A binary random number is generated from a binomial distribution based on the 
probability that TEU Loss > 0.  If the random number generated equals 0, TEU Loss = 0.  
If the random number generated equals one, the TEU Loss = ex, where x is calculated by 
sampling from a lognormal distribution of TEU Losses where the mean equals the TEU 
Loss calculated from the multivariate regression with coefficients corresponding to those 
found in Run ABD, and the logarithmic standard deviation equals the standard error 
(0.49) associated with the calculation of the regression equation: 
 
(3.27) 
3.6.2 Calculation of Business Interruption Losses 
Business interruption losses should be calculated from the number of TEUs lost from the 
either the BQCSP or operational regression model.  The cost per TEU may be estimated 
for each terminal within the port using financial information such as the revenue derived 
by the port and terminal operator for each TEU.  Each of these cost values were discussed 
with port officials (Seeds, 2011) and can be found in Table 3.31. 
))(1995.2))(ln(9818.0))(ln(7001.1)(0054.08391.7(]0[ maxmin CWWT NttxTEULossP −+++−Φ=>
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Table 3.31 – Business Interruption Costs 
Business Cost $/TEU 
Revenue derived by port operator $100 
Revenue derived by port operator $150 
  
 TEUs will be lost if the ships that are carrying them are turned away from the port.  
This could occur if a terminal is so severely damaged there are no available berths during 
the repair period, or if the ship has to wait an unacceptable amount to time to dock at an 
available berth (3 days (Seeds 2011)).  Also, ships will be turned away if the terminal has 
to undergo wharf replacement.  In this situation it is assumed that every ship scheduled to 
arrive at that terminal will be displaced.  Therefore every TEU will be counted as a loss.  
 Adding these business interruption losses to the repair and/or replacement costs for 
wharves and cranes in each terminal yields the total port-wide losses due to damage from 
a given earthquake.  
3.6.3 Operational Mitigation Options 
Several options exist to minimize the amount of downtime experienced at a port.  
Total downtime can be reduced by improving the operations within the port or by 
reducing the downtime resulting from constructional issues.  One of the operational 
mitigation options studied under the scope of this project deal with the assignment of 
ships to undamaged berths when the originally assigned berth is damaged.  In handling 
the assignment of ships to undamaged berths, this project will examine the following 
options: 
1.) Keeping the status quo- a scenario in which ships may only dock at their original 
destination berths despite damage. 
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2.) Force Majeure – Company claims over berths are dissolved and incoming ships 
may dock at any available berth. 
These options represent the spectrum of how berthing assignments could be made 
after an earthquake.     
The other type of mitigation option studied under the scope of this project examines 
the affect of decreasing the construction times or repair periods on the operational 
interruption experienced after an earthquake.  One option decreases the downtime 
required for repairs by offering a bonus to construction crews to reduce the length of the 
repair process.  For comparison, an additional scenario will be run in which mobilization 
time is reduced to a minimum time and increased to a maximum time.  In this way it will 
be possible to see what effect construction crews have on business interruption losses. By 
studying each of these mitigation options and their effects on downtime and operational 
losses within the port, it will be possible to recommend those options that offer the 
greatest returns on investments. 
3.7 Total Cost 
Total cost of the losses sustained by the port system from the earthquake is 
calculated by adding the cost of the physical damage to the port components to the 
business interruption losses calculated from the operational model.   This total cost is 
calculated for every earthquake in the earthquake catalogue by the risk analysis program 
and stored in a matrix with its corresponding intensity measure.  This data is used to 
calculate mean rate of exceedance curves for cost and downtime and the mean annual 
losses for the port. 
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3.7.1 Mean Rate of Exceedance 
The depending on whether exceedance curves for cost or time are calculated, 
mean rate of exceedance calculation requires the following exceedance data to be known: 
1.) data - the total cost or total time required before the port can return to working 
order as a result of earthquake j in the earthquake catalog. 
2.) sample parameters - to “undo” the stochastic misrepresentation of the event 
set created through stratified sampling, the probability p that a rate falls in stratum 
i (pi), and the number of samples within each stratum (Ni) must be known.  (If 
Monte Carlo (MC) sampling was chosen, the probability = 1 because the number 
of samples = the total number of samples.) 
3.) total rate – the total rate of the earthquakes.  When using Monte Carlo 
sampling the total rate is the sum of the rates of all the earthquake events in the 
event set.  For stratified sampling, the total rate must be calculated per stratum.  In 
this case it equals the sum of the rates in the event set that have a magnitude 
corresponding to the magnitude of the stratum examined. 
The probability of exceedance is calculated for y occurrences, where y equals a data 
value in a vector defined from 0 to max(data) that has a number of divisions equal to the 
number of values in data.  The probability of exceedance equals: 
       (3.28) 
where is an indicator variable that equals one if yj equals or exceeds some value 
y being examined and zero if does not.  In this way the mean probability of exceedance is 
calculated.  Variance of the mean is calculated in the same fashion: 
       (3.29) 
 
 The mean rate of exceedance is calculated by multiplying the probability exceedance 



























mrey = mpe * total_ratei        (3.30) 
where the total_rate is the sum of all mean rates of occurrence for the earthquakes 
sampled in stratum i.  If confidence intervals were required along with the mean rate of 
exceedance, those would be calculated by calculating the standard deviation for each 
stratum: 
std = σ*total_rate         (3.31) 
where σ is the  calculated in equation 3.29.  Distances from the mean for the 
confidence intervals can be acquired by multiplying the standard deviation by the inverse 
cumulative distribution function and a corresponding alpha value.  For instance when the 
confidence interval of 90% is calculated, as in this case, α = 0.1 = (1- 0.90), and the 
distance from the mean is calculated using: . (Johnson 1992) 
 
Figure 3.68 Inverse cumulative distribution function (from (NIST 2011)) 
 
The distance calculated from the mean at the confidence interval of 90% would then be 
added or subtracted from the mean to get the CI values needed to plot both the mean rate 
of exceedance and the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval.  Mean rate of 
exceedance plots look similar to the following (Figure 3.69): 
variance




Figure 3.69 Mean rate of exceedance plot example 
3.7.2 Mean and Variance of Annual Loss 
Mean annual loss would be calculated using the cost mean rate of exceedance curve and 
integrating it over all intensity measures (calculating the area under the curve).  Since the 
mean rate of exceedance curve exist in a discrete format, integration can be accomplished 
using the trapezoidal rule between discrete cost values in the mean rate of exceedance 
curve: 
       (3.32) 
where a is the ith discrete point, and b is the ith+1 discrete point.  Mean annual loss will 
equal the sum of the f(x) values over the entire range.   
Total cost of the losses sustained by the port system from the earthquake is 
calculated by adding the cost of the physical damage to the port components to the 
business interruption losses calculated from the operational model.   This total cost is 











corresponding intensity measure.  This data is used to calculate mean rate of exceedance 




4 RISK ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK AS APPLIED TO A HYPOTHETICAL 
PORT 
4.1 Hypothetical Port Configuration 
Due to concerns about the release of proprietary data, no existing west coast port 
was modeled using the risk framework.  Instead, a hypothetical port was created on the 
coast of Santa Cruz, California (Figure 4.1) to test the risk framework.  The following 
sections detail the parameters and response models used within the risk analysis 





Figure 4.1- Hypothetical port location: A.) Map Location, B.) Aerial view. 
The hypothetical port (Figure 4.2) consists of four terminals each with a wharf 
type modeled after a 1960’s type wharf commonly found in US West Coast ports that are 
expected to have the high seismic vulnerability.  The wharf type description can be found 
in Section 3.4.3.1.  Each terminal also contains a number of one of the three specified 
crane types (Section 3.4.4.1) commonly found in US West Coast ports.  It is also 
assumed that every terminal sits on liquefiable soil. (Soil profile description located in 
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3.4.2 )  The terminal lengths and number of cranes at each terminal were chosen for the 
hypothetical port because they are consistent with the variety of terminal lengths and 
corresponding crane numbers typically found in US ports ((Schleiffarth), unpublished 
data).  
 
Figure 4.2 - Hypothetical Port 
Terminal positions for the hypothetical port were chosen to mimic actual 
separations distances between terminals at west coast ports. Figure 4.3 depicts a 
histogram of the separation distances between container terminals in the Port of Los 
Angeles, Port of Long Beach, and Port of Oakland.  Of the 84 separation distances 
measured, the average separation distance was 2.48 km, with a minimum distance of 0.62 








Figure 4.3 Histogram of terminal separation distances 
The separation distances for the hypothetical port (Table 4.1) fall into the range of 
separation distances, while fitting into the natural land shapes at the hypothetical port 
location, and into the range of separation distances applicable to terminal sites with 
spatially correlated ground motions (Jayaram and Baker 2009). 
Table 4.1 Separation Distances (h in km) between Terminals in the Hypothetical Port. 
 A B C D 
A 0 0.57 1.46 3.27 
B 0.57 0 1.55 3.30 
C 1.46 1.55 0 1.82 
D 3.27 3.30 1.82 0 
 
The spatial correlation coefficients for the ground motions between each of the 
terminals can be calculated using the following equation from Jayaram and Baker (2008): 
          (4.1) 
where  is the correlation coefficient, h is the separation distance (in kilometers), and 
b is the range of the exponential semivariograms.  For the situation of the hypothetical 






similar soil conditions among the terminals, and short periods, T  < 1 second.  Assuming 
that the period T equals 0.26 seconds (the fundamental mode of the wharf in the 
transverse direction), and using the separation distances in the table above, the correlation 
coefficients between terminals would equal: 
Table 4.2 – Spatial Correlation Coefficients for Hypothetical Port 
 A B C D 
A 1 0.95 0.89 0.77 
B 0.95 1 0.88 0.76 
C 0.89 0.88 1 0.86 
D 0.77 0.76 0.86 1 
 
It is apparent that the terminals within the hypothetical port have fairly high 
correlation coefficients. All of the correlation coefficients exceed 0.76, which indicates 
that spatial correlation of earthquake ground motions between terminals is important, as 
would be expected for sites with small separation distances. 
4.1.1.1.1 Baseline Configuration 
Table 4.3 outlines the specifications for each terminal of the hypothetical port 
introduced in the previous chapter.  It is assumed that due to the wharf and soil types 
chosen (1960’s wharves on liquefiable soils) that the baseline configuration of the port 
will have the highest probability of seismic disruption.  Latter runs of the hypothetical 
port will seek to use mitigation options to lessen the total losses sustained at the 
hypothetical port.  
Table 4.3 Hypothetical Port Terminal Specifications. 










A 122°1’21.97” 36°57’11.18” 2400 60’s 4 LD50 L 
B 122°1’23.72” 36°57’29.91” 2400 60’s 5 LD100 L 
C 122°0’23.23” 36°57’15.86” 5400 60’s 12 J100 L 




4.2 Example Earthquake 
The risk analysis framework discussed in Chapter 3 is applied to every single 
earthquake in the earthquake sample for the distances to each terminal in the port.  For 
instance, the hypothetical port has four terminals, so for a 1000-earthquake sample, the 
risk analysis program would calculate earthquake and loss statistics for (1000 x  4) 4000 
earthquake occurrences.  The calculated data includes the following: 
Table 4.4 Example Earthquake and Loss Data Generated by Risk Analysis Program 
   Earthquake Data 




N. San Andreas: SAO+SAN 7.85 A 104.36 17.89 0.0581 
 
  Loss Data 
Wharf Repair Cost 

























$903,970 (38, 43, 56, 60) $0 (0,0,0,0) $20,831,623 $21,735,593 
 
 
From this data it is possible to see that for this specific magnitude 7.85 earthquake 
at Terminal A, a PGV of 0.0581 cm/s and a spectral acceleration of 0.0581 g caused a 
total of just under one million dollars in wharf damage and no crane damage.  Specific 
cost and repair times at each berth are calculated. From those, the business interruption 
loss can be calculated.  In this situation for 38 days, no berth segments are available for 
use, so every incoming ship must be counted as a loss.  After day 38, berth segments 
begin to become functional until day 60 when all segments have been repaired. 
4.3 Evaluation of Results for Entire Earthquake Sample 
The following detailed results from the risk analysis program were generated 
using a stratified sampling of 10,000 earthquakes as well as a stratified sampling of 
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100,000 earthquakes both in conjunction with the operational regression model discussed 
in Section 3.6.  Port configuration specifics are those of the baseline configuration 
described in section 4.1.  A plethora on data is generated within the risk analysis program 
at each terminal for each earthquake instance.  The following earthquake and loss data 
was collected and will be analyzed within a 10,000-earthquake sample: fault name, 
magnitude, terminal name, berth number, distance value used in the ground motion 
prediction equation, peak ground velocity, spectral acceleration at a period of 1.5 seconds 
and 5% damping, min / max wharf repair time (days), wharf repair cost, min / max crane 
repair time (days), crane repair cost, and business interruption loss.  This data will be 
examined to test the functionality of the calculation methods within the risk analysis 
program.  A 100,000-earthquake sample will be used to produce mean rate of exceedance 
data that was discussed in Section 3.7.1. 
4.3.1.1 PGV and SA Data 
The earthquake and loss data will be analyzed to check for reasonable correlations 
between the intensity measures used within the program and the resulting losses.  The 
earthquake intensity measures used within the risk analysis are peak ground velocity 
(PGV) and spectral acceleration (SA).  PGV was used as the input into the fragility 
models that described the wharf response and spectral acceleration was used as the input 
into the crane fragility models.  If the risk analysis program is properly calculating repair 
requirements from the fragility models, the PGV should correlate well with the wharf 







Figure 4.4 – a.) PGV vs. Repair Time for the wharf, b.) SA vs. Repair Time for the cranes 
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Figure 4.4 a and b show that both PGV vs. wharf repair time and SA vs. crane 
repair time are well correlated.  Therefore one can assume that the program is in fact 
calculating the repair times for the wharf and cranes from the intensity measures in the 
positive correlation expected.  One should note that both wharf and crane repair times are 
rounded up to the next largest integer value.  This causes the bands of data that are 
especially apparent at small repair times.  These bands also highlight the scatter in PGV 
and SA values for specific repair times.  The rounding of repair times is partially 
responsible for the wide scatter in PGV and SA.  However the scatter also results from 
the random normal distribution used to select repair times from fragility curves and the 
spatial correlation of repair times between berths in the terminal.     
Plots of the intensity measures vs. the resulting repair costs should also be 
correlated since repair cost is a repair requirement calculated from the fragility curves.  
Furthermore, if the repair costs are correlated to the intensity measures, the business 
interruption losses should also be correlated to the intensity measures since BIL is 
calculated as a function of several variables, the most predominant of those being repair 
time. Figure 4.5 - Figure 4.8 plots the intensity measures vs. the repair costs and the 
business interruption losses (both in millions of dollars) at each terminal.  Logic dictates 





Figure 4.5 – a.) PGV Vs. Cost, b.) Spectral Acceleration vs. Cost: Terminal A 
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Figure 4.6 – a.) PGV Vs. Cost, b.) Spectral Acceleration vs. Cost: Terminal B 
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Figure 4.7 – a.) PGV Vs. Cost, b.) Spectral Acceleration vs. Cost: Terminal C 
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Figure 4.8– a.) PGV Vs. Cost, b.) Spectral Acceleration vs. Cost: Terminal D 
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As an additional check Figure 4.9 plots the relationship between repair time and 
repair cost.  Again, logic dictates that as the repair time increases, the repair cost should 
also increase.  Instances of wharf and crane repair are plotted in blue and red 
respectively: 
 
Figure 4.9 – Repair Time vs. Repair cost for Wharf and Crane 
  Figure 4.9 also demonstrates how damage to the wharf is more prevalent during 
earthquake disruption than crane damage.  Each point represents an instance of damage 
and the number of blue points far exceeds the number of red points in the plot above.   
4.3.1.2  Total Cost Data 
Since repair costs and business interruption losses correlate with the intensity 
measures and the total cost is calculated as the sum of the repair cost and business 
interruption loss at each earthquake instance, it stands to reason that the total cost should 
also logarithmically correlate with the intensity measures.  These relationships are plotted 
in Figure 4.10: 































Figure 4.10 - Total Cost Plots a.) PGV vs.  Total Cost, b.) SA vs. Total cost 
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The most noticeable feature in each of these plots is that there are two distinct 
clusters of correlated points.  The reason for this is very simple.  As described by the 
operational regression model (Section 3.6), multiple earthquake instances that result in no 
business interruption loss.  Business interruption losses only occur when an arriving ship 
cannot be serviced within three days after arriving.  In some instances the wharf and 
crane damage was so minor that all arriving ships could still be serviced.  Therefore, the 
lower cluster in Figure 4.10 corresponds to instances where the business interruption loss 
equaled zero, and the upper cluster corresponds to instances where the business 
interruption loss was greater than zero. 
 The clusters are so distinct because the difference between no business 
interruption loss and a business interruption loss is the displacement of an entire ship.  
The ships used in the risk analysis have TEU capacities ranging from 1012 to 9310 
TEUs.  Since the mean number of TEUs processed by the port is calculated as 0.57* TEU 
capacity + 0.61*TEU capacity, the mean number of TEUs lost ranges from 1194 to 
10986.  At a loss of $250/TEU, that translates to $298,500-$2,746,500.  So the gap 
between BIL = 0 and BIL>0 is at least $298,500. 
  The width of the lower cluster and the range of PGVs or SAs that correspond to 
no business interruption loss is a function of berth length.  Two scenarios could occur 
where larger intensity values with assumed larger repair requirements would still produce 
no business interruption loss.   
1.) A scenario might occur in which the intensity measures damage only a 
short portion of a terminal and enough berths are still available to 
accommodate all incoming ships.  This would be likely in longer 
terminals.  
2.) Shorter berths correspond to longer inter-arrival times between ships.  
A larger intensity measure may have cause significant damage in one 
part of the terminal, but as long as there’s enough berth length and 
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cranes to service the one ship that will arrive every three to four days, 
there won’t be a business interruption loss.   
4.3.1.3   Conclusions 
All of the previous plots were logarithmically correlated as was expected.  
However they also depict several other interesting details within the risk analysis 
program that should be noted: 
Business interruption losses are larger than the repair costs.   
This result is clearly visible in Figure 4.5 - Figure 4.8 for both intensity measures.  
For all earthquake instances in the 10000-earthquake sample where BIL >0, the ratio of 
BIL to total repair cost was calculated (BIL/Total Repair Cost) and plotted in Figure 
4.11: 
 
Figure 4.11 – Ratios of BIL/Total Repair Cost 
    While some ratios were greater than 100, of the 37,759 instances calculated 
most were less than 50 and the average ratio was 28.94 and the median ratio was 14.97.  













Very few ratios were less than one, which would indicate that the BIL was smaller than 
the total repair cost.  Therefore on average, the business interruption loss is almost 30 
times that of the total repair cost.  As suspected, the majority of the total losses 
experienced at ports are due to business interruption, and this result reiterates the 
necessity of calculating operational losses within the risk framework 
 
4.3.1.3.1 Damage states are visible in the crane data 
In the plots depicting spectral acceleration vs. cost, the crane repair costs are 
correlated and grouped into 3 clusters. Moreover, it is almost possible to differentiate 
between the different crane damage states as described in Kosbab (2010).  For instance 
the plot for terminal A shows three distinct clusters of points.  If one keeps in mind that 
Figure 4.5 shows the total crane repair cost (sum of all crane repairs in a terminal) it is 
possible to associate the elevated means of the clusters to specific damage states.  The 
lowest cluster corresponds to the derailment damage state, which has a mean cost of 
$50,000 and a COV of 0.3.  The middle cluster is probably a combination of the 
immediate use and structural damage damage states which have a mean cost of $300,000 
and $500,000 respectively and COVs of 0.5.  The upper cluster would then correspond to 
the complete collapse damage state, which has a mean cost of $7,000,000 and a COV of 
0.3.   The presence of specific damage states with the repair cost data further confirms 
that the repair requirements are being calculated correctly within the risk analysis 
framework. 
The lack of visible damage states within the wharf repair data is due to the nature 
of how and the number of repair costs calculated.  While different damage states exist for 
the wharf, they are less binary than that of the cranes.  If a crane is in a certain damage 
state, there is a specific mean cost associated with that state.  The wharf repair cost is also 
calculated as a function of the extent to which the berth is damaged (i.e. the number of 
piles damaged).  However, because there are so many instances of wharf repair and the 
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damage states are correlated, repair costs take on large ranges of values that plot as a 
single correlated cluster of wharf repair costs.   
 
4.3.1.3.2 Intensity Measures correlate well with fragility curves.  
Figure 4.5b-Figure 4.8b also show that crane damage initiates at a SA value 
around 0.1 g and the cost increases rapidly as the SA increases.  The spectral acceleration 
intensity measure was taken at a period of 1.5 s and a damping ratio of 5%.  This 
damping differs from the ratio used to generate the fragility curves (1.5%) but this 
difference is accounted for within the risk analysis program (See 3.3.4.6).  This value is 
consistent with the fragility curves developed in Kosbab (2010) in which crane damage 
initiated around the same value (Figure 4.12). 
 
Figure 4.12 Fragility curves for LD100, assuming portal uplift theory seismic demand 
model. (Kosbab 2010) 
  
Wharf repair costs in Figure 4.5-Figure 4.8 initiate at a PGV of 0.02 cm/s and 
logarithmically increase with increasing PGV.  The fragility curves from Shafieezadeh 
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(2011) in Figure 4.13 depict slight damage at PGVs near 0 m/s for relative movement of 
the wharf with respect to the crane rail.  While there are instances of damage at low 
PGVs that correspond to this curve, the core of the repair cluster begins near 0.1 cm/s 
which correspond to the curve for slight damage near 0.1 m/s for damage to pile-deck 
connections.  One must remember that these fragility curves show the PGVs 
corresponding to the probability of damage for an entire wharf section, which includes 
110 separate piles.  It takes 0.1 m/s to initiate damage all 110 piles, however damage to a 
single pile would not require such a large intensity.  The smaller intensity measure value 
of initial damage in Figure 4.5-Figure 4.8 likely corresponds to the damage of a single or 
small number of piles.   
 
Figure 4.13 - Component fragility curves for (a) pile section, (b) pile-deck connections, 
and (c) relative movement of the wharf with respect to the landside crane rail (solid lines 
are the fragility estimates and dashed lines are the corresponding 90% confidence 





Figure 4.9 proved that for the earthquakes sampled wharf damage was far more 
prevalent than crane damage.  This of course is partially due to the fact that the number of 
wharf sections that can be damaged is larger than the number of cranes.  However, it is 
still apparent that wharves seem to be more vulnerable during earthquakes when 
comparing the two.  Figure  attempts to draw conclusions about the vulnerability of the 
wharf at each terminal: 
 
Figure 4.14 – PGV vs. Repair Cost per Terminal 
However, the density of the points and the wide scatter among repair costs at 
specific PGVs prevent any definitive statement about the order of vulnerability among 
the terminals.  Therefore statements of wharf vulnerability per terminal will be saved 
until the mean rate of exceedance curves are plotted.  However, it can be said that if 
differences in vulnerability exist, it will be a factor of wharf length, because that is the 
only major difference between the four terminals.  On the other hand, since there are far 




























Terminal A Terminal B
Terminal C Terminal D
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less instances of crane damage it is much easier to see correlations between crane type 
and SA values. 
 
Figure 4.15 – SA vs. Crane Repair Cost Comparison per Crane Type 
From Figure 4.15 it is evident that the range of SA at which damage occurs varies 
by crane type.  The LD100 crane has the lowest range, the LD50 crane a mid-range, and 
the J100 the highest range.  If ranked from most to least vulnerable the order would be 
LD100, LD50, and J100.  This can also be confirmed by counting the instances of 
damage for each crane type for the 10019 earthquakes in this particular sample (Table 
4.5) or by comparing mean rate of exceedance curves for crane damage. 
























Table 4.5 – Instances of Crane Damage per Terminal 
Terminal Crane Type Instances 
of Damage 
% of Total 
A LD50 217 2.2% 
B LD100 279 2.8% 
C J100 138 1.4% 
D LD100 298 3.0% 
 
4.4 Probabilistic Analysis Results 
4.4.1 Earthquake Sample Size 
 A sample size of 100,000 earthquakes implementing stratified sampling was 
chosen to generate mean rate of exceedance data within the risk analysis program.  A 
sample that large was required in order to accurately calculate the annual exceedance 
rates less than 10e-4 that corresponded to the largest instances of port damage/disruption. 
Smaller sample sizes were tested but the results were not consistent at small 
annual exceedance values.  A hazard curve for PGV vs. a reference hazard curve for 
Terminal A and a 10000-earthquake sample (Figure 4.16) confirms that MRE curves 
were not representative of true hazard curves at small rates of exceedance.  For instance, 
this hazard curve begins to become unrepresentative of the reference curve at an 
exceedance value of about 10-3.  A larger earthquake sample will be used so that the 






Figure 4.16 – Empirical (10000-EQ sample) and Reference Hazard Curve Comparison: 
Terminal A 
When the 100,000 earthquake sample was implemented curves at lower rates of 
exceedance were better defined at smaller rates of exceedance (Figure 4.17).  The 
following plot shows MRE curves for total cost among two different 100,000 earthquake 
baseline runs as compared to a 10,000-earthquake run (in red), and plot b shows the 
empirically calculated hazard curve for PGV vs. the reference hazard curve for the run 





Figure 4.17 – a.) MRE curves for total cost among 2 different 100,000 earthquake 
baseline runs as compared to a 10,000-earthquake run (in red), and b.) The empirically 
calculated hazard curve for PGV vs. the reference hazard curve (red) for the run 
represented by the red MRE curve in a.): Terminal A  































In Figure 4.17a, the 100,000-earthquake samples (blue and green) are similar in 
magnitude and well defined even at small rates of exceedance.  The horizontal portions of 
the smaller sample (red) at small rates of exceedance indicate that there are not enough 
large earthquakes in the sample to properly define the MRE curve at very small rates of 
exceedance.  Thus, it’s obvious that the larger sample is needed.  However, from Figure 
4.17b, it is also possible to see that at very very small exceedance rates, the 100,000-
earthquake sample also loses definition of the MRE curve.  Considering the previous 
plots and using a sample size of 100,000 earthquakes, MRE curves up to 10-4 will be 
considered well defined, the portion of the curve between 10-4 and 10-5 will be considered 
moderately well defined, and any data smaller than 10-5 will not be considered.  There 
aren’t enough earthquakes in the 100,000-earthquake sample to properly define the 
curves at exceedance values less than 10-5.  This result is acceptable because in practice, 
most earthquake engineers do not consider exceedance rates for earthquakes larger than a 
return period of 2500 years.  The data is well defined up to and slightly smaller this 
value. For reference, the following return periods correspond to the following exceedance 
rates: 
Table 4.6 – Exceedance Value Reference 
Return Period 
(years) 
Annual Rate of Exceedance  
10 10-1 
72 (OLE) 1.4*10-2 
100 10-2 









4.4.2 Exceedance Results 
Exceedance curves are the most common results used in earthquake risk analysis.  
Calculation of these curves is outlined in Section 3.7.1.  The exceedance curves produced 
to analyze the port system include curves that find the annual rate of exceedance for 
repair costs, business interruption losses, and total costs at each terminal.    
 
Figure 4.18 – Comparison of RC, BIL, and TC Exceedance Curves: Terminal A 
When these costs are compared simultaneously (Figure 4.18) the MRE curves 
confirm that business interruption losses make up the majority of the total cost (as 
discussed in 4.3.1.3).  This figure only shows a comparison of Terminal A, but the 
remainder of the terminals plot in the same manner.  Notice how at larger annual rates of 
exceedance and smaller costs the total cost and BIL curves are nearly equal.  Only as the 
exceedance rates decrease and the repair cost grows larger does an apparent separation 
grow between total cost and BIL. 































4.4.2.1  Repair Cost Exceedance Curves 
The following curves compare repair costs among the port terminals: 
 
Figure 4.19 - Repair Cost Exceedance Curves: All Terminals 
Repair cost exceedance rates vary by terminal.  For instance in Figure 4.19 if the 
exceedance rates are compared at a repair cost of 1 x 108 = $100,000,000, Terminal C has 
the smallest annual rate of exceedance at about 9*10-4, Terminal D is next at 6*10-5, and 
Terminals A and B are nearly equal at about 7*10-5.  In terms of return periods, a 
$100,000,000 repair cost has an expected return period of 90000 years at Terminal C, 
600000 years at Terminal D, and 700000 years at Terminals A and B.  Using this logic 
with respect to repair costs, Terminal C is the most vulnerable, followed by terminal D, 
and then Terminals A and B.  This result makes sense because wharf repair costs make 
up the majority of the total repair costs and the order of vulnerability also corresponds 
with the order of berth length from longest to shortest. 






























4.4.2.2  Business Interruption Loss Curves 
Next the exceedance curves for business interruption losses were plotted for all 
terminals in Figure 4.20: 
 
Figure 4.20- Business Interruption Loss Exceedance Curves: All Terminals 
Unlike repair costs, vulnerability in terms of business interruption losses by 
terminal would be ordered: C, A, D and B.  As described in Section 3.6, the BIL 
magnitude is dependent on wharf repair time, berth length, crane repair time and number 
of cranes, with wharf repair time being the most dominant variable.  Terminal C has the 
highest annual rates of exceedance most likely because it is the longest berth, which 
means it also has the smallest inter-arrival time.  Table 4.7 shows the mean inter-arrival 
times for each terminal calculated for the current data:  






























Table 4.7 – Mean Inter-arrival Times for All Terminals 
Terminal Length (ft.) Mean Inter-Arrival Time (days) 
A 2400 2.38 
B 2400 2.38 
C 5400 0.91 
D 3600 1.47 
 Since more ships arrive at Terminal C as compared to any other, very large BILs  
can be more easily reached (i.e. larger exceedance rate) because more ships will 
be displaced during extreme damage.  The second largest BIL is at Terminal A, which 
incidentally is the shortest terminal (equal to B).  This terminal has high BILs because it 
has the most vulnerable crane type.  At Terminal A, ships cannot be serviced because 
there are few available cranes for loading/unloading.  Terminals D and B have nearly 
identical BILs.  Each of these terminals contains the same crane type and has similar 
inter-arrival times. 
4.4.2.3  Total Cost Curves 
It is of no surprise that the exceedance curves for total cost have the same 
terminal vulnerability order as BIL since total cost is dominated by the business 
interruption loss.  Figure 4.21 separates the total loss curves for each terminal and shows 
the mean MRE and a one-sided 90% confidence interval.  Notice that the variance is 




























MRE of Losses and One-Sided Confidence Interval
Terminal A




























Figure 4.21 – MRE of Total Losses and One-sided Confidence Intervals: All Terminals 






















MRE of Losses and One-Sided Confidence Interval
Terminal C


























4.4.3 Sample Summary Statistics 
As described in Section 3.7.2, the mean loss, variance of the mean, and sample 
variance of the earthquake sample can be calculated from the data.  The following 
summary statistics were calculated for the baseline run: sample mean, variance of sample 
mean (with 90% confidence intervals), and variance of sample.  Each is plotted in the 
figures below.  Note that the variance of the mean is very small as compared to the 
variance of the sample. 
  
Figure 4.22 – Summary Statistics: Repair Cost 








































Figure 4.23 – Summary Statistics: Business Interruption Loss 












































Figure 4.24 – Summary Statistics: Total Cost 
4.4.4 Exceedance Curve Sample Calculations 
Exceedance curves are particularly useful because they can be used to extract 
basic information about the port that is valuable to port stakeholders.  The subsequent 
sections give examples of three calculations that can be made using exceedance curves 
and summary statistics: finding the probability of a specific loss over some exposure 
period, finding the loss associated with a specific return period, and finding the mean, 
variance, and confidence interval of the loss over some exposure period. 
4.4.4.1 Probability of a Specific Loss 
This example will calculate the probability of exceeding a total loss of 
$200,000,000 over an exposure time of 20 years at Terminal A.  To find the mean rate of 
exceeding the loss at Terminal A, the exceedance curve for total losses at Terminal A will 









































be used.  The mean rate of exceedance can be found from this graph by finding the MRE 
associated with a loss of $200,000,000 (Figure 4.25).  For this example the λ(Total Loss 
= $200,000,000) = 0.01.  The probability that the loss exceeds $200,000,000 over a 20 




Figure 4.25 - Finding the Probability of Exceeding a Specific Loss 
4.4.4.2 Loss Associated with a Specific Return Period 
Port stakeholders might also be interested in finding the loss associated with a 
specific return period.  For instance, the Port of Los Angeles uses the operating level 
return period of 72 years as a design measure for seismic hazards.  The mean rate of 
exceedance associated with this return period (λ) = 1/72 = 0.014.  To find the loss 
associated with this MRE at the hypothetical port at Terminal A, one would simply find 
%20198.011]20,000,000,200$[ 20*001.0 ==−=−==> −− eeyearstTLP tλ
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the loss associated with that specific MRE in the total loss exceedance curve (Figure 
4.26).  From the figure the associated loss equals approximately 0.5 x 108, or 
$50,000,000.  Calculations such as this are especially useful in determining the kind of 
impact of a particular return period on the actual port components.  For instance, in this 
case, calculating an actual loss for the OLE is more revealing to the earthquake’s actual 
effect at the port than stating that no major disruption is anticipated at this level, which is 
typical of current practice.   
 
Figure 4.26 - Finding the Loss Associated with a Specific Return Period 
 
4.4.4.3 Exposure Time Calculations 
The last example uses the summary statistics (which can be calculated from the 
exceedance curves) to calculate the net present value of the mean, variance, and 
confidence intervals over some exposure time.  If the mean, variance and confidence 
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intervals were to be calculated for the 20-year exposure time used in the first example, 
supposing that a conservative discount rate of 5% is used, and noting that the starting 
summary statistics are currently calculated in 2009 dollars, the sample mean in for the 
20-year exposure time would be calculated using the following equation: 
 
     (4.2) 
 
    (4.3) 
 
Likewise, the variance would be calculated as: 
 
   (4.4) 
 
  (4.5) 
 
Therefore the summary statistics for total cost for a 20-year exposure time would be: 
 
Table 4.8 – Summary Statistics for Exposure time of 20 years 
 Total Cost at Each Terminal 
 A B C D 
Sample mean 
($) 5.08E+07 4.11E+07 9.16E+07 5.64E+07 
Variance of 
Mean ($)2 1.91E+10 1.53E+10 6.09E+10 2.90E+10 
CI 90% ($) 
5.05E+07 4.09E+07 9.12E+07 5.61E+07 
5.10E+07 4.13E+07 9.20E+07 5.67E+07 
 
 
4.5 Scenario-Based Analysis Results 
The scenario-based run on the hypothetical port tested within the risk analysis 
framework was modeled after the earthquake event in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 2010.  The 






































mean magnitude of 7.0 and COV of 0.2 at a distance 20-25 km from the source zone.  
That specific scenario produced the following repair cost, business interruption loss and 
total cost exceedance results (Figure 4.27): 
 


























































Figure 4.27 – Exceedance Results for Scenario-based example run a.) Repair Cost, b.) 
Business Interruption Loss, and c.) Total Loss 
Exceedance curves plot as expected.  Total repair costs were smaller than 
business interruption losses, and the orders of vulnerability of each terminal for each type 
of loss was consistent with what was seen for the corresponding exceedance rates in the 
fully probabilistic hazard method.  Perhaps more enlightening for this specific type of 
hazard scenario are the mean annual losses calculated for the specific scenario.  The 
mean annual losses give an estimation of the extent of damage expected at the 
hypothetical port if an earthquake the magnitude and distance of the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake were to occur.  Figure 4.28 plots the mean annual loss, standard deviation of 
the mean, and sample variance for the scenario-based run.  





























Figure 4.28 – Sample Statistics of Scenario-Based Run: Total Cost 
The mean total loss at each terminal ranges between $45-75 million dollars, with 
Terminal C having the highest mean and Terminal B the lowest.  If an earthquake the size 
of the 2010 Haiti earthquake were to occur at the hypothetical port in Santa Cruz 
California, the mean total cost to completely repair the port would equal approximately 
$229 million dollars. 
4.6 Intensity-Based Analysis Results 
The intensity-based runs tested within the risk analysis framework correspond to 
the operating level and contingency level design earthquakes used at the Port of Los 
Angeles.  The specific inputs for each of the scenarios can be found in Table 4.9. 






































Table 4.9 - Intensity Based Scenario Inputs 
Earthquake Intensity 
Measure 
IM Value COV # of EQs in 
Sample 
OLE PGV 15 cm/s 0.2 10000 
CLE PGV 42 cm/s 0.1 10000 
 
By using the OLE and CLE it is possible to test if the hypothetical port meets the 
Port of Los Angeles design requirements that no interruption occur for the OLE and an 
acceptable amount of disruption occur after the CLE.  The following figures plot the 
exceedance values for repair cost, business interruption loss, and total loss (Figure 4.29): 
 





































Figure 4.29 – Exceedance Results for OLE and CLE example runs a.) Repair Cost, b.) 
Business Interruption Loss, and c.) Total Loss 


































































From the figures it is possible to see that the loss incurred from the OLE are much 
less than those from the CLE (which is expected), but both still produce rather large 
losses.  After the OLE, the port should still be operational, but from the business 
interruption loss exceedance curve one can see that losses range anywhere from $10 to 
$800 million dollars.  Losses that high indicate that the port is not continuing on with 
“normal operation”.  This fact is further proved by the mean annual losses calculated for 
each scenario Figure 4.30:  
  







































Figure 4.30 – Sample Statistics of OLE and CLE Run: Total Cost 
The mean annual losses for the OLE range from $50 – $75 million dollars while 
mean losses for the CLE range from $125-$160 million dollars.  Both of these mean total 
losses would indicate that extensive damage has occurred within the hypothetical port, 
much more than designed for according to the standards.  The mean maximum repair 
times for the wharf and crane for each scenario further confirm this result (Table 4.10): 











A 198 17 372 131 
B 201 29 381 168 
C 273 4 577 80 
D 235 36 470 218 
 









































For the OLE scenario, it takes Terminal A 6.5 months to fully recover, Terminal 
B - slightly under seven months, Terminal C - nine months, and Terminal D – almost 
eight months.  These repair times further indicate that the OLE would cause significant 
interruption within the hypothetical port.  The CLE repair times are even larger so their 
interruption is also larger.  If the hypothetical port was being tested to the standards of the 
Port of Los Angeles, it would need to be redesigned to reduce the physical repairs and 
downtime resulting from both the OLE and CLE. 
4.7 Sources of Uncertainty 
The risk analysis framework is fully probabilistic, which dictates that multiple 
sources of uncertainty are built into the framework as a whole.  In an attempt to ascertain 
the sources of the largest uncertainties, four possible sources were identified: uncertainty 
associated with the ground motions, uncertainty associated with the calculated repair 
requirements of the crane, uncertainty associated with the calculated repair requirements 
of the wharf, and uncertainty within the operational regression model.  The variations 
associated with each source were compared by conducted a series of risk analysis 
framework runs in which each source was isolated.  The runs conducted within this 
analysis were as follows: 
Table 4.11 – Description of Uncertainty Runs 
Run Isolated Source of  Uncertainty Description 
  1 None Use the mean of all sources of uncertainty 
2 Ground Motion Allow uncertainty within ground motions 
3 Spatial Correlation Allow uncertainty within ground motions but neglect spatial correlation, allow uncertainty in all other sources 
  4 Crane Repair Requirements Allow uncertainty when calculating crane repair cost and time 
  5 Wharf Repair Requirements Allow uncertainty when calculating wharf repair cost and time 




4.7.1.1  Control: Using the Mean of All Sources of Uncertainty 
To compare the sources of uncertainty, a “control” run had to be created where all 
examined sources of uncertainty were removed.  Sources of uncertainty included were: 
ground motions, crane repair requirements, wharf repair requirements, and the 
operational regression.  For this run for each source, the following means were employed: 
1.) Ground Motions – The mean of the ground motions was considered as 
using only the arithmetic mean ( ) in the ground motion equation: 
 .  For the true mean the inter- and intra-
event residuals were neglected.  However, an additional run will be 
conducted that examines only neglecting the spatial correlation in the 
residuals as compared to a baseline run. 
2.) Crane and Wharf Repair Requirements – The mean of the repair 
requirements was calculated by using only the mean cost and mean 
time for chosen damage states when calculating repair requirements.  
Normally, repair requirements are chosen randomly from a lognormal 
distribution using the mean and a sigma value equal to the covariance 
matrix conditional on the specified values of intensity measures. 
3.) Operational Regression – The multivariate regression equation that 
calculates the number of TEUs lost for specific damage scenarios is a 
mean value that is sampled as a lognormal distribution over a sigma 
value equal to the error associated with the equation.  To make this 
value a mean the figure calculated from the equation is simply used 
and the error is ignored. 
Figure 4.31 plots the MRE for total cost for a baseline run and a run only using 
mean values for all uncertainty sources for every terminal in the hypothetical port.   
Yjk
 




Figure 4.31 – Total Cost Uncertainty Comparison: Control – Using only Mean Values 
Neglecting uncertainty significantly decreases the total cost values at equal rates 
of exceedance.  All subsequent graphs will contain plots of each of these runs for 
reference.  However, for ease of viewing and since the trends in every terminal are 
similar, all subsequent graphs will only plot comparison for Terminal A.  Figure 4.40 




Figure 4.32 – Total Cost Uncertainty Comparison: Mean Values, Terminal A 
The next figure (Figure 4.39) separates the components of total cost and plots 
repair cost and business interruption loss.  Notice that the difference in cost between the 







Figure 4.33 – a.) Repair Cost and b.)Business Interruption Loss Uncertainty Comparison: 




4.7.1.2  Ground Motion 
The following section examines the effect of introducing uncertainty as developed 
from the ground motions into the calculation of total costs within the risk analysis 
program.  Common convention dictates that a large amount of uncertainty can be 
associated with ground motions.  The following run uses mean values for all uncertainty 
sources except for the ground motions, which are calculated in the same manner as in the 
baseline scenario.  Figure 4.34 plots the MRE of total cost for the baseline, all means, and 
ground motion scenarios. 
 
Figure 4.34 – Total Cost Uncertainty Comparison: Ground Motion 
By adding uncertainty in with the ground motions it accounts for around 50% of 
the cost difference between the all means and baseline scenarios.  The same can be seen 





Figure 4.35 – a.) Repair Cost and b.) Business Interruption Loss Uncertainty 





4.7.1.3  Spatial Correlation 
Park et al. (2007) showed that neglecting ground motion spatial correlation 
underestimated large losses and overestimated small losses in risk analyses.  This 
statement was tested by neglecting spatial correlation within the calculation of the ground 
motion intensity measures in the risk analysis framework.  The figures below (Figure 
4.36 - Figure 4.37) plot the MRE curves that include and don’t include spatial correlation.  
The reader should note that for all terminals, neglecting spatial correlation seemed to 
have little to no affect.  Possible reasons for this is the small number of sites tested within 
the risk analysis framework.  The Park study ran risk analyses that tested two portfolios 
of sites, one containing over 1,000 sites, and the other containing 133.  The resulting 
MRE Loss curves produced for both portfolios displayed noticeable variations of losses 
for exceedance rates small than 10-3.  Since the hypothetical port only contains four sites, 
it is entirely possible that this sample was not large enough to properly capture the 









Figure 4.37 – a.) Repair Cost and b.) Business Interruption Loss Uncertainty 
Comparison: Spatial Correlation 
 
 
4.7.1.4  Crane Repair Requirements 
The crane repair requirements introduce uncertainty into the calculation of total 
cost in the risk analysis program because crane costs and times are randomly chosen from 
a lognormal distribution using the mean value and a sigma term.  Figure 4.38 plots the all 
means and baseline scenario as compared to a scenario run where the only uncertainty 




Figure 4.38 – Total Cost Uncertainty Comparison: Crane Repair Requirements 
The crane repair requirement scenario is almost equal to the all means scenario.  
This indicates that the crane repair requirements are not large sources of uncertainty since 
the results including the uncertainty are almost identical to the results where it is omitted.  






Figure 4.39 – a.) Repair Cost and b.) Business Interruption Loss Uncertainty 




4.7.1.5  Wharf Repair Requirements 
The wharf repair requirements are calculated in the same manner as the crane 
repair requirements except that the sigma calculated differs from that of the cranes.  
Figure 4.40 plots the baseline and all means runs and compares that to a run where the 
only uncertainty allowed came from the wharf repair requirements: 
 
Figure 4.40 – Total Cost Uncertainty Comparison: Wharf Repair Requirements 
Much like the crane repair requirements, the wharf repair requirements are not a 
large source of uncertainty and the results for total cost (Figure 4.40 ) and  repair cost / 






Figure 4.41 – a.) Repair Cost and b.) Business Interruption Loss Uncertainty 





4.7.1.6 Operational Regression Model 
The uncertainty within the operational regression model is the last source of 
uncertainty to be tested.  Uncertainty within this model results because TEU loss values 
are randomly chosen according to a distribution using the mean value and an error value 
(Figure 4.42). 
 
Figure 4.42 – Illustration of Uncertainty within the Operational regression Model’s 
calculation of TEUs.  (Red = mean and distribution) 
Figure 4.43 plots the baseline and all means scenarios as compared to a run only 
allowing uncertainty in the calculation of the TEU loss within the operational regression 





Figure 4.43 – Total Cost Uncertainty Comparison: Regression Analysis 
The uncertainty within the regression analysis also accounts for a significant 
amount of the total uncertainty within the risk analysis.  Much like the ground motions, it 
appears that regression uncertainty accounts for around half of the total uncertainty.  
Unlike the ground motions, this uncertainty is sole expressed in the calculation of the 
business interruption loss as seen in Figure 4.44.  This result is expected since the 
operational regression equation has no influence on the repairs, because they are used as 





Figure 4.44 – a.) Repair Cost and b.) Business Interruption Loss Uncertainty 
Comparison: Regression Analysis 
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4.7.1.7  Comparison of All Sources of Uncertainty 
The following figure (Figure 4.45) plots every source on uncertainty examined for 
each terminal.  These plots shed light on the influences that each uncertainty source plays 









Figure 4.45 – Comparison of Uncertainty Runs Terminals A, B, C, and D 
In every terminal the uncertainty associated with the wharf and crane repair 
requirements attributed to little if any of the overall uncertainty.  Both sources were equal 
to or near the all mean run at every terminal.  The ground motions and the regression 
equations were the main sources of uncertainty, but had different distributions at varying 
terminals.  At terminals A and C their contributions were nearly equal, but at terminals B 
and D, the ground motions were the largest source of uncertainty. 
4.8 Comparison with Previous Studies 
True comparisons of the entire risk analysis program are hard to make with 
previous studies because the ports described in each of these studies are very different.  
However, some direct comparisons could be made regarding individual components of 
previous studies.  Some comparisons as to the hazards and port components have already 
been made in previous sections, so this section will make comparisons regarding the 
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operational modeling within the risk analysis program since this is the part that differs the 
most as compared to all previous studies.  Operational modeling at the level of the NEES 
Grand challenge project has yet to be employed in port risk analysis.  The subsequent 
sections will compare the operational modeling techniques of Werner and Taylor 2004, 
Pachakis and Kiremidjian, and a linear calculation of BIL to the BQCSP technique used 
within the grand challenge project. 
4.8.1  Werner and Taylor 
Werner and Taylor’s study estimated loss at the Port of Oakland and therefore 
operational policies specific to the Port of Oakland were used.  For instance, in the event 
of an emergency, the port facility reserves the right to implement a force majeure clause 
in which the port is allowed to assign ships to any available berth post-disaster. Business 
interruption losses for each day after the earthquake are then calculated using the 
following formula: 
    (4.2) 
This equation functions under the following assumptions:  Business interruption 
losses are calculated by multiplying the number of ships not serviced that day by the 
revenue accumulated per ship. The number of ships not serviced equals the number of 
ships scheduled (m) – the number of ship spaces available (capacity, j). Revenue that 
would have been acquired (cost/ship) if the ship had been processed is estimated using 
average values from various sources.  It should be noted that no operational consideration 
of the cranes is taken.  This method assumes that cranes will be available for every open 








4.8.1.1  Cost 
Cost is equal to the money lost/ship.  For the Port of Oakland, this is calculated as 
.  From Adams (2000), it is estimated that ships in a large vessel 
schedule spend on average 22 hours in port.  Additionally, for the port of Oakland the 
number of TEUs loaded/unloaded per hour was equal to 36 in 1999, and according to 
income records for the port, they receive $59 on average for each TEU handled.  
Multiplied out, the cost/ship equals $46728/ship.  However, because Werner and Taylor 
used a walkthrough method for analysis, this cost is only applicable to the year 1999.  For 
subsequent years in the walkthrough, it is assumed that the number of TEUs handled will 
increase by 3% per annum, therefore YTEU = 36*(1.03)j.  Here, j equals the number of 
years after 1999.  Notice that ship capacity is neglected since the average number of 
TEUs/hour is considered instead. 
4.8.1.2  Number of Ships Scheduled 
The number of incoming ships per day is based on the average weekly demands at 
the Port of Oakland and data provided by Adams (2000).  Daily demands are allocated 
proportional to the number of work hours per day of the week for San Francisco bay Area 
Longshoreman.  As an example, the number of hours worked per day on Monday-Friday 
is about twice the number worked on Saturday and Sunday.  Additionally, it has been 
assumed that weekly shipping demands will increase 5% per annum. 
 
4.8.1.3  Port Capacity 
The capacity of the port is an indication of the number of ships that can be 
docked, loaded and unloaded at the port at any given time.  Post-earthquake, it is 
expected that some of the port facilities could be damaged and unusable.  Port capacity 







were more than one ship to be docked at the same terminal, it would require 200 ft. of 
clearance.  Available berth lengths will determine the available ship capacity for each 
post-earthquake day. 
 
4.8.1.4  Comparison 
To most accurately compare the Werner and Taylor BIL calculation to that of the 
risk analysis, the “port” confines will be limited to only terminals A and B and the force 
majeure scenario will be used in the risk analysis.  Using equation 4.2, the business 
interruption loss will be calculated for the combined arrival schedule of Terminals A and 
B using the Werner/Taylor method and compared to the business interruption loss 
calculated using the force majeure combination in the risk analysis framework.  From 
equation 4.2, and assuming that the earthquake in question takes place in the year 2011: 
       (4.3) 
$59/TEU would also have to be adjusted for inflation to 2011 dollars.  Assuming 5% 
inflation, $59 * (1.05)2011-1999 = $106/TEU.  Therefore, 
    (4.4) 
The variables m and j correspond to the number of scheduled ships and berth 
capacity respectively.  Berth capacity can be calculated from the repair requirements for 
given earthquakes, and the number of scheduled ships can be calculated using the 
arriving vessel stream. 
Capacity 
  For this example, a moderate-sized earthquake (M6.05 from the South San Andreas 
fault) with moderate damage will be investigated at terminal A.  Terminal A and 
Terminal B are both 2400 ft long and in an undamaged condition, can accommodate 4 
ships according to the Werner/Taylor assumption of 970 ft ship lengths with 200 ft 









clearance between them.  As calculated within the risk analysis framework, Figure  
displays the 600 ft berths of Terminal A and Terminal B and their respective repair times:  
 
 
Figure 4.46 Terminal A and B – BIL Comparison Example 
Since each berth is 600 ft in length, two consecutive berths would need to be open 
in order to accommodate one ship.  Therefore according to these repair times and berth 
locations the following ship capacities are available at Terminal A and B on the following 
days: 
Table 4.12 Ship Capacity for Comparison Example 












Using the ship arrival schedule calculated in the risk analysis program, the 
number of scheduled ships can be found and compared to the capacity as in equation 4.2.  
Business interruption loss will be calculated by summing the number of ships that cannot 
be accommodated at Terminals A and B during the repair period.  Table 4.13 compares 
the number of scheduled ships to the capacity of the port. 
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Table 4.13 Scheduled Arrivals vs. Capacity for Terminal A 
Scheduled Arrivals 
(day) 
Capacity on that 
day 
Scheduled - Capacity 
2.7 0 1 
5.0 0 1 
6.9 0 1 
7.1 0 1 
7.7 0 1 
8.4 0 1 
8.9 0 1 
16.0 0 1 
17.3 0 1 
19.4 0 1 
19.5 0 1 
21.3 1 0 
21.8 0 1 
26.2 2 0 
28.9 2 0 
29.0 2 0 
30.1 2 0 
30.6 2 0 
33.4 4 0 
38.9 4 0 
 SUM 12 
 
Twelve ships will not be accommodated using this method for calculating 
business interruption losses, and at $119,695/ship, that means the total business 
interruption loss will equal $1,436,340.  This figure is much less than the BIL = 
$29,340,490 calculated using the risk analysis program. 
The discrepancy between the figures can be explained by the method used to 
calculate the BIL and the assumptions made in doing so.  One major difference is that the 
risk analysis program calculates losses to both the port operator and to the port terminal, 
at an amount of $100 and $150 per TEU respectively.  If the $106 per TEU increased to 
$250, the BIL using the Werner/Taylor method would increase to $3.39 million dollars.  
This figure is still well below the $29 million calculated by the risk analysis program.  
The second major difference is that the Werner/Taylor method calculates the average lost 
per ship, and it assumes that all ships are 970 ft in length.  Table 4.14 shows the ship 
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lengths and TEUs used in the ship arrival stream used in the risk analysis for the 12 ships 
that were not accommodated at Terminal A. 
Table 4.14 Ship Arrival Stream – Ship lengths and TEUs 
Scheduled Arrival 
(day) 
Ship Length TEUs/ship 
2.7 964.3 5414 
5.0 849.6 3569 
6.9 964.6 6351 
7.1 918.1 7358 
7.7 900.9 8613 
8.4 964.7 4316 
8.9 1148.0 10267 
16.0 964.7 3981 
17.3 964.7 6070 
19.4 983.3 7662 
19.5 964.7 6740 
21.8 902.0 4901 
 
 While most of the ships are around 970 ft in length, the number of TEUs 
on each ship is very different from what is assumed in the Werner/Taylor method.  If it 
costs $119,695 per ship and $106 per TEU, then by division this method assumes that 
there are approximately ($119695/$106) 1129.2 TEUs per ship.  However, from the table 
it can be seen that every ship, no matter the length holds more than 1129 TEUs, and the 
average capacity is 6270 TEU.  It is important to remember that the TEU and ship length 
values in the risk analysis arrival stream are sampled and calculated from actual ships in 
the MXSOCAL log that actually docked at the Port of Los Angeles or the Port of Long 
Beach.  If the Werner/Taylor TEU figure were increased, it would cost ($106 x 6270) 
$664,683/ship and the BIL calculated would increase to $7.9 million dollars. If that new 
TEU figure were used with the risk analysis loss of $250/TEU instead of the $106/TEU 
currently used, the BIL calculation would increase to $18.8 million dollars.  This figure is 
much closer to the $29 million calculated within the risk analysis program.  The 
additional difference in loss of $10 million dollars could possibly be explained by the fact 
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that the Werner and Taylor method considers a force majeure option for the entire port of 
Oakland while the risk analysis framework only considers force majeure in Terminals A 
and B.  Even though the compared arrival stream is identical, the port of Oakland has 
more available berths than at Terminals A and B which will reduce the overall business 
interruption loss. However, the risk analysis program method for calculating business 
interruption loss does seem to be more accurate than the Werner/Taylor method which 
uses port and ship assumptions that contributes to an underestimation the business 
interruption loss figure. 
4.8.2  Pachakis and Kiremidjian 
  The operational modeling within this study is more representative of the 
approach taken within the Grand Challenge operational modeling.  Here, loss is 
calculated as the difference between revenue generated during some time period and 
revenue generated during that same time period conditional on damage caused by an 
earthquake.  Calculated revenue for the operational model of Pachakis and Kiremidjian is 
dependent on the fees collected from craneage, wharfage, and dockage revenues.  
Definitions of each of these fees can be found in Section 2.4.2. 
4.8.2.1  Ship Traffic 
Ship arrivals were assumed to have exponentially distributed inter-arrival times, 
and modeled as a random process with different traffic intensities for each month 
(nonhomogeneous Poisson arrivals).  Properties associated with the ships (quantity of 
cargo, capacity, minimum and maximum number of cranes to be used) are generated 
from distributions based on collected data. Once the traffic stream is generated, ships are 




4.8.2.2  Berth Assignment and Crane Allocation 
Once a ship enters the port, it is assigned a terminal and berth.  Berths are 
assigned by examining all berth sets within the port that can accommodate the ship’s 
length and capacity.  Actual berth assignment goes to the berth set with the largest 
number of available cranes.  Each berth accepts ships into an individual queuing model.  
If the model exceeds some maximum number of ships within its queue, the incoming ship 
is diverted to others berths or terminals.  The number of cranes used to load/unload a ship 
depends on the capacity of the ship itself.  From observed data, Pachakis and Kiremidjian 
estimated that one crane is used for every 400 TEUs to be handled.  An algorithm uses 
this average, the number of available cranes, and the ship capacities to assign cranes 
within the operational model.  Algorithms for both berth and crane assignment minimize 
the waiting time and service time for each ship. 
4.8.2.3 Service Times 
The service time, or time the ship spends at the dock being loaded and unloaded, 
is calculated as a lognormal distribution with varying parameters dependent on the 
handling system (cranes, storage equipment, etc.).   
The main differences between the Pachakis and Kiremidjian (PK) model and that used in 
the Grand Challenge occur in the algorithms that assign berths and cranes.  The GC 
model uses rolling horizon’s to plan for incoming arrival streams much as a port official 
would in real life.  The queuing model suggested by Pachakis and Kiremidjian does not 
allow for future planning.  Once the ship enters the queue, it must be dealt with before 
another ship can be planned for.  The GC model more closely mimics real-life situations 
and is therefore more suitable.  Furthermore, there are also slight differences in how ship 
data is stored and used within the models.  The GC model samples ships from a database 
of actual ships and therefore the ship properties are fixed and inherent to each ship.  On 
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the other hand, the PK model randomly samples ship lengths and the properties are then 
sampled from distributions based on that length.  While either method is acceptable, the 
GC method utilizes actual west coast ships. 
4.8.3  Linear Calculation of BIL 
An additional comparison of BIL calculation will be made using a linear 
calculation of the TEU Loss (= BIL/$250) based on the availability of port structures 
during the repair period of the port.  From observation it is apparent that business 
interruption losses are a function of the availability of berths and cranes given some ship 
arrival schedule.  For the linear calculation it will be assumed that TEU Loss is calculated 
as a fraction of the berths and cranes available on a given day. 
The specific examples used will be the five earthquake examples in section 
3.5.2.1.  The linear BIL calculation procedure will be described using earthquake #3, and 
then calculated TEU Losses will be compared for each of the five earthquakes in the 
aforementioned example.   Recall for each earthquake example that a 3000 ft terminal 
was examined and repair requirements for each of the 600 ft berths and six cranes were 
specified.  Figure 4.47 shows the repair requirements for Earthquake #3, which will be 
used in the linear BIL calculation procedure example.  Earthquake #3 represents a 
moderate sized earthquake with moderate wharf damage and mild crane damage 
 
Figure 4.47 Wharf and Crane Repair Times for Example Earthquake Scenario #3 
t = 22 t = 27 t = 51 t = 63 t = 78
t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0 t = 0t = 57
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For this example, the maximum repair time equals 78 days for berth 5, which 
equals 11.1 weeks.  Therefore, it will be assumed that no business interruption losses will 
occur past week 12.  The following figure plots the TEUs handled per week within the 
port for a no damage state (normal operation) and for BQCSP calculated operation after 
Earthquake 3 (EQ 3) (Figure 4.48).  When the number of handled TEUs during EQ 3 
operation is subtracted from the number of TEUs handled during normal operation, 
which in this case equals 70943 TEUs.  Business interruption loss (BIL) would be 
calculated by multiplying the TEU loss by a figure of $250 Lost/ TEU (BIL = 
$17,735,750).  For the rest of this example, loss figures will not be dollar amounts.  
































TEU Loss can be calculated in a linear manner according to the availability of 
port structures.  In this calculation, the TEUs handled per week in the no damage 
condition will be multiplied by the fraction of components not available per given week.  
This calculation assumes that all components at the port are used equally and that when 
components are not available for use, the TEUs handled per week will be reduced by a 
factor equal to the number of unavailable components over the total number of 
components.  Figure 4.49 is a replica of Figure 4.48 showing the TEUs handled per week 
for EQ 3 but with the availability of the components (berths, cranes) during weeks when 
repairs are made.  Repair times were rounded up to the nearest week, so for week 4 one 
can see that 1 of 5 berths are available and 5 of 6 cranes are available.  
 
Figure 4.49 TEUs Handled per Week with (berth,crane) Availability: Earthquake 3 
 
Table 4.15 calculates the TEUs lost per week using the linear calculation based on 
the total components and compares that to the TEUs lost per week using the BQCSP 
model.  For instance, for week 4, 1 of 5 berths and 5 of 6 cranes are available, so the 
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linear calculation of TEU loss would equal the normal TEUs handled * 5/11 components 
that are unavailable.  In addition, a linear TEU loss was also calculated separately for the 
number of berths and number of cranes not available as the multiplier times the normal 
TEUs handled. 
Table 4.15 Calculation of Linear TEU Losses Using Components and Berths Not 


























1 24500   6/11 13,364 25,111  5/5 24,500    1/6  4,083 
2 19208   6/11 10,477 20,628  5/5 19,208    1/6  3,201 
3 17836   6/11 9,729 16,474  5/5 41,034    1/6  2,973 
4 12740   5/11 5,791 8,731    4/5  10,192    1/6  2,123 
5 9800   4/11 3,564 0    3/5  5,880    1/6  1,633 
6 9604   4/11 3,492 0    3/5  5,762    1/6  1,601 
7 5880   4/11 2,138 0    3/5  3,528    1/6  980 
8 14308   4/11 5,203 0    3/5  8,585    1/6  2,385 
9 4900   1/11 445 0    2/5  1,960    1/6  817 
10 7840   1/11 713 0    1/5  1,568    1/6  1,307 
11 18228   1/11 0 0    1/5  0    1/6  3,038 
12 20972 0/11 0 0  0/5 0  0/6 0 
  Total 54,916 70,943  Total 122,217  Total 24,141 
 
It is apparent from the table that for EQ 3, using the components not available or 
the cranes not available underestimates the TEU Loss, and using the number of berths not 
available overestimates the TEU Loss.  This result is expected.  TEU losses are a direct 
result of the number of ships that have to turn away from the port because they cannot be 
serviced at the port.  While the number of ships that can be serviced is a function of the 
wharf and crane availability, more often than not, the damage of one component 
dominates the other.  In this instance, there is far more wharf damage than crane damage.  
The average of the linearly calculated TEU loss from only the berth and only the crane 
components provides a reasonable estimate of TEU Loss ( TEU Loss = 73,179).  This 




These linear estimations and which combination of components / computation 
method was further investigated using the other four earthquakes within the example.  
The following figures (Figure 4.50 - Figure 4.53) show the TEUs handled and component 
availability for the other four earthquake examples: 
 















Figure 4.53 TEUs Handled per Week: Earthquake 5 
The other four earthquake examples vary in the degree of damage at the terminal.  
Earthquake 1 results in very minor damage, while Earthquake 5 results in extensive 
damage.  In the same manner as the Earthquake 3 example, linear loss calculations were 
made for the previous four earthquake examples using the total number of components, 
solely the berths not available, and solely the cranes not available.  Results for all five 
earthquakes are listed in Table 4.16:   
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(Avg B & 
C) 
1 14847 11136 24500 0 12250 
2 55276 29560 63073 0 31536 
3 70943 54916 122217 24141 73179 
4 103805 53401 132614 0 66307 
5 385069 1010330911 235827 477064 356446 
 
It can been seen from Table 4.16 that for earthquakes where both berth and crane 
damage occurs, the average of the TEU loss for the berth and the loss for the crane 
provides the best estimate.  For Earthquake 5, the total component estimate severely 
overestimated the loss.  This resulted from the long time period during which repairs 
continued.  For instance as seen in Figure 4.53, while it only took 23 weeks to repair all 
of the berths, the cranes were not all functional until week 49.  So from week 24-49 the 
total component linear model was calculating TEU losses that were probably not 
consistent with those actually occurring at the port.  After week 11 there were two cranes 
available.  The BQCSP estimation is much lower because those two cranes worked 
constantly to load/unload all the cargo entering the port so that little TEU loss actually 
occurred.  On the other hand, Table 4.16 shows that for earthquakes where only one 
component type of damage occurs, the average does not provide the best estimation.  
Instead, the calculation using the damaged component provides the best estimation, and 
in the case of Earthquakes 1, 2, and 4, that component is the wharf.  The only exception 
to this is Earthquake 1, which can be explained through rounding.  The berths in 
Earthquake 1 received minor damage and all but one was repaired by day 4 of week one.  
However, the linear calculation rounds up to the nearest week, so all of the berth sections 
are considered unusable and every TEU that arrived during week one is lost.  This 
problem could easily be remedied by calculated the linear TEUs lost per day instead of 
per week.  However, if a linear TEU Loss calculation were to be made, it would be best 
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to base it on the average of the TEU losses calculated for each separate component unless 
one of the component types remains undamaged, in which case it would be best to 
calculate the loss based on the fraction of the damaged component unavailable.  Still, the 
use of the BQCSP model would provide even better data since it calculates TEU Loss 





5  MITGATION OPTIONS 
The mitigation options discussed in previous chapters will be compared to the 
baseline configuration in the subsequent sections.  It is important to note that mitigation 
options will only be compared in a monetary sense.  However, every mitigation option 
may also have additional environmental or social benefits with their implementation that 
will not and cannot be quantified monetarily in this section.  Mitigation options to be 
considered include: upgrade of cranes to J100 models, installation of vertical drains in the 
wharf backfill, reducing repair time with repair incentives, and implementation of a force 
majeure policy. 
5.1 Geotechnical Options 
Much of the damage to the wharves was caused by the lateral movement of the 
soil during liquefaction.  The next mitigation run models the situation in which vertically 
drains are installed within the backfill to prevent liquefaction.  Liquefaction prevention 
should lessen the wharf repair costs and reducing total cost.  First the exceedance curves 
for the wharf repair cost will be checked to ensure that the drains are in fact reducing 




Figure 5.1 – MRE of Wharf Repair Costs With and Without Drains: Terminal A 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – MRE of Wharf Repair Costs With and Without Drains: Terminal B 




























































Figure 5.3 – MRE of Wharf Repair Costs With and Without Drains: Terminal C 
 
Figure 5.4 – MRE of Wharf Repair Costs With and Without Drains: Terminal D 



























































While only slightly decreasing the exceedance values, terminals with drains have 
smaller exceedance values than terminals without drains.  Figure 5.5 shows that drains 
also slightly reduce the overall repair cost: 
 
Figure 5.5 – MRE of Repair Costs With and Without Drains: All Terminals 
This exceedance reduction in repair costs may also translate into a decrease in 




Figure 5.6 – MRE of Business Interruption Losses With and Without Drains: All 
Terminals 
However, in examining Figure 5.6 business interruption loss exceedance values 
are only slightly reduced in Terminals A, B, and D, and almost equal at Terminal C.  
Since business interruption losses comprise the majority of the total cost, the same 
magnitude of exceedance reductions should also be present in the MRE curves for total 




Figure 5.7 – MRE of Total Losses With and Without Drains: All Terminals 
 
Figure 5.8 – MRE of Total Losses With and Without Drains: Terminal A 































Figure 5.9 – MRE of Total Losses With and Without Drains: Terminal B 
 
Figure 5.10 – MRE of Total Losses With and Without Drains: Terminal C 



























































Figure 5.11 – MRE of Total Losses With and Without Drains: Terminal D 
While it is apparent that the installation of vertical drains does have an effect in 
reducing the wharf repair costs, the reduction in exceedance is so small that it has only a 
slight affect in reducing the overall total cost. 
5.2 Structural Options 
5.2.1 Crane Improvements 
 
Three different crane types existed in the baseline configuration.  To illustrate the 
effect of crane improvements, the cranes at terminals A, B, and D were replaced with 
J100 cranes.  These are the newest and least seismically vulnerable of the cranes tested 
within the scope of this risk analysis.  The following figures (Figure 5.12 - Figure 5.14) 
plot the annual rate of exceedance for crane repair costs at terminals A, B, and D for the 
baseline configuration and a configuration with upgraded cranes: (Terminal C was 
omitted because a J100 crane already existed in the baseline configuration.) 































Figure 5.12 – MRE of Crane Repair Costs With and Without Crane Upgrade: Terminal A 
 
Figure 5.13 – MRE of Crane Repair Costs With and Without Crane Upgrade: Terminal B 



























































Figure 5.14 – MRE of Crane Repair Costs With and Without Crane Upgrade: Terminal D 
 






























 In every case, replacing the current crane with the J100 upgrade decreased the 
exceedance rate for crane repair costs.  Comparatively (
 
Figure 5.15), terminals B and D, which correspond to the LD100 crane, show the 




Figure 5.15 - MRE of Crane Repair Costs With and Without Crane Upgrade: All 
Terminals 
It is obvious that crane repair costs are lowered by updating all the current cranes.  
However, replacement of the cranes would need to lower the total cost at each terminal in 
order to be cost effective overall.  Figure 5.16 compares exceedance rates for total cost 




Figure 5.16 - MRE of Total Costs With and Without Crane Upgrade: All Terminals 
 
Terminals A, B and D all show decreased exceedance rates for total cost.  This 
decrease can be attributed partially to the decrease in crane repair cost, but is mostly 





Figure 5.17 - MRE of BIL With and Without Crane Upgrade: Terminal A 
 
Figure 5.18 - MRE of BIL With and Without Crane Upgrade: Terminal B 



























































Figure 5.19 - MRE of  BIL With and Without Crane Upgrade: Terminal D 
 
Using this information, if crane upgrades were to be planned, it would be best to 
update the LD100 cranes in Terminals B and D first, and then the LD50 cranes at 
Terminal A since the crane repair cost is reduced the most for the LD100 cranes. 
5.3 Repair Options 
As seen in Section 4.5.3, business interruption losses comprise the majority of the 
overall total cost.  Operational mitigation options provide a means to decrease the 
business interruption losses within the port.  Multiple operational scenarios will be run to 
study the effect of operational changes on the total cost.  Introducing repair incentives 
and implementing a force majeure option will be studied as mitigation options.  
Additionally, runs will also be conducted that vary the mobilization time and the repair 
sequence in order to examine those variables effect on total cost. 






























5.3.1 Repair Incentives 
The following program run offers a repair incentive to the construction workers 
repairing the physical port damage.  By offering a repair incentive, the effect of 
decreasing the overall downtime can be examined.  In this scenario repair time will be 
reduced by 50% and the corresponding repair costs will be doubled.  For example, a 
repair scenario that took 14 days and cost $450,000 in the baseline configuration will 
now take 7 days but cost $900,000.  This scenario is a simple rough estimate of real life 
repair incentives.  Obviously the repair time of every job cannot be cut in half, and it may 
cost more or less than double the original cost.  However, this estimate should still 
provide excellent insight into the affect that repair time and cost has on the port system. 
The first plot of exceedance rates for repair costs checks to make sure that repair 
costs are being increased within the risk analysis program.  If every cost for each of the 
100,000 earthquakes is doubled, the exceedance rates for the run with decreased repair 




Figure 5.20 – MRE of Repair Costs Baseline and Repair Time Decrease: All Terminals 
Figure 5.20 shows that exceedance values of repair costs with the repair time 
decrease are in fact higher than that of the baseline run.  Therefore the program is 
calculating repair costs correctly.  Likewise, repair time reductions can be checked by 
examining the exceedance values of the business interruption losses.  When repair times 
are reduced, fewer ships will be displaced at the hypothetical port and business 





Figure 5.21– MRE of BIL Baseline and Repair Time Decrease: All Terminals 
 
Exceedance rates for the repair time decrease scenario are all smaller than the 
baseline exceedance rates.  Therefore, the program is properly implementing the 
reduction in repair time.  The overall effect of the reduction of repair time and the 
increase in repair cost will be determined by the exceedance rates for total cost (Figure 




Figure 5.22 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Repair Time Decrease: All Terminals 
 
 
Figure 5.23 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Repair Time Decrease: Terminal A 
































Figure 5.24 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Repair Time Decrease: Terminal B 
 
Figure 5.25 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Repair Time Decrease: Terminal C 



























































Figure 5.26 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Repair Time Decrease: Terminal D 
 
 Despite the increase in repair costs, the decrease in repair time decreased 
the exceedance rates for the overall total cost.  In fact, the decrease in exceedance rates is 
clearly visible at every terminal.  This result reiterates the significance of business 
interruption loss in calculating the total cost.     
5.3.2 Varying Mobilization Time 
Mobilization time refers to the amount of time it takes to get the supplies and 
workers needed to begin port repair.  The mobilization time within the baseline run is a 
function of the earthquake magnitude.  For earthquakes less than 6.0 mobilization is 
assumed to take place within a week, or take 7 days.  Earthquakes M 6.0 – 7.0 are 
assumed to have mobilization times of 14 days, and earthquakes above a M 7.0 are 
assumed to have mobilization times of 28 days.  It was apparent from the reduction of 
repair time run that decreases in repair time have significant effects on the total cost.  






























Therefore two additional runs were completed to test the effect of varying the 
mobilization time.  In one run, mobilization time was decreased to 10 days independent 
of the earthquake magnitude, and in the second run mobilization time was increased to 60 
days independent of the earthquake size.  Figure 5.27 uses business interruption loss to 
compare the increase and decrease of mobilization time to the baseline run for Terminal 
A: 
 
Figure 5.27 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Mobilization Variation: Terminal A 
Differences in total cost are negligible for exceedance rates larger than 10-4 
(10000 year return period).  Since only data above the 10-4 is considered well defined, it 
is possible to say that adjusting mobilization time will not provide a significant effect in 
increasing or reducing the total cost.  This is further confirmed by the MRE curves 
generated for total cost for the other terminals (Figure 5.28 - Figure 5.30): 
 
 
































Figure 5.28 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Mobilization Variation: Terminal B 
 
Figure 5.29 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Mobilization Variation: Terminal C 






























































Figure 5.30 – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Mobilization Variation: Terminal D 
 
5.3.3 Repair Sequencing 
It is assumed in the baseline scenario that wharf and crane repairs will be done 
simultaneously (in parallel).  As an example, take the following terminal with the 
following repair times for each berth and crane (Figure 5.31): 
 
Figure 5.31 – Terminal Example: Repair Sequencing 































In the baseline scenario the total repair time would equal 78 days for the wharf 
and 57 days for the crane because it is assumed that workers would be making repairs on 
the entire wharf from day 1.  This scenario is used for the baseline runs because it is not 
unreasonable to assume that workers would repair more than one berth in a terminal at a 
time.  It would be extremely conservative to assume that the workers would only work 
consecutively on only one berth or crane at a time.  In that case, the repair time would 
increase from 78 days to 22+27+51+63+78 = 241 days for the wharf and 67 days for the 
cranes.  A program run was conducted that implemented the “series” scenario and it had a 
large influence on the business interruption loss (Figure 5.32): 
 
 Figure 5.32  – MRE of BIL Baseline and Repair Sequencing Variation: All Terminals 
 
Figure 5.32 shows significant increases in exceedance were present at every 




Figure 5.33  – MRE of Total Cost Baseline and Repair Sequencing Variation: All 
Terminals 
5.4 Operational Options 
In an emergent situation it is common for a port to implement a force majeure 
policy in which ships of varying companies are allowed to dock at any wharf to which 
they are assigned.  To test this scenario the ship arrivals of terminals A and B will be 
combined and incoming ships will be allowed to dock at any of the open berths within the 
two terminals.  In a force majeure situation and earthquake would occur and damage 
would result at terminals A and B.  The repairs to each terminal would be calculated 
normally and the repair costs would remain the same.  However, business interruption 
losses would differ because there are now a larger number of berths that the incoming 
ships could possibly dock at.  If the BQCSP operational model was used to calculate BIL 
it would have to be rewritten to account for the larger number of combined berths and 
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cranes.  However, the regression operational model estimates BIL using the following 
variables: berth length, number of cranes, and the wharf and crane repair times.   
If force majeure was enacted, it could be represented by one of two methods using 
the regression equation.  First, terminals A and B could be combined into a “superberth” 
with a length of (2400+2400) 4800 ft, (4+5) 9 cranes.  However, the repair times would 
have to be set to either that of terminal A or B.  It was decided that repair times would be 
set to the minimum of the two maximum repair times for the wharf under the assumption 
that by the minimum max repair time incoming ships could at least fully utilize the 
repaired terminal, and business interruption losses should not exceed past that date.  The 
second method for calculating BIL in a force majeure situation uses the commutative 
property (BILAB = BIL for Terminal A + BIL for Terminal B) and the fact that using the 
minimum of the max repair times in the superberth essentially means that now each 
terminal can have the BILs calculated separately as long as the repair times for each are 
the minimum max repair time of the two terminals.  When calculated separately, a series 
of if statements can be added within the risk analysis framework to ensure that if the BIL 
of say Terminal A was zero before force majeure, it will remain zero after force majeure. 
Remember, the operational regression equation first determines if the BIL for a 
particular earthquake equals zero, if it does not, it calculates the BIL.  So for method one 
with the superberth, the regression would determine if BIL = 0, and if not calculate the 
BIL.  However, it is possible that for a given earthquake that originally had BILs equal to 
zero for both terminals, that a BIL > 0 could have been calculated for the superberth.  
This result is unacceptable because it is not representative of reality.  Therefore it was 
prevented by separating the terminals, finding the BIL using the minimum max repair 
time if the original BIL was > 0, and then adding the terminals together to get the BIL for 
the combined terminal.  When plotted, the MREs for method one and method two were 
quite similar, but it was decided to use method two because it was more realistic. Figure  
plots the MRE for total cost for 100,000 stratified sample earthquakes using force 
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majeure method 2 and compares that to the sum of the total costs if Terminals A and B 
were calculated separately. 
 
Figure 5.34 – MRE of Losses: Force Majeure 
Force majeure reduces annual rates of exceedance especially for the very small 
values.  Therefore, it would be a good mitigation option to reduce the business 
interruption losses at ports.  This is particularly true since it has no initial costs.  
5.5  Economic Analysis of Alternative Options 
One of the real benefits to the vast functionality of the risk analysis program and 
all of the data that it can produce is that it can be used to assess seismic vulnerability in 
ports and be applied in various economic analyses evaluating mitigation options.  Recent 
studies have found that in some higher-hazard ports in the US, no plans to assess seismic 
vulnerability have been made, and many have no or only informal seismic mitigation 
plans (Scharks et al.).  Unlike engineers, port stakeholders are more likely to use financial 





























data rather than force or displacement data to make important port decisions such as 
retrofitting a component or changing an operational routine.  The risk analysis framework 
marries the two by using engineering data to estimate financial losses that could be used 
to make important port decisions.  The following sections highlight some of the ways in 
which the risk analysis can be utilized to economically evaluate mitigation options, plan 
for emergency response, and calibrate the current seismic design.   
5.6 Economic Analysis 
    Several economic analyses could be used with the risk analysis to evaluate 
mitigation options.  The methods discussed in the following section will include cost 
benefit analysis, mean-variance, and stochastic dominance.  Several mitigation options 
will be examined within the scope of the hypothetical port using the aforementioned 
methods. 
5.6.1 Cost Benefit Analysis 
One of the most commonly used methods for economic analysis is cost benefit 
analysis (Sullivan et al. 2003).  This method can be used to assess whether a project is 
worth completing or to choose between several different options.  The basic principal 
involves comparing the total expected cost of an option against the total expected benefits 
to determine if the benefits outweigh the cost: 
    (5.1) 
Using this equation, if the ratio B-C > 1, then the benefits outweigh the costs and the 
project is a good investment.  However, if B-C < 1, the benefits do not outweigh the cost 
and the project is not a good investment. 
For the port system cost benefit analysis will be used to compare the cost/benefit 
of installing vertical drains in the embankment at each terminal.  Costs associated with 







• Cost of installing vertical drains at each terminal 
Benefits associated with this scenario will include: 
• Money saved in business interruption losses by decreasing the TEU loss during 
earthquakes with the installation of the vertical drains. 
• Money saved in wharf repair costs during earthquakes with the installation of the 
vertical drains. 
• Money saved in crane repair costs during earthquakes with the installation of the 
vertical drains. 
Annual maintenance and operating costs for the port are being excluded in this 
analysis because each would be relatively equal with or without the presence of vertical 
drains at the terminals.  The cost benefit analysis will be conducted over an exposure time 
of 20 years using a discount rate of 5% per year to determine whether the installation of 
vertical drains is a good investment. 
5.6.1.1  Cost of Installing Vertical Drains 
Vertical drains installed within the wharf embankment will span the length of the 
terminal and treat the embankment 100 ft. inland of the landside crane rail (Rathje 2010).  
Each corrugated drain is 3 inches in diameter with a spacing of 3.3 ft.  Therefore for each 
100 ft of terminal length there are 30 x 30 = 900 drains.  Drains will be extended the full 
depth of the liquefiable soil layer (60 ft.).  Therefore there would be 900 x 60 ft. = 54000 
linear ft. of drains per 100 ft. of terminal length.  
Scott Ellington, a prefabricated vertical drain contractor at Ellington-Cross 
suggests that drain installation roughly costs about $4 per linear foot (Ellington 2010).  
Therefore, $4/ft x 54000 ft = $216,000 per 100 ft of terminal will be used to calculate the 
total cost of drain installation at each terminal: 
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Table 5.1 – Installation Costs per Terminal for PVDs 
Terminal Terminal Length (ft.) Drain Installation Cost ($) 
A 2400 5,184,000 
B 2400 5,184,000 
C 5400 11,664,000 
D 3600 7,776,000 
 
5.6.1.2  Calculation of Benefits 
To calculate the money saved through the implementation of vertical drains, 
wharf repair costs, crane repair costs, and business interruption losses were calculated by 
the program for the scenario where drains have been installed in the port in addition to 
the baseline scenario.  Repair costs and BIL with drains Table 5.2) and Repair costs and 
BIL for the baseline (Table 5.3) were calculated at each terminal: 
Table 5.2 – Average Repair Costs and BIL with Drains 
Terminal  Repair Cost ($) BIL ($) 
A 480,948 6,494,950 
B 486,619 4,818,660 
C 1,094,360 8,074,470 
D 740,625 5,457,780 
 
Table 5.3 – Average Repair Costs and BIL: Baseline 
Terminal Repair Cost ($) BIL ($) 
A 476,348 6,881,400 
B 475,937 5,153,050 
C 1,090,270 8,604,650 




The money saved can then be calculated by subtracting the losses for repair and 
business interruption for the scenario run with drains from the baseline scenario (Table 
5.4): 
Table 5.4 – Wharf Repair Costs and BIL Saved Through Drain Upgrade 
Terminal Wharf Repair Cost ($) BIL ($) Total ($) 
A -4,600 386,450 381,850 
B -10,682 334,390 323,708 
C -4,090 530,180 526,090 
D -15,351 367,470 352,119 
 
5.6.1.3  Calculation of Cost/Benefit 
The benefit cost ratio will be calculated for each terminal using the costs and 
benefits calculated above in the following equation where i = discount rate and N = study 
period (Sullivan et al, 2003): 
   (5.2) 
 
Table  shows the result of the calculation of the above equation for each terminal: 
Table 5.5 – B-C Ratio for PVD Installation 






5.6.1.4  Conclusion 
From the ratios, it is apparent that cost of installing vertical drains is not exceeded 
by the benefits of installation for any of the terminals in the hypothetical port.  Therefore, 
















reduce the wharf and crane repair costs during earthquake events, overall it is not cost 
effective and is not recommended as a mitigation option. 
5.6.2 Mean-Variance Analysis 
Mean-variance is a method of decision making borrowed from modern portfolio 
theory that aims to make “portfolios” mean/variance efficient.  In other words, portfolios 
should have the highest level of return per unit of risk and the lowest level of risk per unit 
of return (Lintner 1965).  Translated for the port, mean-variance criterion evaluates the 
“investment” of a seismic mitigation option and how it affects the return (or profit) of the 
port system and the variance of the returns associated with that mitigation option.  The 
goal for a port system would be to apply a mitigation option that offers a large reduction 
in overall loss, and also is fairly consistent (i.e., minimum variance) in producing that 
result. 
Calculation of the mean total cost of the investment option will be taken from the 
exceedance curves for total cost, and the variance will be calculated from the mean 
according to the equation:  
     (5.3) 
where N is the total number of strata from stratified sampling, pi is the probability of an 
earthquake being in strata i, and the total rate is the sum of all mean rates of occurrence 
for the earthquakes sampled.   where µ is the mean expected 
value calculated from: 
      (5.4) 
The following figure (Figure 5.35) plots the mean total costs and standard 
deviations of that total cost in Terminal B for three of the previously discussed mitigation 
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upgrade to solely J100 cranes at Terminals A, B, and D, and the reduction of wharf and 
crane repair times by half while doubling the repair costs: 
 
Figure 5.35 – Mean Variance of Total Cost: Terminal B 
In examining the means in Figure 5.35 it is apparent that the largest decrease in 
total cost came from the repair time decrease option.  The implementation of PVDs or a 
crane upgrade had higher mean costs than the baseline scenario because the initial costs 
for the mitigation options are so large.  The repair time mitigation option produced the 
largest decrease in variance, followed by the drain option.  The variance for the crane 
mitigation option was slightly higher than the baseline.  From Figure  the mitigation 
option involving the repair time would be good to implement and the drain mitigation 
might be considered if the reduction in variance was worth the increase in mean cost.  
However if a mitigation option were to be implemented, it is apparent that the best to 
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worst option of the three shown would be: repair time decrease, installation of vertical 
drains, and upgrade of cranes. 
 
5.6.3 Stochastic Dominance 
Stochastic dominance is commonly used in decision analysis in reference to 
ranking gambles (probability distributions over a number of possible outcomes) as 
superior to other gambles.  For the port system, the gambles will be taken as the entire 
cumulative distribution function of total loss for the different mitigation options at the 
port.  Using stochastic dominance, options can be ranked.  First order dominance would 
be preferential where A is dominated by B if the CDFA ≥ CDFB at every point.  If this is 
not the case and , the options will be ranked using second order 
dominance criteria.  Here, A is dominated by B if for every 
weakly increasing concave utility function u.  This translates to B being more dominant 
over A if B is more predictable (has a lower risk aversion) and has at least as high of a 
mean. 
10,000 earthquake conventional Monte Carlo samples were run to get the total 
loss data used to create cumulative distribution functions for the stochastic dominance 
comparison.  Monte Carlo sampling was chosen over stratified sampling because the total 
cost data generated in the program from stratified sampling is not representative of the 
earthquake distribution of the ERF.  To accurately compare the total costs generated by 
the earthquakes in the samples, the earthquakes themselves need to be representative of 
the ERF.  The following figure compares cumulative distribution function of the total 
cost (in millions of dollars) for the following mitigation options: configuration with 
drains, all terminals with upgraded J100 cranes, and a 50% decrease in repair time (with a 
doubled repair cost) for Terminal B (Figure 5.36): 
∫∫ = BA dCDFxdCDFx




Figure 5.36 – Stochastic Dominance Comparison of Mitigation Options: Terminal B 
 The cumulative distribution functions show the same order as the mitigation 
option comparison using mean variance: the repair time decrease has the smallest total 
cost values in its cumulative distribution function, installation of drains follows, and 
lastly the crane upgrade option. 
5.7 Planning for Port Emergency Response Operations 
As seen in Port-au-prince, Haiti, for ports are vital components in emergency 
response reactions (Green et al. 2010; Werner et al. 2010).  In order for a port to operate 
at a maximum functionality after earthquake disasters, emergency response preparations 
should be made before the earthquake event.  The risk analysis program could be used to 
estimate the port’s operational capacity after an earthquake event and test various 
mitigation options that might help increase capacity (such as force majeure).   
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5.8 Calibration of Current Seismic Design 
 
The risk analysis program could be used to calibrate the current seismic design 
within west coast ports.  For instance, the contingency level earthquake (CLE) and the 
operating level earthquake (OLE) at the Port of Los Angeles (POLA) have return periods 
of 475 and 72 years, respectively.  If the terminal locations, and terminal parameters 
(terminal length, wharf type, number of cranes, crane type, etc.) for the Port of Los 
Angeles were input into the risk analysis program, it could be used to calculate the repair 
times and repair costs at the port.  Those could then be input into an operational model 
and for the CLE it would be possible to estimate if: 
1.) “CLE forces and deformations, including permanent embankment 
deformations, [resulted] in controlled inelastic structural behavior and 
limited permanent deformation.” (Port of Los Angeles 2007) 
2.) “All damage requiring repair [was] located where visually observable and 
accessible for repairs.” (Port of Los Angeles 2007) 
3.) “Temporary loss of operations [was] restorable within an acceptable 
period of time.” (Port of Los Angeles 2007) 
For the OLE it would be possible to estimate if: 
1.) “OLE forces and deformations, including permanent embankment 
deformations, [did not result] in significant structural damage.” (Port of 
Los Angeles 2007)  
2.) “All damage requiring repair [was] located where visually observable and 
accessible for repairs.” (Port of Los Angeles 2007) 
3.) “Repairs [did] not interrupt wharf operations.” (Port of Los Angeles 2007) 
If these requirements were met, no calibration would be needed.  However, if they 
were not, the risk analysis program could be used to estimate appropriate exceedance 
values for the specified level of damage or test mitigation options that would improve 
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port performance to the specified level of damage.  While it is not possible to estimate 
requirements 1 and 2 for either of the earthquake levels because the location and 
components in the hypothetical port differ from those of the POLA, the hypothetical port 
will be used to estimate operations after OLE and CLE events.  For the OLE, the baseline 
port scenario will be run for a design earthquake with an annual rate of occurrence = 1.3 
x 10-2 and the CLE for an exceedance rate = 2.1 x 10-3.  The program will calculate 
average total losses, business interruption losses, and repair costs for a sample of specific 
intensity measures.  The reference curve in Figure 5.37 was used to determine that an 
exceedance rate of 0.013 (OLE) corresponded to a PGV of 15 cm/s and that an 
exceedance rate of 0.002 (CLE) corresponded to a PGV of 42 cm/s:   
 
Figure 5.37 – Reference curve for PGV vs. Annual Rate of Exceedance 
The operating level earthquake was run in the program as a 10,000 earthquake 
sample from the ERF with a mean PGV of 15 cm/s and a COV = 0.2 (σ = ± 3 cm/s). The 
contingency level earthquake was run in the same manner with a PGV of 42 cm/s and a 
coefficient of variation = 0.1 ( σ = ± 4.2 cm/s). While Figure 5.37 is calculated 
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specifically for Terminal A, similar graphs for each of the other terminals were also 
examined.  For an exceedance rate of 0.002, PGV values were generally in the 40-45 
cm/s range and it is expected that relative intensities for both earthquake levels at all 
terminals will be included within the specified variances. 
Table 5.6 shows the average repair costs and times, business interruption losses, 
and total losses for each of the terminals in a baseline hypothetical port that were 
calculated by running an intensity-based sample of 10,000 earthquakes.  
Table 5.6 – Repair Costs and Times for OLE and CLE at hypothetical port 
OLE Max Repair Time Costs 
Terminal Wharf Crane Repair Cost BIL Total Loss 
A 198 17 $5,733,480 $51,886,500 $58,174,900 
B 201 29 $5,920,040 $42,953,800 $49,910,400 
C 273 4 $13,309,500 $61,048,000 $74,510,200 
D 235 37 $8,915,830 $48,686,200 $59,165,800 
      
CLE Max Repair Time Costs 
Terminal Wharf Crane Repair Cost BIL Total Loss 
A 372 131 $13,060,100 $107,690,000 $125,609,000 
B 381 168 $13,754,100 $99,453,600 $121,239,000 
C 577 80 $33,433,400 $120,290,000 $157,701,000 
D 470 218 $21,371,100 $114,107,000 $150,204,000 
 
Granted, the baseline configuration of the hypothetical port was designed to be 
the most seismically vulnerable configuration tested, the damage sustained during either 
the operating or contingency level earthquakes are still quite large.  For instance, the 
wharf damage at Terminal C after the OLE would take 9 months to repair.  In those nine 
months, there is $61 million of business interruption losses.  When displaced, the port 
and terminal operators combined lose anywhere from $300,000 to $2,747,000 per ship.  
Assuming an average value per ship of $1.5 million, a BIL of $65 million would translate 
into approximately 43 displaced ships on average for an operating level earthquake.  This 
statistic does not coincide with the no interruption in wharf operations expected.  The 
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same sentiment applies to the CLE which has average wharf repair times at every 
terminal greater than one year.  The POLA code does not specifically mention what an 
“acceptable period of time” is for the restoration of port operations, but it is more than 
likely less than one year. 
Again it should be noted that the hypothetical port is in a different geographic 
location that the POLA, and wharf structures, soil conditions, and port configurations at 
the POLA are not exactly the same as for the hypothetical port.  However, it is apparent 
that if the risk analysis framework were applied specifically to the Port of Los Angeles it 





6 APPLICATION OF RISK ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK TO OTHER PORTS 
As explained in Chapter 3, the risk analysis framework was specifically designed 
for use at the hypothetical port in Santa Cruz, California.  However, aspects specific to 
the hypothetical port or its location can be changed so that the risk analysis framework 
could be applied to other actual or hypothetical ports in the US.  The following chapter 
discusses the issues and makes suggestions as to how one would go about applying the 
risk analysis framework to another port location or configuration.  Specific categories 
include: hazard-related, component-related, and system-related issues. 
6.1 Hazard-related Issues 
The hazard-related issues in within the risk analysis program are all contingent 
upon the location of the port to be analyzed.  The hypothetical port was located in Santa 
Cruz, California and this location determined the latitudes and longitudes of each of the 
terminals, the earthquake rupture forecast used, and the ground motion prediction 
equation chosen with in the analysis.  For ports located in different locations, the 
following must be considered: 
Port Location:  Rupture distances are determined using the latitudes and longitudes of the 
earthquake rupture to the latitudes and longitudes of the terminal locations.  The details 
of each should be known.     
Earthquake Rupture Forecast:  For the hypothetical port, the ERF is pulled from the 
Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast, Version 2 (WGCEP 2008) according to 
those ruptures that possibly affect the chosen Santa Cruz port site.  Relevant earthquakes 
are determined using the OPENSHA program (Feild et al. 2009).  If the ERF were 
repopulated based on location, these references could be used for other California sites, 
but port locations outside California would require different methods in acquiring 
ruptures for the generation of the ERF.  The USGS earthquake hazard program is one 
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possible source for rupture sites, because it has hazards mapped for the 48 conterminous 
states, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 
Ground Motion Prediction Equation:  The OpenSHA program has the capability of using 
one of the following attenuation relationships to calculate the median intensity measures 
at the terminal sites: Abrahamson and Silva (1997), Abrahamson and Silva (2008), 
Abrahamson (2000), Boore and Atkinson (2008), Boore, Joyner, and Fumal (1997), 
Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003), Campbell and Bozorgnia (2008), Campbell (1997), 
Chiou and Youngs (2008), Field (2000), Sadigh et al.(1997), ShakeMap (2003), Spudich 
et al. (1999), and USGS Combined (2004).  In addition, OpenSHA also accommodates 
the following intensity measure types (in relation to each ground motion):peak ground 
acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), peak ground displacement (PGD), 
spectral acceleration (SA), and modified Mercalli intensity (MMI).  If the OpenSHA 
program does not contain a ground motion prediction equation applicable to the port site, 
the intensity measures must be calculated manually for every rupture to terminal site 
distance according to the required GMPE. 
6.2 Component-related Issues 
The Grand Challenge risk analysis framework focused on modeling pile-
supported marginal wharves, which are the most common type of wharf structure in the 
US, and light-duty 50 ft gage (LD50), light-duty 100 ft gage (LD100), and jumbo 100 ft 
gage (J100) cranes, which are the three most commonly found crane types in the US.  
However, specific wharf and crane configurations will vary from port to port depending 
on local practice, soil conditions, age of the structures, etc.  The following sections 
discuss the issues involved in modeling wharf and crane structures other than those used 
for the hypothetical port. 
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6.2.1 Wharf and Embankment 
As mentioned, embankments and wharf types vary from port to port as a factor of 
local practices, soil conditions, etc.  Therefore, the embankment/wharf model currently 
used in the risk analysis program will not be applicable to another port.  The following 
section discusses alternative wharf and embankment types and the main issues involved 
in implementing a model using these alternative configurations. 
6.2.1.1  Other possible embankments 
The embankment in the hypothetical port is a sloped embankment consisting of 
hydraulically placed sand fill over native soils.  While this embankment type is common 
within US ports, the back fill could also consist exclusively of native soils, be a 
combination of rock and sand dike with a backland fill, or consist of a sea wall or 
bulkhead (Werner 1998).   
6.2.1.2 Embankment Performance in Past Earthquakes 
Generally, embankments have not performed well during seismic excitation.  
Most failures are caused by embankment foundations on top of weak underlying soils or 
the embankment being constructed of loose sandy fills that are prone to strength loss 
during excitation.  Common failure modes include: severe lateral ground deformations, 
excessive settlements due to the densification of loose sandy soils, slumping of 
embankments, slope failures through embankment, and catastrophic failures of the 
underlying foundation soils which lead to deep-seated embankment failures (Werner 
1998). 
6.2.1.3  Embankment Modeling 
Proper modeling of the embankment is important because slope failures and the 
resulting displacements can exert significant forces onto piles, cause displacement of the 
crane rail, or displacement of the wharf itself.  Seismic analysis of the embankment 
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should therefore focus on the stability of the embankment itself and also the global 
stability of the embankment including the embankment, backfill, and foundation soils 
(Werner 1998).  In choosing the type of analysis, consideration should be taken as to the 
potential for liquefaction.  For embankments without hydraulically placed backfill more 
traditional pseudostatic rigid body methods would suffice for modeling.  However, if 
liquefaction is a potential problem, the user should at least choose a two-dimensional 
numerical model that calculates both porewater pressures and displacements within the 
embankment at multiple points along the wharf piles/walls.  OPENSEES (McKenna and 
Mcgann 2010) or FLAC (Itasca 2011) provide an excellent medium through which to 
conduct these analyses. 
6.2.1.4  Other Possible Wharf Configurations 
The wharf modeled for the hypothetical port was a 1960’s pile-supported 
marginal wharf categorized by the 2 sets of batter piles on the landside and seaside of the 
wharf (Section 3.4.3.1).  This wharf type is one of the pile-supported marginal wharves 
commonly found in US ports and the design was replaced by more modern designs 
without batter piles.  Additional wharf models and fragility curves will need to be 
generated for wharf types that differ from the type used in the hypothetical port.  Some 
typical wharf configurations aside from pile supported marginal wharves include pile 
walls and gravity walls (quay walls).  Figure 6.1 shows some of the typical pier and wall 
structures used around the world (PIANC 2001).  The pile supported wharf types are 
typically found in the US while the quay walls are more common elsewhere.  For 




Figure 6.1 – Common Wharf Structures (from (PIANC 2001))  
6.2.1.5  Wharf Performance in Past Earthquakes 
Past earthquakes have demonstrated several key vulnerabilities in pile-supported 
marginal wharf performance.  The presence of batter piles has been seen to have poor 
earthquake performance.  Batter piles provide large amounts of lateral stiffness which 
mobilizes large lateral seismic forces at pile caps and deck connections.  This has lead to 
severe cracking and fracture of piles in addition to the damage of the pile caps and 
decking (Werner 1998).  Wharves containing solely vertical piles have faired much better 
during past earthquake excitation because they are more flexible laterally than batter 
piles. However, vertical piles still do not have the ductility or anchorage needed to 
perform well in liquefiable soils.   
6.2.1.6  Developing Fragility Curves 
The physical modeling of the wharf, especially at a liquefiable site, will require at 
least a two dimensional finite element analysis that integrates the embankment results 
into the wharf model as input through some type of soil-structure interaction model.  The 
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wharf model used in the hypothetical port analysis used OPENSEES and integrated the 
soil-structure interaction though the use of a macroelement model which uses a Bouc-
Wen type hysteresis model to capture the effects of liquefiable soil. This resource is 
currently available in the current version of OPENSEES. 
When developing fragility curves, attention needs to be paid to modeling the parts 
of the wharf that are prone to damage so that the assessment of damage states is accurate.  
For pile-supported wharves, common damage modes include: 
1.) Pile Damage – Include minimally spalled and moderately damaged vertical piles 
(above or below the water level), broken batter piles (if applicable), and broken 
piles below the ground surface. 
2.) Deck Damage – Include damage to the underside of the deck above the piles, 
ruptured concrete shear keys, and ruptured deck caused by punch through 
3.) Displacements – Include the relative movement between the crane rails and the 
collector trench and the relative movement between the crane rail and the wharf 
deck 
Repair costs and times for each of these failure modes can be found in Section 
3.4.3.3.  Damage states and the corresponding repair costs and times will be selected 
from this data by modeling the displacements (piles, deck, etc.) and the relative 
movement of various wharf components (wharf deck to crane rail, crane rail to collector 
trench, etc.), the rotation of the pile deck connections due to torsional forces, and the 
curvature ductility demands of the piles.   
While it is highly recommended that fragility curves be developed conducting a 
wharf model analysis like the one presented in Shafieezadeh (2011) If it is not possible to 
conduct a finite element analysis for the particular type of wharf examined, fragility 
curves for various wharf types are available, the most commonly used being those from 
HAZUS.  HAZUS  defines five damage states: none (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate 
(ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5), and for waterfront structures (wharves / 
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seawalls), the following damage and “restoration” (repair time) functions are defined for 
waterfront structures (FEMA 2003): 
Table 6.1 Damage and Repair Time Fragility Curves from (FEMA 2003) 
 
 
6.2.2 Crane  
6.2.2.1  Other Possible Crane Configurations 
Container cranes are operationally defined by their outreach, which determines 
the widest ship that the crane can accommodate during loading/unloading.  The ship’s 
width dictates the number of rows of containers on board.  Ships range in width from 12 
– 24 containers wide (Kosbab 2010).  The following histogram presents the maximum 




Figure 6.2 – Histogram of the Maximum Width (# of containers) of Surveyed US 
Container Cranes. 
From Figure 6.2, cranes at US ports could range in maximum outreaches from 11 
to 25 containers.  Additionally, these cranes would have gage lengths of either 50 or 100 
feet (most common gage widths in US ports).  The three cranes chosen for the 
hypothetical port configuration represent the majority of cranes currently in use, and span 
a range of expected seismic behavior.  The set chosen within the NEES Grand Challenge 
project was intended to provide enough example information that any given A-frame 
crane of typical construction could be seismically modeled and evaluated and fragility 
curves could be produced (Kosbab 2010).    
6.2.2.2  Crane Performance in Past Earthquakes 
Past performance of cranes during earthquakes has showed minor damage even 
for larger ground motions provided the crane foundation supports do not fail.  However, 
collapse has been seen during some large motions and significant damage has occurred in 
conjunction with foundation failures (Werner 1998). Derailment is the most common 
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mode of crane damage because cranes are allowed to uplift during excitation.  Within the 
risk analysis program the damage states for cranes include: derailment, slight crane 
damage (to the crane portal), moderate damage, and complete collapse. 
6.2.2.3  Developing Fragility Curves 
Fragility curves can be generated for any A-frame crane of typical construction 
using the examples of the portal uplift theory seismic demand model outlined in Kosbab 
(2010).  If these methods are not used, it is recommended that the crane model developed 
should calculate portal drift as a function of spectral acceleration to determine one of four 
damage states: derailment, immediate use, structural damage, complete collapse.  If 
neither of the previous options are obtainable, the lognormal fragility curves described in 
the HAZUS Technical Manual (2003) could be used. 
Table 6.2 – Fragility and Restoration Parameters of HAZUS Damage States for 
Unanchored/Rail Mounted Port Cranes from (FEMA 2003) 
 
Note: Because fragility functions are defined for both PGA and PGD, a simple multi-
hazard analysis must be conducted to determine the damage state probabilities. 
6.3  System-related Issues 
System-related issues for the seismic risk analysis revolve around the specific 
system input characteristics of the port analyzed.  For the hypothetical port, the arrival 
stream, incoming ships, delay threshold, repair sequencing, and TEU costs are specific to 
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the hypothetical port.  The use of another port within the risk analysis framework would 
require the user to gather system information that accurately describes operations at that 
particular port.  If the port analyzed is an actual port, it should not be that difficult to 
gather this information.  The arrival stream would be based on the mean inter-arrival 
times for that port which could be calculated using an incoming ship log in a similar 
manner to how it was calculated in section 3.5.1.  Incoming ship lengths and TEU 
capacities would be sampled from the same incoming ship log.  The delay threshold and 
cost per TEU would need to be set specific to the port analyzed and could be found by 
asking port officials.  Lastly, the repair sequencing would need to be tailored to the 
policies of the actual port.  The risk analysis program already accommodates repair in 
parallel or in series from smallest to largest repair time, any other sequencing would need 
to be programmed in by the user.  If the port examined is not an actual port and instead 
hypothetical like the port examined in this study, the same considerations of system 
issues is required, but tailored to the specific port location.   For instance, the arrival 
streams for California ports differ from that of Northwestern ports.  Therefore, at a 
minimum, arrival logs for similar ports in the location of question would need to be 
retrieved to develop the arrival stream and an incoming ship database. 
In addition, it should be noted that the aforementioned system issues apply to the 
BQCSP model.  If the user would like to apply the operational regression model, the 
regression equations would need to be recalculated using the BQCSP data of a couple 
thousand earthquakes that employs the new arrival stream and incoming ship data as 
described in section 3.6.  The current operational regression model within the risk 
analysis framework is only applicable to the arrival stream, incoming ship data, and port 





7 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
Ports are extremely important in this era of global trade and historical examples 
have shown that earthquake disruption can cause significant economic impacts.  The Port 
of Kobe is just one case study of the possible disruption to ports after an earthquake, and 
its fall from the 6th to 55th largest port in the world even after complete repair is a 
testament to the lasting effects of that disruption.  The main objective of this thesis was to 
create and investigate the validity of a risk framework that uses state-of-the-art 
techniques to model earthquake disruption in container port systems and the resulting 
physical and operational losses. 
The risk analysis framework probabilistically calculates losses using a modified 
PEER framework that starts with intensity measures and uses conditional variables to 
arrive at monetary losses within the port.  First, earthquake scenarios are sampled from an 
earthquake rupture forecast.  This sampling can be conducted using Monte Carlo 
techniques with or without stratified (importance) sampling, scenario-based, or intensity-
based sampling.  Next, intensity measures from the sampled earthquakes are spatially 
correlated between terminals.  These intensity measures are then applied to previously 
calculated fragility models of wharves and cranes based on typical structures at west 
coast ports.  The fragility models, which were extensively studied by numerous 
researchers within the scope of the NEES Grand Challenge project, use the intensity 
measures to calculate the probability that said intensity measure will result in a particular 
damage state for the wharf or crane.  Once the damage state is known, the repair 
requirements for the wharf and crane can be calculated.  Repair requirements within the 
framework are defined as physical repair cost of a component and the repair time (in 
days) it will take to fix the component.  Repair cost translated directly into a monetary 
loss, however, repair time is used as input in an operational model that assigns berths and 
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cranes to arriving ships post-earthquake in a port whose capacity has been reduced by 
physical damage.  Due to the reduced capacity, oftentimes, incoming ships will be 
displaced because the port does not have sufficient resources to service the ships within a 
reasonable amount of time.  The shipping containers (measured in twenty-foot equivalent 
units or TEUs) on ships that are displaced are summed over the repair period and are used 
to calculate the business interruption loss resulting from the earthquake.  Business 
interruption losses and repair costs can be added together to get the total loss per terminal 
resulting from earthquake disruption.  The risk analysis framework can make this 
calculation for large numbers of randomly sampled earthquakes and then calculate loss 
exceedance curves for annual exceedance probabilities as small as 10-4.     
This thesis developed and used the risk analysis framework in several different 
capacities.  First a baseline port configuration was run that was expected to cause the 
greatest damage of any of the scenarios studied.  The baseline scenario was then 
dissected to make sure that the methods used within the framework were providing 
reasonable results.  The following findings resulted from the study of the baseline 
configuration:  
• Business interruption losses make up the largest portion of the total losses 
experienced at port systems.  Risk analyses that neglect or underestimate the 
business interruption losses will significantly underestimate the total losses 
experienced at a port due to earthquake disruption, especially for large 
earthquakes. 
• It is possible that business interruption losses equal zero for a given earthquake.  
This was especially true for earthquakes that caused little to no disruption.  
However, some larger earthquakes still resulted in relatively long repair times and 
no business interruption loss.  No business interruption loss for larger earthquakes 
was more common at larger terminals because some portions would remain 
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undamaged and so incoming ships could still be serviced without having to be 
displaced.  
• The downtime associated with wharf repair had the largest influence on 
determining whether or not business interruption losses occurred.  Most 
earthquakes required some form of wharf repair, while very few earthquakes 
required crane repair. 
After the baseline configuration was studied, the risk analysis framework was re-
run using configurations that implemented various mitigation options.  The mitigation 
option configurations were run to see which options were the most effective and to test 
what variables within the framework have the most influence on the total loss.  Upon 
completion of runs for a wharf upgrade, crane upgrade, installation of prefabricated 
vertical drains, implementation of a repair incentive, and implementation of a force 
majeure policy, the following conclusions were reached: 
• Mitigation options that reduce the repair times within the framework have the 
greatest effect in decreasing the overall total cost.  The repair incentive mitigation 
was the most successful option when economically compared to the others.  Force 
majeure (allowing ships to dock at other terminals other than the one to which 
they are assigned) was also effective in reducing total cost.  These results 
occurred because reducing repair times has a direct correlation to the business 
interruption loss, which makes up the majority of the total losses in port systems. 
• The physical mitigation options studied (wharf and crane upgrades, installation of 
drains) were the least successful in reducing total losses.  Physical mitigation 
options showed significant reductions in loss at very small exceedance rates, and 
only very small loss reductions in larger exceedance rates.  While each option 
reduced overall total losses, the implementation costs were so large that overall, 
the options were not cost effective.   
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Overall, the risk analysis framework presented in this work is extremely versatile 
and extremely useful in examining risk-related port decisions.  Not only can the 
framework capture risk scenarios using Monte Carlo sampling of possible earthquake 
ruptures, but it also has the ability to examine specific intensity measure ranges or 
specific faults.  These features make it possible to examine specific earthquake scenarios 
and subsequently that data could be used for emergency preparedness planning or to 
calibrate current seismic designs. 
7.2 Impact of Research 
The primary impact of this research is that it provides a state-of-the-art risk 
analysis framework to model the effect of earthquake disruption in container port 
systems.  It has previously been established that ports are an integral transportation hub; 
the loss of which results in significant economic losses.  The benefits and contributions of 
such a risk analysis framework include: 
• The framework itself is currently the best model available for assessing seismic 
risk in container port system.  Current port codes solely focus on the response of 
individual port components such as the wharves or the cranes to ground motions 
with arbitrary return periods.  The seismic risk framework considers how those 
components work together as a system probabilistically over a large range of 
earthquake intensity measures that could cause disruption.  By looking at the 
entire system, the risk analysis framework can calculate port metrics such as total 
loss that are meaningful to the port stakeholders that make investment decisions 
for the port. 
• The risk analysis framework offers a valuable tool for evaluating mitigation 
options.  One or more mitigation option can be applied to a port system and the 
resulting losses can be compared to the port “as is”.  This data can be 
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economically analyzed by the port stakeholders and used to make sound financial 
decisions. 
• Emergency preparedness planning in ports would be possible using the risk 
analysis framework.  Stakeholders could apply intensity-based hazards within the 
program to examine post-earthquake operations.  These results could be used to 
create an action plan in the event that an earthquake of that intensity was to 
actually occur. 
• The risk analysis framework could also be used to calibrate the current seismic 
design criteria in ports.  The model run at specific intensities could validate (or 
contradict) the current assumptions made in current design codes with respect to 
responses to components and the operational functionality of the port for the 
specified return periods. 
7.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
The currently defined scope of the port system for this risk analysis framework 
provides ample opportunity to expand and additional research would be suggested in the 
following areas: 
• Port Configurations - Currently, component fragility curves are only defined for a 
late 1960’s type wharf.  Future research might include additional commonly used 
West Coast wharves.  Along the same line, it would be beneficial to include other 
soil profiles within the embankment model in addition to the highly liquefaction 
susceptible soil profile used herein.  For example, a non-liquefiable soil, or a soil 
that includes one or more soil improvement measures might also be appropriate to 
model.  The risk analysis framework could also be used to model specific west 
coast ports, and their exact components and locations. 
• Mitigation Options – Additional mitigation options could be implemented within 
the risk analysis framework to examine their success in reducing total losses.  For 
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example, no structural retrofit options were examined within the scope of this 
project.  Retrofit options often cost less than the replacement options studied.  
Perhaps they would be more cost-effective in reducing total loss within the port 
system.  Several mitigation options that could be recommended include crane 
retrofits, pile-deck connection retrofits, and a retrofit to tie the crane-rail to the 
wharf. Injection of colloidal silica gel in the wharf backfill was also suggested as 
a soil improvement option yet never implemented.  The monetary losses 
calculated in scenarios with mitigation options only apply to physical losses to the 
port.  Mitigation options might also impart environmental or social benefits that 
are not being accounted for within the current risk analysis framework.  The 
monetary equivalence of these additional benefits could be a source of study. 
• BQCSP Operational Model – The BQCSP operational model was a significant 
advancement over operational models in previous risk analyses.  However, it 
required significant computing times that were not feasible because of the need to 
use large numbers of earthquakes in the Monte Carlo simulations.  Future work 
should include the time to use the BQCSP model to its fullest extent within large 
earthquake samples.  In addition, some possible improvements to the code might 
include the ability to save and retrieve the operational statistics for any earthquake 
within the sample and the inclusion of crane blocking within the scheduling 
program.  
• Extend the port system parameters – Lastly, future research might include an 
extension of the port system parameters.  As it stands, the risk analysis only 
calculates repair requirements for the wharves and cranes.  Additional 
components could cause losses that are not currently being considered.  For 
instance, business interruption losses, which make up the majority of the total 
losses within the port could result from loss of communications, damage to the 
roadways within the port, or loss of port utilities.   Furthermore, it would be 
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interesting to try to estimate the effects of port disruption on larger economic 




APPENDIX A – CALIBRATION OF OPERATIONAL MODEL 
One of the challenges in integrating the BQCSP operational modeling into the risk 
analysis program was calibration.  The run time needed to be efficient, but the results 
should still be statistically representative of actual crane operations.  The berth and crane 
assignments generated after one earthquake could take anywhere from several seconds to 
several minutes to run depending on how the stopping criteria within the operational 
program were defined.  Knowing that risk analysis scenarios would contain at least 1000 
earthquakes, it was important to scale the runtime down to something manageable.  
A.1   Stopping Criteria within the Operational Model 
When the BQCSP operational model runs, the sub-optimal tabu search examines a 
number of possible solutions to the berth and crane scheduling problem at a specific time 
period, compares them to a stored best solution for that time period, and then after a 
certain number of solutions are examined, the program accepts the best solution and 
moves on to the next time period.  The point at which the model decides it has the “best 
solution” can be controlled by a number of stopping criteria.  Two stopping criteria were 
examined within the operational model to reduce runtime: 1.) limiting the number of 
solutions examined at each time period, and 2.) limiting the number of time periods. 
A.1.1  Full vs. Half Stopping Criteria 
The first stopping criteria examined was the number of solutions examined at 
each time period.  Examining fewer solutions would reduce runtime, but it is also 
important to make certain that enough solutions are examined to adequately solve the 
operational problem.  The original operational program took around two minutes to run 
one earthquake.  So, to reduce the runtime, the number of solutions examined at each 
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time period by the operational model was cut in half.  The statistics generated from the 
half-stopping criteria were then compared with those of the full-stopping criteria to assure 
that adequate solutions were still developed.  The utilization statistics for earthquakes 1-4 
for the full and half stopping criteria are compared in Figure A.1 - Figure A.5.  Figure 
A.1 and Figure A.2, which show the utilization and TEU statistics for earthquake 
scenario #1: 
 

























Figure A.2 Earthquake 1: TEU statistics for full and half stopping criteria 
 
It can be seen in Figure A.1 that the half stopping criteria resulted in a differing 
solution in weeks 14-15 and 35-36 for berth utilization, and weeks 14-15 for crane 
utilization.  It should be noted that one solution is not necessarily better than the other.  
This can be assumed because both solutions still handle the same number of TEUs during 
the weeks where the differences occur (Figure A.2).  During weeks 35-36, the number of 
TEUs handled is exactly the same for both weeks, and during weeks 14-15, the total 
number of TEUs handled over the two-week period is equal.  Similar small difference 
can be seen between the full and half stopping criteria statistics of the other earthquakes 
(Figure A.3- Figure A.5).  However, since the TEUs handled in each situation are equal 
like in Figure A.2; it can be said that the full stopping criteria is no better than the half 
stopping criteria.  Furthermore, since the half stopping criteria took far less computation 
time, it was ultimately used within the risk analysis. 






















Figure A.3 Earthquake 2: Utilization statistics for full and half stopping criteria 
 
 















































Figure A.5 Earthquake 4: Utilization statistics for full and half stopping criteria 
 
 
A.2  Stopping Criteria Based on Repair Periods 
The next method used to decrease the run time of the operational model was to 
limit the number of time periods over which the berth and crane assignments were run.  
For the earthquake scenarios (1-5) run, the same ship arrival schedule was used so that 
the results could be comparable.  In addition, a “calibration” scenario was also run within 
the operational model under the parameters that no berth or crane damage occurred.  In 
this manner, earthquake scenarios could also be directly compared to the port under 
“normal” operations.  Theoretically, during the earthquake event scenarios, once all the 
repairs were complete and the port caught up with the delays that may have occurred, the 
port operations should return to normal operations: in this case, the calibration scenario.  
























generated from the calibration scenario.  Earthquake 5 was omitted from this data simply 
because it has a 50-week repair period and it’s easier to visually compare the data if the 
scale is not skewed by having to add the additional weeks to accommodate it. 
 






























Figure A.7 Total dwell time statistic comparison of earthquake scenarios 
 
 


































Figure A.8 Berth utilization comparison of earthquake scenarios 
 
 





























































From Figure A.6- Figure A.9 it is apparent in every statistic that each earthquake 
does eventually return to normal operations.  Table A.1 shows the actual repair period for 
each earthquake and indicates the week in which each statistic returns to its normal 
operation. 












1 0.71 2 2 2 2 
2 4.87 3 4 5 3 
3 11.14 5 5 12 10 
4 11.71 8 9 13 9 
 
The number of weeks required to return to normal operation varies among each 
statistic.  For instance, TEUs handled and dwell time take five weeks to recover while 
crane utilization takes twice that.  It should also be noted that some statistics still haven’t 
recovered even after the repair period in complete (Berth Utilization).  Therefore it was 
decided that for each earthquake scenario the operational model would run through the 
repair period and for 3 additional BQCSP time periods (approximately 1 day).  After this 
point it would be assumed that all operational statistics would be equal to those generated 
in the calibration scenario. 
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APPENDIX B – GROUND MOTIONS 
The ground motions used to evaluate the fragility analysis for the wharf were 
discussed in Section 3.4.1, and the time histories of each can be found within this 
appendix.  Figures contain the x and y direction time histories of three different motions.  
Motions are graphed respective of the records listed in the figure title.  Simulated motions 

























































































Figure B.21 SIM 0005, 0006, 0007 
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APPENDIX C- MARINE EXCHANGE OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA DATA 
The following data was taken from a three month shipping log kept by the Marine 
Exchange of Southern California from March-August of 2008.  The data was used to 
estimate ship arrivals and ships were sampled from this data according to the calculated 
arrival stream in Section 3.5.1.  Data is sorted first according to berth destination, and 
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Mol 
Presenc






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 
Discove






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 
Proficie






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 
Prosperi






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 






:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 

















:00 1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 




5:20   1234.44 0.319 0.466 
Mol 
Presenc
e 279.77 6350 139 
8/31/08 
5:25       1234.44 0.319 0.466 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Katsura






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
MISC 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Androm






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Hansa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






5:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
















:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Springti






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Lodesta






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Starligh






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Androm
eda 299.80 6214 212 
8/24/08 




:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Starligh






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Androm






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Springti






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Starligh






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Lodesta






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Androm






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Springti






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 

















:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Lodesta






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Springti






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Santa 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Lodesta






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Springti






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Androm






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Starligh






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






0:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Busan 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 
Long 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 
Southa






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
OOCL 
Shenzh






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 






:00 1767.84 0.422 0.593 
NYK 
Atlas 299.90 6492 214 
8/31/08 
7:00       1767.84 0.422 0.593 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
















:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ital 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
Dynami






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
Dynami






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 
















:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
Diamon






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ital 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ital 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
Diamon






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ital 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 




20:35   1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
Diamon
d 294.13 4211 227 
8/31/08 
14:45       1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ital 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
Dynami
















:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ital 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ital 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
















:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Sun 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Sun 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 






:00 1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Hatsu 




20:40   1432.56 0.665 0.603 
Ever 
Safety 299.99 7124 230 
8/30/08 
17:00       1432.56 0.665 0.603 
APL 
















:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Horizon 
Enterpri






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Singapo






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Mendoz






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Mendoz






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Singapo






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Turquoi






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Philippin






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Costa 






0:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Scotlan






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
















:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Singapo






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Canada 277.00 5762 302 
8/30/08 
5:05       1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 
Commo






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Scotlan






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Turquoi






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Scotlan






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Singapo






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 
















:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Scotlan






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Mendoz






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL Los 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Argentin






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Singapo






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Philippin






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Scotlan






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 




17:35   1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Australi
a 282.10 4389 303 
8/29/08 











:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Philippin






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Malaysi






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Philippin






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Philippin






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Malaysi






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
Australi






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 
















:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Hyundai 
Integral 294.10 4922 304 
8/27/08 
20:00   
8/30/2008 
9:45   1219.2 0.67 0.746 
APL 






:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Ines 149.64 1012 305 
5/6/08 




:00 1219.2 0.67 0.746 
Maersk 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 








2 1.108 0.863 
Majestic 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Fremant








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Danbur








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Fortalez








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Fremant








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Messolo








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Fortalez








2 1.108 0.863 
Marie 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Fremant





















2 1.108 0.863 
Sofie 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Fortalez








2 1.108 0.863 
Anna 








2 1.108 0.863 
Sealand 








2 1.108 0.863 
Soroe 








2 1.108 0.863 
Helsinki 








2 1.108 0.863 
Charlott
e 








2 1.108 0.863 
Svendb
org 








2 1.108 0.863 
Sally 








2 1.108 0.863 
Clifford 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 








2 1.108 0.863 
Svend 








2 1.108 0.863 
Caroline 








2 1.108 0.863 
Susan 








2 1.108 0.863 
NYK 








2 1.108 0.863 
Cornelia 








2 1.108 0.863 
London 








2 1.108 0.863 
Sofie 








2 1.108 0.863 
Skagen 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Fremant








2 1.108 0.863 
Kiel 








2 1.108 0.863 
Anna 








2 1.108 0.863 
Sealand 








2 1.108 0.863 
Soroe 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 








2 1.108 0.863 
Majestic 








2 1.108 0.863 
Charlott
e 








2 1.108 0.863 
Maersk 
Danbur




18:45   
2191.51





Maersk 346.98 8680 401 
8/29/08 
15:05       
2191.51
2 1.108 0.863 
Grasme
re 








2 1.108 0.863 
Clifford 








2 1.108 0.863 
Carsten 








2 1.108 0.863 
Glasgow 








2 1.108 0.863 
Svend 








2 1.108 0.863 
Caroline 








2 1.108 0.863 
Cornelia 








2 1.108 0.863 
Sealand 
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